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AN INQUIRY INTO THE RIGHT OF
CRIMINAL JURIES TO DETERMINE THE
LAW IN COLONIAL AMERICA
STANTON D. KRAUSS"
It was late August, 1814. The British army had scattered the
American force at Bladensburg, burned the Capitol, the Execu-
tive Mansion (which has been known as the White House since
the soot was painted over), and much of official Washington.
The road to Baltimore was open, and the northward march was
on.
During the redcoats' advance, four stragglers and a deserter
were taken into custody by civilians from a nearby town that had
previously surrendered to the British. When the invaders
learned of this treachery, they took hostages and warned that
the town would be razed and the townspeople killed if the five
"Professor of Law, Quinnipiac College; B.A. 1975, Yale College; J.D. 1978, Univer-
sity of Michigan. This article is part of a larger study of the historical right of Ameri-
can criminal juries to determine the law. That project has benefited from the
generous support of Quinnipiac College School of Law and from a grant from Wash-
ington University School of Law. The questions and comments of participants in col-
loquia at Quinnipiac College School of Law, Boston University School of Law, and
the University of Cincinnati College of Law have contributed greatly to the develop-
ment of my work. I have also been helped immeasurably by the staffs of Yale Univer-
sity's Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library and the Historical Societies of
Maryland, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania, and by librarians Cristina DeLucia, Linda
Holt, Peggy McDermott, and Mary Beth Reid, who have devoted a considerable
amount of their time to helping me track down old books, pamphlets, and other pa-
pers, without ever losing their good cheer. Finally, I am deeply indebted to Akhil
Amar, Stuart Banner, Stephen Gilles, Tom Green, Charles Heckman, Nancy King,
Dave Konig, Bruce Mann, Linda Meyer, Frank Miller, and Kitty Preyer, each of whom
was kind enough to read and comment on at least one draft of this paper. It is a
much better article because of their criticisms and suggestions. Unfortunately, I have
only myself to blame for its remaining flaws.
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men were not returned by the following noon. Leaders of the
defenseless town, includingJohn Hodges, decided to capitulate.
Hodges, along with others, was directed to satisfy the British
demands. He did so, putting the deserter in mortal danger, but
in the end the town was saved and no one was harmed.
A grateful federal government rewarded Hodges by charg-
ing him with treason.! Because the return of British troops
amounted to giving "aid and comfort" to the enemy,2 the only
issue at his trial was whether the underlying circumstances pro-
vided a good excuse for this conduct. Treason being defined by
Article 1I of the Constitution,3 this was ultimately a question of
constitutional law.
The prosecutor claimed that nothing but a threat to
Hodges' own life could justify his conduct,5 and he asked the
court for an instruction that Hodges' defense was legally insuffi-
cient. Defense counsel William Pinkney vigorously disputed this
view of the law in his closing argument. After giving the matter
'This account of Hodges' case is drawn from Report of the Trial ofJohn Hodges,
Esq., on a Charge of High Treason .... (1815) (S# 35768) [hereinafter Hodges' Trial].
A slightly abridged version of this report appears in 10 Am. St. Trials 163 (1815). A
much more abbreviated version can be found at 26 F. Cas. 332 (C.C.D. Md. 1815)
(No. 15,374). [Editors' Note: Charles Evans' AMERICAN BmIUOGRAPhiY (1903-1959),
Roger P. Bristol's SUPPLEMENT TO EvANs's AMERICAN BiBUOGRAPHY (1970), and Ralph
R. Shaw & Richard Shoemaker's AMERICAN BIBIOGRAPHY (19 vols. 1958-1963)" have
catalogued every book published in America before 1820. These catalogues list all
the libraries at which these scholars were able to find each book. Readex Microprint
Corp., in association with the American Antiquarian Society, has made microfiche
sets of all the locatable books in Evans or Shaw & Shoemaker's catalogues (the titles
of these respective microfiche sets are EARLYAMERCAN IMPRuINS and EARLYAMEPCAN
IMTRINTS SECOND SERIES). The author has included the catalogue number, preceded
by (Evans #) or (S #), whenever he cites to a book that has not been reprinted in
modem times.]
2 "Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them,
or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort." U.S. CONST. art. III,
§3.
'See id.
The prosecution was brought under a statute following the Treason Clause in
haec verba, Act of April 30, 1790, 1 Stat. 112, ch. 9, § 1, and no one suggested that
there was any difference in meaning between the two: In any event, were the Act to
have been broader in scope than the Clause, it would have been to that extent inva-
lid.
' This seems to have been a correct statement of the law, as interpreted by the
judges. See JAMES WIUARD HURST, THE LAW OF TREASON IN THE UNITED STATES:
COLLECrED ESSAYS 223 n.28 (1971).
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some thought, Supreme Court Justice Gabriel Duvall, one of
two judges presiding at this circuit court trial, told the jury that
he believed Hodges had no legally cognizable defense. He con-
tinued, however, by saying, "The jury are not bound to conform
to this opinion, because they have a right, in all criminal cases,
to decide on the law and the facts. 7 At this point, the other ju-
rist on the bench, District Judge James Houston, "said he did
not entirely agree with [Justice Duvall] in any, except the last
remark."8 Pinkney then arose again and addressed the jury.
"Gentlemen of the jury," he proclaimed, "The opinion which
[Justice Duvall] has just delivered [denying the validity of
Hodges' defense] is not, and I thank God for it, the law of this
land."9 Evidently the jury agreed, as Hodges was acquitted.
This incident bears vivid testimony to the fact that the jury
was once widely said to have the "right" to judge "the law and
the facts" in American criminal trials. Although Alexander
Hamilton once argued otherwise,10 that "right" imported more
6 Multi-member circuit courts vested with trial and appellate jurisdiction were cre-
ated by the judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 74, ch. 20, § 4 (1789). At the time Hodges'
case was tried, each circuit court consisted of one Supreme Court Justice and one
federal district court judge. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, THE LAW OF THE FEDERAL
CouRTs 4-6 (5th ed. 1994). For more on the historical use of multi-judge trial courts
in colonial America and the early Republic, see infra note 54 and accompanying text.
7 Hodges' Trial, supra note 1, at 28, 10 Am. St. Trials at 176, 26 F. Cas. at 334. Be-
fore the judges retired to consider the prosecutor's requested jury charge, indeed,
before arguments on the motion had begun, Pinkney questioned the propriety of the
court's giving binding instructions on the law at the request of the State. Presumably
speaking through Justice Duvall, "the Court said they were bound to declare the law
whenever they were called upon, in civil or criminal cases; in the latter, however, it
was also their duty to inform the jury that they were not obliged to take their direc-
tion as the law." Hodges Trial, supra note 1, at 20, 10 Am. St. Trials at 170, 26 F. Gas.
at 332. Thus, the comment quoted in the text doesn't simply reflect the view that a
jury must determine the law for itself when the judges are evenly divided. Similar
charges were given by federal judges in the absence of any division on the bench. See,
e.g., United States v. Hoxie, 26 F. Gas. 397, 402-03 (C.C.D. Vt. 1808) (No. 15,407).
' Hodges' Trial, supra note 1, at 28, 10 Am. St. Trials at 176, 26 F. Gas. at 334.
9 Hodges' Trial, supra note 1, at 28, 10 Am. St. Trials at 176, 26 Fed. Cas. at 335.
'0 See People v. Croswell, 3 Johns. 336, 355, 362 (N.Y. 1804); GEORGE CAINES, THE
SPEECHES AT FULL LENGTH OF MR. VAN NESS .... AND GENERAL HAMILTON, IN THE GREAT
CAUSE OF THE PEOPLE AGANSTHARRY CROswELL ... 72, 75-76 (1804), reprinted in 1 THE
LEGAL PAPERS OF ALExANDER HAMILTON, at 823, 828-29 (Julius Goebel ed., 1964). See
also 16 Am. St. Trials 40, 66-67, 72-73 (1804).
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than even an unchecked power. A moment's reflection identi-
fies both the distinction and its significance.
A spiteful or malicious jury has the power to convict a de-
fendant it does not believe to have been proven guilty of the
crime charged, and its verdict will generally stand if there is
enough record evidence to allow a reasonable person to believe
the defendant guilty. A perverse or puckish acquittal of a de-
fendant whom the jury believes to have been proven guilty be-
yond a reasonable doubt will also stand. In neither case will the
jurors who rendered the improper verdict be subject to pun-
ishment. Of course, as the fact that you did not blink at my use
of the word "improper" in the last sentence shows, this does not
mean that juries have a right to decide criminal cases without
regard to the facts; it just means that they have the power to do
so, and that in some cases that power is absolute. Moreover, just
as the commonality of political corruption doesn't make graft a
right, the frequency of convictions of defendants believed byju-
ries to be innocent wouldn't make it [a] right."
Juries have a similar power to decide for themselves what le-
gal principles should govern decisions in criminal cases and to
implement them. They have the power, that is, to decide what
the applicable substantive rules are, what those rules mean,
whether they are legally valid (i.e., constitutional), and .whether
(despite their validity) they should be followed.12 And some-
times that power-like the factfinding power-is absolute.
It matters whether the jury's exercise of this lawfinding
power is considered rightful or a dereliction of duty. For one
thing, if the former view were accepted, courts presumably
would be forbidden to strip juries of everyone unwilling to im-
plement the judges' opinions on the law.1 3 Beyond that, as the
" Indeed, if Hamilton really believed that an unchecked power is a right, it is hard
to see how he could have denied that Parliament had the right to pass the legislation
that the colonists said caused and justified the Revolution.
12 The first three of these powers are shared with judges. The fourth parallels the
prosecutor's discretion not to charge people believed to be demonstrably guilty of
violating valid criminal laws.
" While jurors whose voir dire testimony manifests a commitment to reject (or to
follow) the judges' law might be excludable for cause in ajurisdiction recognizing the
criminal jury's lawfinding authority (on the theory that they had prejudged the case),
[Vol. 89
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televised jury deliberations in Wisconsin v. Reid so graphically
showed,14 juries are uncomfortable about breaking the rules.
And a jury that is told it has the right to determine the. law (as
was Hodges') will probably approach its job differently than one
that is not, or is told otherwise."5 Indeed, it is for just these rea-
sons that virtually all American judges now refuse to give16 -and
groups like the Fully Informed Jury Association (FIJA) are cam-
paigning to require that juries be given 17 -istructions telling
jurors that they may nullify (i.e., refuse to enforce) valid laws.
They are doubtless also among the reasons why Justice Duvall
gave the charge he gave in Hodges.
jurors vested with such authority couldn't be dismissed because they decided during
their deliberations on a case not to follow the judge's charge on the law. Cf United
States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606 (2d Cir. 1997) (approving the removal ofjurors on this
basis).
" These deliberations, along with the trial in Reid's case, were broadcast on the
PBS television program Frontline: Inside the Jury Room (PBS television broadcast, April
8, 1986).
,- See VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VmMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 158-60 (1986); Irwin A
Horowitz, Jury Nullification: The Impact ofJudicial Instructions, Arguments, and Challenges
on Jury Decision Making, 12 LAW& HUM. BHAnv. 439 (1988); Irwin A. Horowitz, The Ef-
fect ofJuy Nullification Instructions on Verdicts and Jury Functioning in Criminal Trials, 9
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 25 (1985); GaryJacobsohn, The Right to Disagree:Judges, Juries, and
the Administration of Criminal Justice in Maryland, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 571.
6 The leading modem decision is United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1117,
1130-37 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (affirming trial court's refusal to inform the jury of power to
nullify law). Recent federal appellate cases taking this position are listed in United-
States v. Edwards, 101 F.3d 17, 19-20 (2nd Cir. 1996). Among the many contemporary
state court cases endorsing this view are People v. Dillon, 668 P.2d 697, 726 n.39 (Cal.
1983), and State v. Bjerkaas, 472 N.W.2d 615, 619-20 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991) (collecting
cases). But see State v. Bonacorsi, 648 A.2d 469 (N.H. 1994) (holding that approved
model charge saying jury "must" acquit if reasonable doubt about guilt, but "should"
convict if none, properly and adequately informs jury of nullification power, though
noting that "nullification is neither a right of the defendant nor a defense recognized
by law"). But cf., People v. Goetz, 532 N.E.2d 1273 (N.Y. 1988) (upholding instruc-
tion thatjury "must" convict if elements proven beyond reasonable doubt).
17 On FIJA's activities, see Nancy J. King, Silencing Nullification Advocacy Inside the
Juy Room and Outside the Courtroom, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 433, 434-35, 439-41, 482-94
(1998); Alan W. Scheflin &Jon M. Van Dyke, Merciful Juries: The Resilience ofJury Nulli-
fication, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 165, 176-79 (1991); M. Kristine Creagan, Note, Jury
Nullification: Assessing Recent Legislative Developments, 43 CASE W. REs. L. Ray. 1101,
1115-1130 (1993); ErickJ. Haynie, Comment, Populism, Free Speech, and the Rule of Law:
the "Fully Informed"Juy Movement and Its Implications, 88J. Crim. L. & Criminology, 343
(1998); NancyJ. King, We, The Jury, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 165, 171 (1995) (book review).
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No judge in England is known ever to have given such a
charge. It seems that English courts have always held that juries
are obligated to follow their instructions on the law in criminal,
as well as civil, cases.18 We don't know when, where, or why Brit-
ish North Americans first decided otherwise. However, the con-
ventional wisdom is that their juries acquired the right to
determine the law as well as the facts in colonial times and that,
while they lost that right in civil cases somewhat earlier, they re-
tained it in criminal cases until well into the nineteenth century.
This view has it thatJustice Joseph Story's circuit court decision
in Battiste v. United States 9 and a later series of opinions by Chief
Justice Lemuel Shaw of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court0 inspired an almost irresistible judicial crusade against
the criminal petitjury's lawfinding function. The coup de grace is
said to have been delivered in 1895 by the Supreme Court in
Sparf and Hansen v. United States.
21
The fons et origio of this understanding of American jury his-
tory is Justice Horace Gray's dissenting opinion in Sparf and
Hansen2 That opinion, which drew heavily upon an essay writ-
ten thirty years earlier by Samuel Quincy,5 set out exhaustively
'8 Regarding criminal cases, see generally, J. S. COCKBURN & THOMAS A. GREEN,
TWELVE GOOD MEN AND TRUE: THE CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY IN ENGLAND, 1200-1800
(1988); THOMAS A. GREEN, VERDICr ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE (1985). As for civil
cases, see Edith Guild Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 50 HARV.
L. REV. 289, 299-317 (1966).
'9 24 F. Cas. 1042 (C.C.D. Mass. 1835) (No. 14,545).
See Commonwealth v. Anthes, 74 Mass. (5 Gray) 185 (1857); Commonwealth v.
Abbott, 54 Mass. (13 Met.) 120 (1847); Commonwealth v. Porter, 51 Mass. (10 Met.)
263 (1846).
2' 156 U.S. 51 (1895). It remains the stated doctrine in Georgia, Indiana, and
Maryland that ajury has the right to judge the law and the facts in a criminal case, al-
though that right has been wholly gutted in the first two states and only a bit less so in
the third. SeeAlbertW. Alschuler &Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Juy
in the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 911 (1994). There are also (meaningless)
provisions like TENN. CONST. art. I, § 19 ("in all indictments for libel, the jury shall
have a right to determine the law and the facts, under the direction of the court, as in
other criminal cases") and OR. CONST. I, § 16 ("In all criminal cases whatever, the jury
shall have the right to determine the law, and the facts under the direction of the
Court as to the law").
156 U.S. 51, 110-83 (1895) (Gray,J., dissenting).
Samuel M. Quincy, Powers and Rights ofJuries, in JOSIAH QUINCY, JR., REPORTS OF
CASES ARGUED AND ADJUDGED IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OFJUDICATURE OF THE PROVINCE
OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY, BETWEEN 1761 AND 1772, at 558-72 (Samuel M. Quincy ed.,
[Vol. 89
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to recount the story of the criminal jury's lawfinding authority
in Anglo-American law. It concluded that, "from the time of
[America's] settlement until more than half a century after the
Declaration of Independence, the law as to the rights of juries,
as generally understood and put in practice, was more in accord
with the views of' the British proponents of the jury lawfinding
right than the views of its opponents.24 In fact, Gray identified
only one possible exception to "the almost unanimous voice of
earlier and nearly contemporaneous [(with the adoption of the
Constitution) ] judicial declarations and practical usage."21 Driv-
ing his point home, he emphatically summed up his findings in
the following language:
Until nearly forty years after the adoption of the Constitution of the
United States, not a single decision of the highest court of any State, or
of anyjudge of a court of the United States, has been found, denying the
right of the jury upon the general issue in a criminal case to decide, ac-
cording to their own judgment and consciences, the law involved in that
issue-except ... two or three cases ... concerning the constitutionality
of a statute.
These caveats aside, Gray recorded only two instances before
1830 in which any American judge disavowed the jury's right to
"determine the law and the facts" in a criminal case: Pennsylva-
nia common pleas judge Alexander Addison did so in the 1790s
and two New York Supreme Court Justices followed suit in the
1865). (Although no one seems to want to give him the credit for writing this essay,
see MORTON H. SMrrH, THE Warrs OF AssisTANCE CAsE 180 n.70 (1978); Editorial Note,
in 1 LEGAL PAPERS oFJoHN ADAMS 214 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965);
Rene B. Lettow, New Trial for Verdict Against Law: Judge-Juiy Relations in Early Nine-
teenth-Centuiy America, 71 NoTRF DAME L. Rxv. 505, 516-18 (1996), Samuel M. Quincy
appears to have been its author. See Quincy's Reports iv.)
Justice Gray contributed a study of the writs of assistance to Quincy's Reports, see
id., and he was obviously far more intimately familiar with Quincy's essay than one
might infer from the single explicit reference to it in his dissent in Sparf and Hansen.
See 156 U.S. at 146 (GrayJ., dissenting).
2' 156 U.S. at 142 (GrayJ, dissenting).
Id. at 169. Oddly enough, this possible exception was colonial Rhode Island. See
id. at 146; but see infra text accompanying notes 312-27.
156 U.S. at 168 (GrayJ, dissenting).
1998]
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famous Croswell libel case in 1804.27 However, these exceptions
seemed to prove the rule, as Addison was impeached on appar-
ently related grounds in 180328 and the instructions reported to
have been delivered in criminal cases in New York courts be-
tween Croswell and Battiste, like the 1735 Zenger libel case,29
seemed to show those courts' acceptance of the lawfinding
right.30
The second pillar of the current understanding of the
criminal jury's historical lawfinding function is a 1939 article by
Mark DeWolfe Howe.1 Accepting Gray's claim thatjuries were
once acknowledged to have the right to judge the law in crimi-
nal cases, Howe set out to examine "the processes by which...
[that] right has been destroyed." 2 Although it wasn't part of his
stated mission to do so, Howe added significantly to Justice
Gray's treatment of the history of this right before its "demise."
He more closely examined its status in pre-Revolutionary times,
adducing evidence of its recognition in colonial New England
and Pennsylvania23 and (while noting that the matter had not
been "conclusively settled by accepted practice" in Massachu-
setts Bay Colony34) suggesting that colonial practice was the rea-
son for its presence elsewhere after the Revolution.35 He also
presented evidence that, in some of the newly independent
states, this right was embraced at an earlier date than Gray's
People v. Croswell, 3Johns. Cas. 336 (N.Y. 1804). See 156 U.S. at 148, 151 (Gray,
J., dissenting). Gray's inconclusive evidence from colonial Rhode Island, see supra
note 25 and accompanying text, consisted of the acts discussed below in notes 313-14
and the accompanying text and a further statute guaranteeing trial by jury.
2' SeeTHE TRIAL OFAIEXANDERADDISON (Thomas Lloyd ed., 1803) (S# 3631).
Rex v. Zenger (1735). This case is reported in JAMES ALEXANDER, A BRIEF
NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OFJOHN PETER ZENGER, PRINTER OF THE NEW YORK
WEExLYJOURNAL (Stanley Nider Katz ed., Belknap Press 1972) (1736). It also appears
in 17 Howell's St. Trials 675 (1735), and at 16 Am. St. Trials 1 (1735). For a discus-
sion of the Zengercase, see infra text accompanying notes 289-93.
See 156 U.S. at 146-50 (Gray, J., dissenting).
,Mark DeWolfe Howe, Juries As Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARV. L. REv. 582
(1939).
12 Id at 590.
See iai at 591, 594-95, 601.
Id. at 605.
See i at 590.
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authorities established. 6 Finally, he cited the House of Repre-
sentatives' debate on the Sedition Act of 179837 as evidence of
the general acceptance of the jury's right to judge the law in the
Federalist Era8
In recent years, the role of the American criminal jury-in-
cluding its place in judging the law-has received a lot of schol-
arly attention.N Much has been written on the history of its
right to determine the law as well as the facts of any case en-
trusted to it, but this literature includes very little new research
on the subject. Rather, these works tend to do little more than
cite the two "authoritative" texts or review the most prominent
authorities mentioned by Quincy, Gray, and Howe. Still, al-
though Howe warned that his evidence of colonial criminal jury
practice was "spotty",40 recognized that he knew little about the
criminal jury's lawfinding authority in most states in the early
Republic, 4' and stressed that his suggestions about early doctrine
were merely that,42 modem scholars generally write as if these
three men possessed comprehensive knowledge of the relevant
data and it conclusively proved that the authority of American
juries to judge the law in criminal cases was well-established
even before the Revolution.
"See, e.g., i& at 597 n.58 (citing GA. CONsT. art. 41 (1777)).
17 Act ofJuly 14, 1798, ch.124, 1 Stat. 596.
"See Howe, supra note 31, at 586-88.
"In the wake of such media events as the trials of O.J. Simpson, William Kennedy
Smith, the Menendez brothers, and the police officers who beat Rodney King, the
public's attention, too, has been focused on the criminaljury. Some segments of the
public have even taken an active interest of late in the criminal jury's right to deter-
mine the law. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
40 Howe, sura note 31, at 590.
4, See, e.g., id at 594-95 (Pennsylvania), 596-97 n.57 (New York and Virginia), and
605-06 (Massachusetts). Moreover, Howe never mentioned the status of the jury law-
finding doctrine in Delaware, the Carolinas, or Kentucky in the article. Nor did he
say anything about jury practice in early Maryland, or in Tennessee before 1832.
4, See, e.g., id. at 590-92, 594-95, 606.
4' See, e.g., JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF
DEMOCRACY 30-31, 37, 63-64, 75-76 (1994); DAVIDJ. BODENHAMER, FAIR TRIAL: RIGHTS
OF THE ACCUSED IN AMERICAN HISTORY 61 (1992); NORMANJ. FINKEL, COMMONSENSE
JusncE: JuRoRs' NOTIONS OF THE LAw 30 (1995);JOHN GUINTHER, THEJURYIN AMERICA
221 (1988); FORREST McDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS
OF THE CONSTITUTION 40-41 (1985); LLOYD E. MOORE, THE JURY: TOOL OF KINGS,
PALLADIUM OF LIBER Y 104-08 (2d ed. 1988); SHANNON C. STIMSON, THE AMERICAN
1998]
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REVOLUTION IN THE LAw (1990); Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 21, at 902-21; RonaldJ.
Bacigal, Putting the People Back into the Fourth Amendment, 62 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 359,
367-78 (1994); Todd Barnet, New York ConsidersJury Nullification: Informing the Jury of
Its Common Law Right to Decide Both Facts and Law, 65 N.Y. ST. BJ., Nov. 1993, 40, 40-41;
Raoul Berger, Justice Samuel Chase v. ThomasJefferson: A Response to Stephen Presser, 1990
BYU L. REV. 873, 887-90; David C. Brody, Sparf and Dougherty Revisited: Why the Court
Should Instruct the Jury of its Nullification Right, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 89, 93-95 (1995);
Darryl K. Brown, jury Nullification Within the Rule of Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1149,
1154-55 (1997); Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal
Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 700-03 (1995); Lawrence W. Crispo et al.,jury Nullifi-
cation: Law Versus Anarchy, 31 Loy. LA. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1997); W. William Hodes, Lord
Brougham, the Dream Team, and Jury Nullification of the Third Kind, 67 U. COLO. L. REV.
1075, 1088 (1996); Andrew D. Leipold, RethinkingJury Nullification, 82 VA. L. REv. 253,
287-88 (1996); Gerard N. Magliocca, The Philosopher's Stone: Dualist Democracy and the
Jury, 69 U. COLO. L. REv. 176, 190-91 & n.80 (1998); David Millon, Juries, Judges, and
Democracy, 18 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 135, 136-38 (1993); MichaelJ. Saks, Judicial Nullifica-"
tion, 68 IND. LJ. 1281, 1284-85 (1993); Alan W. Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right to
Say No, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 168, 174, 177 (1972); Alan W. Scheflin &Jon M. Van Dyke,
Jury Nullification: The Contours of A Controversy, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1980,
51, 56-58.; Phillip B. Scott, Jury Nullification: An Historical Perspective on a Modern Debate,
91 W.VA. L. REv. 389, 416-17 (1989); GaryJ. Simson, Jury Nullfication in the American
System: A Skeptical View, 54 TEx. L. REV. 488, 496-98 (1976); Development in the Law-
The Civil fury, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1408, 1417-20 (1997); Creagan, supra note 17, at
1109-11; R. Alex Morgan, Note, Jury Nullification Should Be Made a Routine Part of the
Criminal Justice System, but It Won't Be, 29 ARiz. ST. L.J. 1127, 1130 (1997); Steven M.
Warshawsky, Note, Opposing Jury Nullification: Law, Policy, and Prosecutorial Strategy, 85
GEO. LJ. 191, 198-201 (1996); Note, Jury Nullification: The Forgotten Right, 7 NEW ENG.
L. REv. 105, 107-10 (1971); Note, The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century,
74YALEL.J. 170, 170, 172-74 (1964).
The work of William E. Nelson, WLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE
CoMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOC T', 1760-1830
(1975) [hereinafter NELSON I]; William E. Nelson, The Eighteenth-Century Background
ofJohn Marshalls Constitutional Jurisprudence, 76 MICH. L. REv. 893 (1978) [hereinafter
Nelson H], is in two respects an important exception to this rule. In the first place,
he has done significant original research on the historical power of juries to deter-
mine the law in the colonies, which he relates to their right to do so. In the second
place, his work has become part of the canon. I do not mention him at this point in
the text, however, because his work has focused so greatly on civil jury power, rather
than on criminal jury rights. Nonetheless, the discussion in this article of things like
the difference between power and right, see supra text accompanying notes 10-17,
and some of the "resistable temptations", see infra text accompanying notes 62-85, is
in good part a response to Nelson's remarkable work. I will have more to say about it
below, in notes 387-90 and accompanying text.
Another exception worthy of note is the small group of contrarians (and they are
hard to find today) who challenge the view that colonial criminal juries had the right
to judge the law. The most striking thing about their work is that they, too, don't
seem to deny the completeness of the canonical body of research. Thus, Hiller B.
Zobel's Some Agonies and Misuses of Legal History, 50 N. ENG. L.Q. 138, 147 n.21 (1977),
questions the authority of criminal juries to determine law in colonial Massachusetts,
but does so on the basis of evidence within this corpus. And Stephen Presser, who
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If American criminal juries had this right from colonial
times until the mid-nineteenth century, several important con-
sequences might follow. On the one hand, a powerful origi-
nalist argument could be made that the criminal jury's right to
determine the law is of constitutional dimension." On the
other hand, even if the courts were to prove unreceptive to an
originalist argument of this sort,4 the existence of a tradition
pre-dating the founding of the Nation might lend a greater
sense of legitimacy (and more political force) to campaigns like
the one now being waged to obtain statutory recognition of the
criminal jury's right to nullify the law.46
But does the prevailing view of jury history square with the
historical record? Was the criminaljury's right to determine the
law as well as the facts widely recognized in colonial times? Or
was it forged in the crucible of the Revolution, or even later?
Indeed, was there ever "a" jury lawfinding doctrine? If so, what
was it? And was it really universally accepted law until the
1830s?
In this article, I will begin to address these questions by ex-
amining the doctrinal history of the right to judge the law in the
colonial periodY. My conclusion is that the published records I
appears to believe that colonial criminal juries-at least outside of Massachusetts, Vir-
ginia, and Pennsylvania-were never authorized to reject the judges' law, provides no
justification whatsoever for his skepticism.. See STEPHEN B. PRESSER, THE ORIGINAL
MINERSTANDING: THE ENGLISH, THE AMERICANS, AND THE DIALECTIC OF FEDERALIST
JURISPRUDENCE 109-12, 125, 128-29, 137-40, 185 (1991) [hereinafter PRESSER I]; Ste-
phen B. Presser, Et tu Raoul? or The Original Misunderstanding Misundertood, 1991
BYU L. REv. 1475, 1486-88 [hereinafter Presser II].
" Indeed, Raoul Berger, for one, has made it. See Berger, supra note 43, at 887-90.
It might be argued, for example, that, whatever the intent of the generation that
adopted Article III's jury clause and the Sixth Amendment, the original understand-
ing was supplanted by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of
Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1195 (1991). Or that originalism is not the
proper mode of constitutional interpretation.
See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
4 As noted above, see supra note *, this article is part of a larger study of the history
of the American criminal jury's right to determine the law. Although a comprehen-
sive understanding of the criminal jury's lawfinding role would include an examina-
tion of what the law has said about what these juries were supposed to do, what they
have done, and how the courts and the public have reacted to both, the focus of my
present research is exclusively on the first of these issues. In this article, I examine
the criminal jury's formal lawfinding authority in the colonial period. In the next
piece in this series, I will explore the criminal jury's formal lawfinding authority from
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have studied 48 do not support the conventional wisdom. In fact,
this data only proves that the criminal jury's right in any real
sense to determine the law was firmly established in one colony,
offbeat Rhode Island. While there is sporadic evidence that
criminal juries may have had some form of lawfinding authority
at times in colonial Pennsylvania and New York, there is at least
as strong an indication that they had no such right for much of
the colonial era in Georgia, Maryland, and Massachusetts. For
the most part, however, we just don't know enough to say what
lawfinding authority colonial criminal juries had.49 Nonetheless,
given the prominence of the discussion of history in the current
debates about jury nullification,50 it is important to note that the
evidence reviewed in this paper quite strongly indicates that
these juries had no right to nullify laws they deemed valid. In-
deed, there is no indication that any colonist even suggested
that such authority existed.
the outbreak of the Revolution until the Revolution of 1800. Later installments will
consider issues such as the significance of Joseph Story's decisions in this field and
the implications of certain developing rules of evidence (e.g., relevancy rules) and
jury selection (i.e., rules authorizing the exclusion for cause of prospective jurors un-
willing to be bound by the judges' law) for the statedjury lawfinding doctrine.
" My study has largely been limited to the published historical record. Even with
respect to that data base, it is not complete: for example, I haven't reviewed all of the
surviving colonial newspapers. Such a survey, like a systematic review of unpublished
manuscripts (including, but not limited to, court papers, lawyers' and judges' note-
books, and diaries), would certainly shed greater light upon this problem. I have be-
gun to review all of these materials, and some of my findings are reported here. But
this research is far from complete.
49 As is implied in the text accompanying note 12, above, lawfinding authority
could be of various kinds. It should be borne in mind, however, that judges or others
who said (or denied) thatjuries had a right to determine the law may not have meant
any of these things, but something else-i.e., that a jury had the right to return a gen-
eral verdict, which was to be reached by applying the judges' law to the facts found by
the jury. (That is how Stephen Presser claimsJustice Samuel Chase understood this
maxim at the turn of the nineteenth century. See PRESSERI, supra note 43, at 111, 128-
29, 137-38, 185; Presser U1, supra note 43, at 1488.)
As the titles of the works listed in note 43 suggest, scholarly discussion of the his-
tory of the criminal jury's right to find the law is mainly found in pieces on jury nulli-
fication, and papers on jury nullification generally discuss that history. This is also
true of court decisions, examples of which are cited in note 16. With respect to the




John Lilburne is the first person known to have argued in
an English court that a petit jury has the right to determine the
law and the facts of a case entrusted to its charge."' Although
this claim was rejected by the judges in England in Lilburne's
1649 treason trial and every other case in which it was ever
made, the idea would not die. Rather, it spread-even across the
Atlantic, where the issue was joined in many colonial American
courts before the end of the century. In the years leading up to
1776, American Whigs became more and more convinced of the
virtue of trial by jury in civil and criminal cases at least in part
because juries throughout the thirteen colonies used their for-
midable powers to prevent the enforcement of unpopular Brit-
ish laws.5 2 Moreover, London's threats-and actual attempts-
to bypass these juries helped bring about the Revolution, as well
as the many jury-related provisions in the Constitution and the
Bill of Rights. 53 But had colonial legal systems embraced ajury
lawfinding doctrine? Were these juries understood to be rebel-
ling or doing their job?
Howe had it right when he noted that our knowledge of co-
lonial criminal procedure is fragmentary. We do know that
criminal trials were a lot different than they are now. These tri-
als were generally conducted before multi-judge tribunals. 4
51 For a report of this argument, see Rex v. Lilburne, 4 Howell's St. Trials 1270,
1379-81, 1400-03 (1649). As to its primacy, see GREEN, supra note 18, at 153, 175. But
see infra text accompanying notes 148-60.
5' See, e.g., Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 21, at 871-75; Stephan Landsman, The Civil
Jury in America: Scenes From an Unappreciated Histo", 44 HAsTINGs L.J. 579, 595-96
(1993).
'- See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI, VII; JOHN PH=
REID, CONSITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORTY OF
RIGHTS 190-92 (1986); Landsman, supra note 52, at 595-600; Colleen P. Murphy, Inte-
grating the Constitutional Authority of Civil and Criminal juries, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
723, 742-45 (1993).
', See, e.g., Nelson I, supra note 43, at 3, 26, 166-68; Nelson II, supra note 43, at 911;
Wilfred J. Ritz, REWRITING THE HISTORY OF TIE JUDICIARY ACr OF 1789: ExPOSING
MyTHS, CHALLENGING PREMISES, AND USING NEW EVIDENCE 10, 27-30, 36 (Wythe Holt &
L.H. LaRue eds. 1990). This continued to be a common practice through the early
nineteenth century, perhaps the most well-known instance of which being the federal
circuit courts mentioned in connection with Hodges. See supra note 6.
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Judges and jurors could question witnesses5 5 In some colonies,
statutes gave jurors the right to seek advice from anyone they
wished, as long as they did so in open court. 6 Jurors could hear
debates about the admissibility of evidence 7 and about the law.5
Jurors also might have heard defendants speak in their own be-
half, but not under oath. 9 What jurors might not have heard,
particularly in trials for minor crimes, was a defense lawyer.6 At
times, judges even had the right to refuse to accept verdicts-
acquittals as well as convictions-they thought were wrong.6'
There is, however, a lot about colonial criminal procedure
that we don't know at all, or with any certainty. With respect to
the question at hand, in fact, the extent of our ignorance is truly
breathtaking. We are sorely lacking in direct evidence of the
scope of the jury's authority in most of the colonies; the circum-
"' See, e.g., The Trials of Major Stede Bonnet, and Thirty-three Others .... for Pi-
racy, 15 Howell's St. Trials 1231, 1270, 4Am. St. Trials 652, 684 (1718).
16 See infra text accompanying notes 260, 357. But see infra text accompanying note
266.
" See, e.g., 1 PAUL M. HAmuN & CHARLES E. BAKER, SUPREME COURT OFJUDICATUREF
OFT-HE PRovi CE O NEwYoRK 1691-1704, at 214 (1959). On the corresponding prac-
tice in eighteenth-century England, seeJohn H. Langbein, HistoricalFoundations of the
Law of Evidence: A View From the Ryder Sources, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1168, 1188-89 (1996).
8Since the admissibility of evidence might depend upon the content of the sub-
stantive law, evidentiary motions were one setting in which juries might have heard
debates about the substantive law. These might also have been heard before, or in
lieu of, ajury charge.
" See generally, John H. Langbein, The Historical Origins of the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination at Common Law, 92 Mxcs. L. REv. 1047 (1994); Eben Moglen, Taking the
Fifth: Reconsidering the Origins of the Constitutional Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 92
MICH. L. REv. 1086 (1994).
6' See Moglen, supra note 59. But see W. Roy Smith, SOUTH CAROLINA AS A ROYAL
PROvINCE 127-28 (1903); David H. Flaherty, Criminal Practice.in Provincial Massachu-
setts, in LAW IN COLONIAL MASSACHUSETrS 1630-1800, at 191, 205-16 (Daniel Coquil-
lette ed., 1984).
" See infra notes 90, 105, 121-28, 130-33, 148-49, 195, 234-35, 257, 267, 288, 306,
309, 323-26, 335-36, 351-53, 358, 361-64 and accompanying text. A study of how and
why American judges lost this power would be a valuable, and interesting, contribu-
tion to the literature. (Oddly enough, the earliest American criticism of this practice
that I have found was made in the Loyalist press during the Revolution. See Char-
lestown, April 6, The Royal Gazette (Charlestown, S.C.), Apr. 3-6, 1782, at 3.) On the
corresponding practice in England, see John H. Langbein, Shaping the Eighteenth-
Century Criminal Trial: A View From the Ryder Sources, 50 U. CHa. L. REV. 1, 118-19
(1983), and John H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial before the Lauyers, 45 U. CH. L. REV.
263, 291-95 (1978).
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stantial evidence, while somewhat more abundant, is largely in-
conclusive; and a number of seductive gap-filling hypotheses
must be rejected.
A. ASSUMPTIONS WE MUST REJECT
First, the resistible temptations. To begin with, we may not
simply assume that all of the colonies expected criminal juries
to do the same thing.62 The thirteen colonies had very different
histories and characters. Moreover, we know that they did not
always have the same attitude toward criminal juries. Thus, for a
time. in the seventeenth century, jury trial was nonexistent in
New Haven, disfavored for non-capital offenses in Massachusetts
Bay and Connecticut, and favored for all crimes in Rhode Is-
land.6 ' Neither did the colonies that did use criminal juries em-
ploy uniform rules of jury practice. For instance, judges gave
these juries instructions on the law in some colonies, but not in
all of them.r Even in the former group of colonies, there is no
reason to assume that this diversity didn't carry over to the ques-
tion of the jury's right to determine the law.6 Nor may we as-
sume that jury lawfinding doctrine was uniform over time or
unidirectional in development within any single colony.
This leads to a further point. We may not simply project
onto these colonies the jury practices they followed after the
Declaration of Independence, as Howe would have us do. This
is so for two reasons. To begin with, we know just as little about
the jury lawfinding doctrine prevailing in many of the new states
between 1776 and the Revolution of 1800 as we know about the
doctrine prevailing in them before the Revolution of 1776.5
Beyond this, while inertia is a powerful force in law as elsewhere,
the successful rebellion from England provides ample reason to
doubt the continuity of lawfinding doctrine. For one thing,
" Kathryn Preyer makes a similar point in Penal Measures in the American Colonies:
An Overview, 26 AM.J. LEGAL HIsr. 326, 326 (1982).
' See generallyJohn M. Murrin, Magistrates, Sinners, and a Precarious Liberty: Trial by
Jury in Seventeenth-Centuy New England, in SAINTS & REVOLUTIONARIES: ESSAys ON EARLY
AMIcAN HIoRY 152-206 (David D. Hall, et al. eds., 1984).
Compare infra text accompanying notes 265 and 316-17.
As Hodges' case shows, instructions need not be meant to bind the jury.
See supra note 47.
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many of the new states enrobed newjudges after Independence,
many of whom were non-lawyers ignorant of prior practice and
disinterested in, if not downright contemptuous of, lawyer's
law.67 Even when these judges knew what colonial jury practice
was, anti-British sentiment ran so high among the patriots that
the judges might have replaced British lawfinding doctrine with
a practice more reflective of the prevailing revolutionary demo-
cratic impulses.r8 More broadly, those same impulses may also
have prompted the adoption of provisions like Article Forty-One
of the Georgia Constitution of 1777, which states, "The jury
shall be the judges of law, as well as fact, and shall not be al-
lowed to bring in a special verdict...,69 On the other hand, the
6 7 We are sorely lacking in systematic studies of the impact of the Revolution on the
membership andjurisprudence of colonial judiciaries. In fact, there is no colony for
which such a history has been written. We do, however, have some indications of the
turnover (or continuity) of membership on individual courts. See, e.g., WILLIAM
PLUMER, JR., LIFE OF WILLIAM PLUMER 150 (A. P. Peabody ed., 1857) (New Hampshire
Supreme Court); ALFRED B. STREET, THE COUNCI OF REVISON OF THE STATE OF NEW
YORK 50-60 (1859) (New York Supreme Court); William E. Nelson, Emerging Notions of
Modern Criminal Law in the Revolutionary Era: An Historical Perspective, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV.
450, 452 n.7 (1967) (Middlesex, Massachussets County courts); John Whitehead, The
Supreme Court of New Jersey 3 THE GREEN BAG 401, 402-04 (1891); John D. Cushing, A
Revolutionary Conservative: The Public Life of William Cushing, 1732-1810, at 92,
100-05 (unpublished dissertation on file with The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminol-
ogy) (Massachusetts Superior Court ofJudicature); cf CHARLES WARREN, A HISTORY OF
TiE AMERICAN BAR 212-14 (William S. Hein & Co. 1990) (1961) (discussing effect of
Revolution on Massachusetts bar); John L. Langbein, Chancellor Kent and the History of
Legal Literatur 93 CoLUM. L. REv. 547, 553 n.29 (1993) (discussing effect of Revolu-
tion on membership of New York bar). On the pre- and post-Revolutionary practice
of using lay judges, see, e.g., FRANCIS R. AUMANN, THE CHANGING AMERICAN LEGAL
SYSTEM: SOME SELECTED PHASES 34-42 (1940), RICHARD E. ELLIS, TIE JEFFERSONiAN
CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE YOUNG REPUBLIC 115 (1971), PLUMER, supra, at
149-59, and Langbein, supra, at 567. On the hostility that some judges (and others)
felt towards a formal system of law (and procedure), see, e.g., PLUMER, supra, at 150-
58. On the relative lack of information about, and the resulting ignorance of, colo-
nial precedent after the Revolution, see, e.g, Langbein, supra, at 571.
6 See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 67, at 567-68. As William Nelson has observed,
even without regard to any such antipathy, judges in the newly independent states felt
freer than colonial judges to reject British authority of which they disapproved. See
Nelson I, supra note 43, at 475-76.
69 GA. CONST. art. 41 (1777), which may be found at DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF THE
STATE OF GEORGIA 14 (Robert & George Watkins eds., 1800), reprinted in THE FIRST
LAWS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA-PART I (John D. Cushing comp., 1981). This surpris-
ing provision continues, "but if all, or any of the jury, have any doubts concerning
points of law, they shall apply to the bench, who shall each of them in rotation give
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fact that the end of Royal and Parliamentary authority over the
former colonies made them truly self-governing could have led
to the rejection of that view of the jury's right in jurisdictions in
which it had previously been held.
Fourth, we may not blithely project what little we know
about colonial civil jury practice onto criminaljuries. The rules
applicable to civil and criminal juries haven't always been the
same, and the differences haven't always cut the same way.
Consider a few pages of Connecticut legal history. In 1796,
Zephaniah Swift wrote that Connecticut judges gave juries in-
structions on the law before sending them out to deliberate in
criminal, but not civil, cases. By 1810, Swift could report that
the Superior Court judges (of whom he was one) 7' had started
giving such charges to civil juries and promulgated a rule re-
quiring that this be done by the presiding judge in every case. 72
Two years later, the legislature made this requirement statu-
tory.7s By 1821, the situation had so changed that the revised
laws of that year made it clear that while the charge in a crimi-
nal case should merely inform the jury of the judge's "opin-
ion[s]" about the law, the judge was supposed to "decide" the
law in civil cases and "direct the jury to find accordingly."7
While this shift from the greater regulation of criminal to civil
juries occurred after the Revolution, civil and criminal jury
practice differed in a non-uniform manner in some of the colo-
nies before the Revolution as well.75
their opinion." Id. For further speculation as to why this article was adopted, see infra
note 126.
70 See 2 ZEPHAMAH Swirr, A SySTEM OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECICUT 258-
59, 401 (Arno Press 1972) (1796).
" Swift was elected to the Superior Court in 1801 and served until 1819. He was
Chief Justice for the last four years of his tenure. See Simeon E. Baldwin, Zephaniah
Swift, in 2 GREAT AME ICA LAWYERs 99, 130-39 (William Draper Lewis ed., 1907).
See ZEPHANIAH SWIFt, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
CASES AND A TREATISE ON BiLs OF EXCHANGE AND PROMSSORY NOTES 169-70 (Arno
Press 1972) (1810). The rule can also be found at 3 Day's Reports 28 (1807).
7See 1812 Conn. Pub. Acts 106.
71 See 1821 Conn. Pub. Acts 49 & n.6, 174. (The chair, and most influential mem-
ber, of the three-person revisory committee, was Zephaniah Swift. See Baldwin, supra
note 71, at 140-41. Swift also wrote the notes accompanying the Code. See idL)
s Two examples should suffice. Colonial New York allowed courts to set aside
guilty verdicts, but it isn't clear that they could set aside civil verdicts. See Nelson II,
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Fifth, the fact that a colony allowed people to argue the law
before the jury wouldn't necessarily prove that its juries had the
right to determine the law.76 Thus, in the 1760 trial of some of
the soldiers charged in the Boston Massacre, 7 defense lawyer
Josiah Quincy told the jury what he believed the applicable law
to be, but he also admonished the jurors that they were bound
to follow the law they would receive from the Bench. Though
Justice Trowbridge told the jurors that Quincy was right about
their duty, neither he nor any of his brethren interfered with
Quincy or his co-counsel, John Adams, when they argued the
law to the jury.78 In the same vein, eighty-five years later the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court asserted that a criminal
jury must take its law from the court but held that a trial judge
had erred by barring the defense from arguing the law to the
jury.7 Of course, that case may reflect the Court's reluctance to
prohibit arguing law to juries before the lawfinding doctrine was
rejected in a holding of the Court. Still, the practice of arguing
the law before the jury may originally have developed because
colonial courts lacked the kind of motion practice we have to-
day or because of an affirmative sense that arguments about fac-
tual guilt had to be put into some legal context to make sense,80
rather than as a result of a belief in any jury lawfinding right.
supra note 43, at 915-16. Massachusetts Bay sometimes used attaint to attack civil, but
not criminal, verdicts. See Quincy, supra note 23, at 559-60.76 Nor would ajurisdiction's refusal to allow lawyers to argue law to the jury neces-
sarily mean that juries had no right to determine the law. Argument on the subject
might simply have been deemed unnecessary or an undue temptation to reject the
judge's opinion. Cf. United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1117, 1130-37 (D.C.
Cir. 1972) (affirming for these reasons trial court's refusal to allow counsel to inform
jury of its right to nullify the law). But see Virginia v. Zimmerman, 28 F. Cas. 1227
(C.C.D.C. 1802) (No. 16,968) (Cranch, J., dissenting) (arguing jury's right to deter-
mine law implies right to hear argument).
77 This case, Rex v. Wemms, and the incident mentioned in the text, are discussed
below. See text accompanying notes 378-86.
7 For more on Adams' views, see infra notes 391, 392 and accompanying text.
' Commonwealth v. Porter, 51 Mass. (10 Met.) 263 (1846).
'8 With respect to the former possibility, see supra, text accompanying note 57.
With respect to the latter, consider, for example, the following passage from the
opening argument of Massachusetts Attorney GeneralJames Sullivan in the 1805 rape
trial of Ephraim Wheeler:
[Vol. 89
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This leads to some final points. When there was no dispute
about the law, which was probably true in most cases, it wouldn't
have been necessary for the judges to say anything about the
law. Thus, we can't infer anything from the isolated, or even
routine, absence ofjury instructions on the law. Furthermore, if
this condition was sufficiently common, colonies may occasion-
ally have had no known "law" or "practice" with respect to the
right of the jury to determine the law in a criminal case. Third,
as previously noted, we can't infer from the fact that juries re-
turned verdicts inconsistent with their instructions that they had
a right to do so. Moreover, although the lack of judicial guid-
ance would have forced juries to decide the law as well as the
facts, the practice of giving legal instructions wouldn't necessar-
ily mean that juries were bound to obey them. Hodges' case
proves that.8' Nor would the fact that the members of a multi-
judge panel might give conflicting legal instructions necessarily
82
mean thatjuries were supposed to decide what the law was. Af-
ter all, the fact that United States Supreme Court Justices de-
liver conflicting opinions in a case does not mean that the lower
courts aren't bound by the Justices' views. This is so because the
Court acts by majority rule, a principle well known to colonial
Americans, who may have applied it in this context, as well. 3
It is my duty, as Attorney-General of the Commonwealth, to lay before you
the evidence which exists against [Wheeler]. Previous to which, it may be ex-
pected, that I shall give you some definition of the crime, with which he is
charged, and a general arrangement of the proof I am about to offer. This will
enable you to apply, or rather to understand, the propriety of the testimonies as
they may be given.
REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF EPHRAIM WHEELER... 8 (1805) (S# 9720).
" More generally, a "charge" might have been a purely hortatory command to "do
right," see, e.g., PLUMER, supra note 67, at 153-55, judicial advice on the law and/or
facts (as in Hodges' case), or a binding instruction (on either or both). See infra note
100.
"But see, e.g., NELSON I, supra note 43, at 3, 26; Nelson II, supra note 43, at 911-13.
83A number of colonies had statutes providing that judges' disagreements about
the law were to be resolved according to the majority rule principle. See, e.g., 1 THE
COLONIAL LAWS OF NEWYORK FROM Tm YEAR 1664 TO THE REVOLUTION 42 (Robert C.
Cumming ed., 1894) [hereinafter COLONiALNEWYORKLAWS], which is reproduced in
facsimile in THE EARLIST PRINTED) LAWS OF NEW YORK 1665-1693 (John D. Cushing
ed., Michael Glazier, Inc. 1978) [hereinafter EARuEsr NEw YORK LAWs] (one of the
Duke of York's Laws). Assuming that they applied to divergent jury instructions,
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Finally, neither the power nor the inability of the bench to re-
ject a verdict because it felt the jury to have misunderstood or
ignored the law has any necessary implications with respect to
whether the criminal jury had a right to decide the law and the
facts; the former could simply reflect a courtroom bicameral-
ism, 84 the latter deference to jury factfmding.Y
B. ANALYSIS OF THE PUBLISHED HISTORICAL EVIDENCE
Having eliminated the easy alternatives, it's necessary to ex-
amine the evidence contained in the historical records. For the
most part, a survey of the published data reveals a series of in-
formational voids. We generally don't know whether colonial
juries had the right to determine the law as well as the facts in a
criminal case. There are exceptions to this rule, but they are
few, and modest.
South Carolina is the colony about whose juries' work we
know the least. We have exactly one published bit of datum
from that colony, a report of the 1718 piracy trials of the infa-
mous Steede Bonnet and his associates. 6 The only issues in
these prosecutions were purely factual: who did what to whom.
these laws would have left unanswered what a jury was supposed to do if the bench
was evenly divided. Perhaps there were unwritten rules giving one member of an
evenly divided court the casting vote. Cf. SAMUEL SMITH, THE HISTORY OF THE COLONY
OF NOvA-CAESARIA, OR NEW JERSy... TO THE YEAR 1721, at 572 (The Reprint Co.
1966) (1890) (proprietors' 1701 proposal that tie votes in court consisting of council
and judges be resolved in favor of position taken by oldest voting council member).
Or maybe, as in modem practice, the moving party was understood to have lost the
argument. Or maybe the jurors were expected to decide what law to apply under
these circumstances. But that would be a very limited lawfinding right, indeed.
84 SeeAmar, supra note 45, at 1188-89, 1193.
Cf. Bushell's Case, 6 Howell's St. Trials 199, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670),
which is discussed in Green, supra note 18, at 221-36. The celebrated civil case from
Massachusetts Bay, Erving v. Cradock, Quincy's Reports 553 (1761), might also signal
that trial courts' impotence to challenge jury verdicts inconsistent with the law was a
product of the division of labor among judges, not between judges and juries. Al-
though no colonial court could have done so, the Board of Trade was competent to
reject the jury's verdict in that case.
86 The Trials of Major Stede Bonnet, and Thirty-three Others, ... for Piracy, 15
Howell's St. Trials 1231, 4 Am. St. Trials 652-722 (1718). HuGH T. LEFR & WILIAM
S. POWELL, COLONIAL NORTH CAROLiNA-A HISTORY 81-86 (1973), and ROBERT M.
WEIR, COLONiAL SOUTH CAROLINA-A HISTORY 86-89 (1983), locate these trials in the
context of the war on piracy that affected both colonies at the time.
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Thus, it is not surprising that, although we learn that the juries
in these trials were instructed, no one is reported to have said
anything at all about their right to judge-or their obligation
not to judge-the law. For the same reason, however, the fact
that they seem to have been charged to convict if they decided
that the defendants had done what they were accused of doing
tells us very little about the criminal jury's right to judge the law
in the colony.
7
We have a somewhat more extensive set of published court
records from colonial Delaware. These archives establish that
judges in the Lower Counties routinely charged juries at the
end of criminal trials until at least 1710, when the published re-
cords run out." Unfortunately, except for one case tried while
the area was under the jurisdiction of New York, 9 these records
don't indicate what the charges said. The records also show
that judges could reject verdicts of which they disapproved.9
8 7 WEIR, supra note 86, at 256-59, notes the extreme informality of proceedings in
the colony's courts and the fact that the judges' ignorance of law led the colony to
permit criminal defendants to have the assistance of counsel. Neither point, however,
implies that the even less law-trained jurors were allowed to determine the law in
criminal cases.
u See, e.g., COURT RECORDS OF KENT COUNTY, DELAWARE 1680-1705, at 93-97 (1697
trials of Walter Price, Annanias Turner, &John Hillyard), 234-37 (1702 trials of Adam
Latham, Joan Mills, & Andrew Mills) (Leon De Valinger, Jr., ed., 1959) [hereinafter
KENT COURT RECORDS]; 1 RECORDS OF THE COURT OF NEw CASTLE ON DELAWARE 1676-
1681, at 16 (Symon Gibson's Case, 1676), 88 (John Johnson's Case, 1677), 105 (Sy-
mon Gibson's Case, 1677) (The Colonial Soc'y of Pa. 1904) [hereinafter NEW CASTLE
COURT RECORDS]; 1 RECORDS OF THE COURTS OF SUSSEX COUNiY, DELAWARE 1677-1710,
at 548 (Edward Morgan's Case, 1688), 593 (Henry Bowman's Case, 1688) (Craig W.
Horle ed., 1991) [hereinafter SUSSEX COURT RECORDS]; 2 SUSSEX COURT RECORDS, su-
pra, at 756 (Sarah Willshire's Case, 1690), 758 (Harculus Shepheard's Case, 1690),
1298 (Alexander Windford's Case, 1710), 1299 (Patrick White's Case, 1710).
" See 7 PENNSYLVANIA ARcUYEs (2d series) 728-29 (John B. Linn & William H. Egle
eds., 1878) (Marcus Jacobson's Case, 1669) (trial judges ordered to instruct jury "to
find the matter of Fact according to the evidence"). JOHN A. MUNROE, COLONIAL
DELAwARE-A HISTORY (1978), discusses Jacobson's activities and trial against the
backdrop of the Anglo-Dutch struggle for North American territory. See id, at 59-71.
Finally, Delaware was "an administrative appendage" of NewYork from its conquest in
1664 until 1682, when it was granted to William Penn. See id. at 81-85.
90 See 1 NEW CASTLE COURT RECORDS, supra note 88, at 16 (accepting Symon Gib-
son's 1676 not guilty verdict); 1 SUSSEX COURT RECORDS, supra note 88, at 548-49 (di-
vided court rejecting Edward Morgan's first 1688 not guilty verdict, accepting second
one over dissent); 2 SUSSEx COURT RECORDS, supra, at 756 (rejecting special verdict in
1690 trial of Sarah Willshire), 758 (accepting Harculus Shepheard's 1690 not guilty
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However, the cases documenting this fact, too, shed no light on
the lawfinding authority of criminal juries in this colony. Thus,
we have no greater insight into the colonial criminal jury's right
to judge the law in Delaware than in South Carolina.
We have somewhat more data with respect to colonial Vir-
ginia, but we still don't know whether criminal juries ever had
the right to determine the law in its courts. Our principal evi-
dence about Virginia practice, George Webb's 1736 justice of
the peace manual, 1 is intractably ambiguous. Webb's book says
four things potentially relevant to the question at hand. The
first sentence of its discussion ofjuries says that the job of every
jury, be it civil or criminal, petit or grand, is to decide "the Mat-
ter of Fact in Issue,"92 and Webb repeats this message time and
again.93 But if this means jurors were supposed to make purely
factual judgments about guilt, why does Webb also say that if a
person charged with a non-capital offense "traverse[s] the In-
dictment, or challenge[s] itfor Insufficiency," the case "is referr'd to
another Jury?"94 Was the petit jury to determine the sufficiency
of the indictment? If so, was it also to determine the applicable
law as a predicate for resolving the factual question of the de-
fendant's guilt? Or did Webb mean that while traversing a
criminal charge would lead to the empaneling of a petit jury,
persuading the court of its insufficiency would lead to the em-
paneling of another grand jury?5
verdict), 914 (accepting Ann Row's 1694 guilty verdict), 1299 (rejecting two not guilty
verdicts in 1710 trial of Patrick White; no reported response to third). But see
WILLIAM H. LOYD, THE EARLY CoURTS OF PENNSYLVANIA 59-62 (Fred B. Rothman & Co.
1986) (1910) (discussing 1684 impeachment of ChiefJustice Nicholas Moore for, inter
alia, rejecting civil jury's verdict, threateningjury until it returned contrary verdict).
9' GEORGE WEBB, THE OFFICE AND AUTHORIY OF AJUSTICE OF PEACE (1736) (Evans #
4101).
Id. at 192 (citation omitted).
13 Id at 193, 194, 198 (citations omitted).
" Id at 193 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
" The interpretive difficulty noted in the text could be attributable to the fact that
this book is a pastiche of selections from leading English texts; comparing the lan-
guage of each included excerpt might lead us to see problems where none really ex-
isted. (Although Eben Moglen has written that Webb's book was largely derived from
Michael Dalton's The CounthyJustice, see Moglen, supra note 59, at 1098, these passages
weren't.) Naturally, Webb, a Virginia magistrate, knew how criminal trials were con-
ducted in Virginia and wouldn't have been confused by these quotations. His failure
to describe Virginia jury practice plainly and in his own words may reflect his agree-
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Turning to the subject of juror misconduct, Webb notes
that no sworn juror was allowed to "go from the Bar until the
Evidence is given, and the Direction of the Court," without its per-
mission.9 Later in the same discussion, after observing that a
juror who refused to consent to a verdict for no reason at all
could be fined,97 Webb states that no such fine would lie if he
acted for a reason that the judges found less reasonable than
the majority's or even if the whole jury went "against the Direc-
tion of the Court."98 These comments are consistent with the
surviving records of the Richmond County Court, which show
that judges (in this case justices of the peace) did give charges
in criminal cases.? But were those charges comments on the
law or only on the facts? If instructions covered the law, were
they supposed to bind the jury?; °° If civil juries were still subject
to attaint for returning a bad verdict, 10' and if both criminal and
ment with Richard Starke, who penned a successor volume to his manual. Starke
wrote, "The Method and Ceremony of arraigning and trying Criminals being known to
most Persons, and foreign to the Purposes of this Book, are omitted." RICHAD STARKE,
THE OFFICE AND AUTHORITY OF AJUSTICE OF THE PEACE 120 (1772) (Evans # 13637)
(emphasis added). (Of course, even if the English authorities quoted by Webb had a
clear and coherent meaning in England, we don't know whether he would have
known what it was.)
WEBB, supra note 91, at 198 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
Webb commented that such ajuror "may be committed and fined, because he is
sworn well and truly to try the Issue, and therefore to be obstinate without Cause...
is a Misdemeanor, and finable." Id. at 198 (citation omitted). For a recent attempt to
punish jurors for refusing to deliberate in a criminal case, see Reg. v. Barclay (Eng.
C.A. 1997) and Reg. v. Schot (Eng. C.A. 1997).
"WEBB, supra note 91, at 198 (citation omitted).
"See CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA 25 (John Henderson's Case,
1716), 137 (loan Stephen's Case and Benjamin Hind's Case, 1731), 146 (Anthony
Morgan's Case, 1733), 164 (William Tillery's Case, 1736) (Peter Charles Hoffer & Wil-
liam B. Scott eds., 1984).
"00 On the ambiguity of the word "direction" in eighteenth century jurisprudence,
see Editorial Note, in 1 LEGAL PAPERS OFJOHN ADAMS, supra note 23, at 199, 214-15;
John Adams, Notes of Authorities, in id. at 227.
Whatever the jury's authority to determine the law in criminal cases, Edward Bar-
radall's notes of trials held before the General Court show that criminal juries
could-and sometimes did-leave legal questions to the judges by returning special
verdicts. SeeKing v. Moore (1733) (special verdict leaving court to determine effective
date of statute on which charge based), reported in 2 VIRGINIA COLONIAL DECISIONS B38
(R. T. Barton ed., 1909), and in THOMASJEFFERSON, REPORTS OF CASES DETERMINED IN
THE GENERAL COURT OFVIRGINIA... 8 (William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 1981) (1829).
... SeeWEBB, supra note 91, at 197.
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civil juries were supposed to decide 'Just the facts," why
shouldn't criminal jurors who defied "the Direction of the
Court" have been punished as misdemeanants? Did they have a
right to defy the court by determining the law for themselves, or
did the law simply intend to privilege their determination of
disputed facts? Neither Webb nor the Richmond County Court
records answer these questions, and so they ultimately fail to en-
lighten us as to the colony's position on the jury's right to judge
the law in a criminal case.
Finally, a word about the famous (albeit unreported) 1763
case known as the Parson's Cause.102 This was a civil suit for a
clergyman's unpaid salary. Upon a demurrer, the court ruled
that the parson's claim was valid as a matter of law. At the hear-
ing on damages, defense counsel Patrick Henry appears to have
been allowed in his closing argument to attack the court's pre-
vious ruling on the merits and (successfully) to urge the jury to
nullify that ruling by awarding the parson a mere penny in
damages.
Even if we were to assume that the colony's civil and crimi-
nal procedure were identical in this particular, Henry's speech
seems sufficiently to have stunned his audience to suggest that
his argument-which appears to have stopped short of an ex-
plicit claim that the jury had and should exercise a right to de-
termine the law-was unprecedented. At the very least, the
meaning of presiding judge Colonel John Henry's failure to si-
lence or correct his son is hopelessly ambiguous. While the
frustrated plaintiff and some supportive onlookers were out-
raged, we simply do not know how the court or the legal system
viewed Henry's conduct,"'3 or the jury's.
10 For an account of this case, see HENRY MAER, A SON OF THUNDER: PATRICK
HENRY AND THE AMERICAN REPUBuC 58-66 (1991); ROBERT DOUTHAT MEADE, PATRICK
HENRY:. PATRIOT IN THE MAKING 114-38 (1957); MOSES COIT TYLER, PATRICK HENRY 36-
55 (Cornell U. Press 1962) (1898); WILLIAM WIRT, SKETCHES OF THE LIFE AND
CHARACTER OF PATRICK HENRY 19-31 (2d ed. 1818) (S # 46839).
103 We do know that Colonel Henry later told a friend that he was proud of Pat-
rick's performance and impressed by the breadth of knowledge displayed in his ar-
gument. See MAYER, supra note 102, at 66; WIRT, supra note 102, at 27. In light of the
awesome rhetorical power that Patrick unveiled on this occasion and the tumultuous
popular response to his speech-which marked his emergence as a political figure as
well as an orator-, can we blame his father for strutting? But a father's exultation in
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An opaque justice of the peace manual is also a major
source of information about the criminal jury's lawfinding role
in colonial North Carolina. James Davis' volume,0 which was
published in 1774, built on Webb's book, and it repeats the con-
fusing statements mentioned above. But Davis didn't stop
there. Quoting William Hawkins' classic treatise, he noted that
verdicts could be rejected and juries told to think again, and
that recorded convictions could be set aside when "contrary to
Evidence[] and the Directions of the Judge."1 °5 Nonetheless,
while Davis went on to say that the "better" practice, followed in
the superior courts, was for instructions (at least sometimes) to
explain the law in civil cases, all he said about the court's re-
sponsibility in closing criminal cases is that "the Evidence is
summed up by the court to the jury."'0° If we assume that Davis'
own words more accurately described North Carolina criminal
practice than the passage he copied from Hawkins, and that his
words meant criminal juries got no instructions on the law,
those juries would, of necessity, have had both a right and a duty
to be judges of the law as well as the facts in the cases before
them.
However, Davis also wrote that
Jurors are to try the Fact, and the Judges ought to judge according
to the Law that ariseth upon the Fact. 1 Inst. 226
But if they will take upon them the Knowledge of the Law upon the
Matter, they may; yet it is dangerous, for if they mistake the Law, they
run into the Danger of an Attaint: Therefore to find the Special Matter is
the safest Way, where the Case is doubtful. 1 Inst. 228107
his son's prowess isn't the same thing as ajudge's ruling on the propriety of a lawyer's
argument. And with respect to the propriety of Patrick's behavior, we can't tell
whether (or to what extent) he (like the lawyers in 0. J. Simpson's recent trial) was
allowed to violate the normal rules of practice because of the intense public interest
in the case.
'" JAMES DAVIS, THE OFFICE AND AUTHORIT OF AJUSTICE OF PEACE (1774) (Evans #
13236).
5 I& at 223-24 (quoting 2 WnnAM HAWRINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE
CRoWN 442 (1721)).
10 Compare id. at 328 (civiljuries) with id. at 326-27 (criminaljuries).
7Id. at 223 (citations in original).
1998]
STANTOND. KRAUSS
Yet, as Davis reported, attaint lay only to challenge a corrupt
civil verdict.'8 So was this cautionary word-this hedging on the
jury's right to judge the law-relevant to criminal juries? If not,
why is it surrounded by passages concerning criminal juries?
Moreover, if criminal juries were supposed to be bound by the
courts' interpretations of the law, how could these juries have
done their job if instructions commented exclusively on the
facts? Or did Davis' comment about judicial recapitulation of
the evidence mean something else-i.e., that his colony rejected
not the London judges' practice of instructing juries on the law,
but their practice of commenting on the evidence?1°9
As was the case with respect to colonial Virginia, the pub-
lished records include some additional information about
North Carolina's colonial jury practice, but nothing that re-
solves the ambiguities of Davis' manual. One of these bits of
data is the account of a 1769 larceny trial found in the journal
of Waightstill Avery, who went on to become the first attorney
general of the State of North Carolina."' In this entry, Avery
wrote that his closing "spoke to all the Law & Evidence, that any
way affected the Cause at Bar.""' This indicates that legal ar-
guments could be addressed to someone at the end of a crimi-
nal trial. However, it tells us nothing about what, if anything,
the judge (or anyone else) said to the jury. Or about what the
jury'sjob was.
A second item, a set of instructions written in 1773 by un-
known persons to two members of the colony's legislature,' is
equally tantalizing and equally opaque. One issue addressed by
these instructions is the Crown's right to create courts in the
colony, which was an issue because the Governor, acting pursu-
ant to royal instructions, had recently set up prerogative courts
'0 Id. at 221.
"o9 See JAMES BRADLEYTHAYER, A PRELIMINARYTREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON
LAw 188 n.2 (1898).
1I0 See Biographical Sketch of Waightstill Avery, With illustrative Manuscripts, 4 N.C.U.
Mag. 242, 242 (1855).
. Id. at 254 (Paul Crosby's Case, 1769).
112 9 COLONIAL RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 699-706 (William L. Saunders ed.,
1886-1890) [hereinafter NORTH CAROuNA COLONAL RECORDS].
136 [Vol. 89
COLONIALJURTES
of oyer and terminer after the King disallowed a provincial
court law.13 The constituents/authors of these instructions di-
rected their representatives to deny that the Crown had the
right to establish such courts without the colonists' consent."
The reason: only consent legitimates the exercise of the state's
authority, and none had been given. Not even by the customary
acquiescence of the inhabitants of England. The colonists' re-
sponse to the claim of customary right clearly demonstrates
their belief that juries had the right in at least certain cases to
determine the law. s But it isn't clear who wrote these instruc-
tions, for whom the authors were speaking, and whether their
statements aboutjury lawfinding reflected the colony's accepted
practice in criminal, or any other, cases.
Whatever authority North Carolina criminal juries might
have had in 1773, a newspaper report strongly suggests that they
had no right in 1764 to nullify the law or engage in a form of
"pious pejury."116 This article tells the extraordinary story of
Mr. Crooker and Mr. Conner. Their paths first crossed when
pirates captured a ship and started slaughtering everyone on
board. In an isolated and apparently random act of mercy, pi-
rate Conner saw to it that Crooker's life was spared. At their
'3 See HUGH T. LEILER & WILLIAM S. POWELL, COLONIAL NORTH CAROLINA-A
HisTORY 256-57 (1973).
.. See 9 NORTH CAROLINA COLONIAL REcoRDs, supra note 112, at 704-05.
15In pertinent part, the instructions read as follows:
Where [English] usage is notJust, or of no use to us (which may depend on
our Circumstances) we think ourJudges andJuries have a right to refuse them,
but they have no right to refuse Acts of Assembly; yet we think there is a Power in
the Crown of applying remedies to very pressing Evils for which no Law has pro-
vided, and the necessity and manner of exercising this Power must afterwards be
Judged of by the People, either as Juries in Courts or as an Assembly, and if they
find there was Necessity, that an expedient remedy was applied, that the manner
of applying it was not oppressive, and in a Word that the power was not abused,
we think the persons employed in it ought to be excused, but severely punished
if the Contrary appears. We think the Courts we are now speaking of were a
Necessary and useful remedy for very pressing Evils....
Id. at 705.




next, and presumably final, encounter, things were rather dif-
ferent. This time, Crooker found himself sitting on the jury at
Conner's trial for horse theft, a capital offense. Unfortunately
for the (former?) pirate, Crooker's gratitude didn't stop him
from joining the other jurors in condemning Conner to die. As
the newspaper report put it, Crooker felt "a sensible Concern"
that his duty as a juror "necessitated [him] to find [Conner]
guilty of a Capital Offense." Since the article contains no hint
that Crooker misunderstood his duty, this report implies that
Crooker had no right to grant Conner mercy by acquitting him
or voting to convict him of some lesser, non-capital, charge. Of
course, that would still leave unclearjust what the criminal jury's
authority was.
We have better information on the responsibilities of crimi-
nal juries in colonial Georgia, and it suggests that they had no
lawfinding authority in the first dozen years of that colony's ex-
istence. Our earliest insight into the rights of Georgia's crimi-
nal juries dates from 1734, the year after the colony's
founding.117 It was a particularly busy year for hard-drinking
colonist and Indian trader Captain Joseph Watson.118 For start-
ers, he called Mary Musgrove, a half-Indian interpreter who was
1,7 On the founding of Georgia, see KENNETH COLEMAN, COLONIAL GEORGIA-A
HISTORY 13-35 (1976).
... Watson's annus horribilis and its sequelae are chronicled in SARAH B. GOBER
TEMPLE & KENNETH COLEMAN, GEORGIAJOURNEYS 82-89 (1961). The following are the
best primary sources on these events: 20 THE COLONIAL RECORDS OF THE STATE OF
GEORGIA 87-88 (letter from Samuel Eveleigh to James Oglethorpe, Oct. 19, 1734),
172-76 (letter from Thomas Causton to the Trustees, Jan. 16, 1735), 253-54 (letter
from Joseph Watson to Peter Gordon, Mar. 10, 1735), 256-62 (letter from Thomas
Causton to the Trustees, Mar. 10, 1735), 283-84 (letter from Thomas Causton to
James Oglethorpe, Mar. 24, 1735) (Allen D. Candler et al eds., 1904-) [hereinafter
GEORGIA COLONIAL REcORDS]; 29 id, at 47-48 (letter of Benjamin Martyn to Thomas
Causton, Mar. 17, 1735), 60 (letter of Harman Verelst to the Bailiffs and Recorder of
Savannah, May 15, 1735); 32 id. at 112-14 (Common Council Instructions of the Bail-
iffs and Recorder of Savannah in the Case ofJoseph Watson, Jan. 17, 1735); 2 DIARY
OF VISCOUNT PERCEVAL, AFTERWARDS FIRST EARL OF EGMONT 141 (entry for Mar. 8,
1735), 368 (entry for Mar. 14, 1737) (1923) [hereinafter DIARY OF VISCOUNT
PERCEVAL]; THOMAS STEPHENS, A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE CAUSES THAT HAVE RETARDED
THE PROGRESS OF THE COLONY OF GEORGIA (London 1743), repinted in 2 COLLECTIONS
OF THE GEORGIA HISTORICAL SOCIETV 132-36 (1842); A TRUE AND HISTORICAL
NARRATIVE OF THE C&LONY OF GEORGIA BY PAT. TALIFER AND OTHERS WrIH COMMENTS BY




his partner's wife and a trusted friend of General James
Oglethorpe," 9 a witch, for which he was successfully sued. Wat-
son then tried to shoot Mary, for which he was fined. Next, he
defrauded and assaulted Esteechee, an Indian warrior whose
tribe was Georgia's ally. Watson was fined for this misconduct,
and a number of Indians told the judge that they wanted to do
no more business with him. Watson soon engaged one of these
men-a Creek warrior named Skee, whom Oglethorpe had
made a Captain of the Indian militia-in a fatal drinking
spree. 12' To make matters worse, when Skee took ill, Watson
proclaimed that his goal had been to get Skee to drink himself
to death, and he bragged of this accomplishment after Skee
died. An enraged Esteechee tried to kill him, and the Indians
demanded that Watson be turned over to them.
Georgia's magistrates were unwilling to do this, because
Watson's execution following a tribal murder trial would have
been unacceptable to many colonists. But something had to be
done, to placate the Indians, protect Watson against tribal vigi-
lantes (like Esteechee), and stop Watson from further inflaming
the situation by word or deed. The colony's valuable relation-
ship with the Indians was at stake.
Thus, the chief judge of Georgia's only court1 2 (bailiff
Thomas Causton) was delighted when the grand jury to which
he proffered an indictment charging Watson with "misdemean-
ors" in connection with Skee's death-our records don't men-
tion the precise charges; they just say that he "was indicted for
stirring up animosities in the minds of the Indians, &c. tending
to the ruin and subversion of the colony"12 2-- brought in a true
On Mary Musgrove, see COLEMAN, supra note 117, at 25, 79-88.
' For reasons unknown to me, Oglethorpe and the Indians also believed that
Watson had poisoned Skee. See 2 DIARY OF VISCOUNT PERCEVAL, supra note 118, at 368
(entry for Mar. 14, 1737).
2' For a discussion of colonial Georgia's court system, see JAMES Ross MCCAIN,
GEORGIAAS A PROPRIETARYPROVINcE: THE ExEcUTION OF ATRuST 198-225 (1917).
"2 A TRUE AND FoIsTORIcAL NARRATIVE, supra note 118, at 57. Our sources do not
explain why Watson was not charged with murder. Perhaps Causton knew that no
jury would condemn him to die for killing an Indian. Or maybe, as Oglethorpe later
suggested, see 2 Diary of Viscount Perceval, supra note 114, at 368 (entry for Mar. 14,
1737), the problem was that the testimony of Indians would have been needed to
convict Watson of murder, but was inadmissible in Georgia's courts. Be that as it may,
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bill. But the petit jury seems to have returned a verdict declar-
ing only that Watson was "guilty of unguarded expressions.
" '2
Causton, who had testified in the trial, twice refused to accept
this apparently incomplete verdict. Finally, the foreman ac-
companied this written verdict with an oral statement recom-
mending that Watson be treated leniently because the jury
believed him a lunatic. This satisfied Causton, who (with the
blessing of the Trustees) ordered that Watson be kept in close
confinement in his own home until he came to his senses. 24
This incarceration lasted for several years, until the Trustees or-
dered his release to prevent the Privy Council from deciding
whether it could exercise appellate jurisdiction with respect to a
Georgia court's decision. l2
In the meantime, the colony's dissidents had taken up Wat-
son's cause. These men seem to have been offended by the no-
the Trustees decided that principles of double jeopardy barred his subsequent prose-
cution for murder. See id.
23 STEPHENS, supra note 118, at 135-36. See 20 GEORGIA COLONIAL RECORDS, Supra
note 118, at 175 (letter from Thomas Causton to the Trustees, Jan. 16, 1735); A TRUE
AND HISTORICAL NARRATIVE, supra note 118, at 57. The Earl of Egmont wrote that the
latter account was "false," see id. n.84, but it isn't clear wherein he thought it in error.
If his point was that this jury also convicted Watson for assaulting Mary Musgrove, it
appears that the mistake was Egmont's. But Egmont may have felt that the Narra-
tive's authors had misdescribed the verdict in another way, either by stating that the
declaration that Watson was a lunatic was not part of the verdict or by otherwise mis-
stating what the verdict found him guilty of.
124 The Trustees initially interpreted the outcome of the trial as having decided
that Watson, as a lunatic, had been incapable of defending himself on the misde-
meanor charges, so that his return to sanity would lead to a new trial on those
charges, if not murder. See 29 GEORGIA COLONIAL RECORDS, supra note 118, at 48 (let-
ter of Benjamin Martyn to Thomas Causton, Mar. 17, 1735); 32 id. at 112-13 (Com-
mon Council Instructions of the Bailiffs and Recorder of Savannah in the case of
Joseph Watson,Jan. 17,1735); THEJOURNAL OFTHE EARL OF EGMONT ... 1732-1738, at
241 (Robert G. McPherson ed., 1962) (entry for Mar. 7, 1737). In time, however, they
came to see the proceedings as having decided that Watson was guilty of a crime and
a lunatic, and that the end of what we would call his civil commitment would lead to
the imposition of a sentence on his conviction. See 2 DIARYOFVISCOUNT PERCEVAL, su-
pra note 118, at 368 (entry for Mar. 14, 1737); 32 GEORGIA COLONIAL RECORDS, Supra
note 118, at 234 (Trustees Instructions to the Bailiffs and Recorder of Savannah
about Joseph Watson's mental state, June 6, 1737). As such, they also decided that
Watson could not then be tried for murder. See supra note 122.
" Watson's case, the only Georgia case appealed to the Privy Council during the
Proprietary period, is also discussed in COLEMAN, supra note 117, at 108, and MCCAIN,
supra note 121, at 209-12.
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tion that a colonist could be imprisoned for abusing an Indian,
but they also condemned Causton's behavior toward the jury.
In their view, Causton bullied it into declaring Watson insane,
to which finding four jurors later denied they had ever as-
sented. 6
The Trustees in England, who served as the colony's appel-
late court,127 never wavered in their support of Causton's han-
dling of this case, but it is not clear what this incident tells us
about the provinces of judge and jury in the colony. In part,
that's because we don't know whether (or to what extent) the
authorities were deviating from the normal legal rules in this in-
tensely political case. In part it's because we don't know
whether (or to what extent) the dissenters' complaints were hy-
perbolic sour grapes. In part, though, the problem is that we
don't know what the real bone of contention between Causton
and the jury was: did the jurors doubt Watson's lunacy, or were
they attempting to nullify the law by suppressing the true facts
of the case? Given the partial written verdict the jurors returned
on the misdemeanor counts, their evident unwillingness to re-
write it to include a finding of insanity, and what we know about
Watson, the latter seems more likely to reflect what was really
going on. In either event, Causton's rejection of the unadorned
"guilty of unguarded expressions" verdicts says nothing about
the jury's right to decide what the law was. However, the jury's
" The authors of A True and Historical Narrative wrote that Causton "hectored" the
jury and that he generally made juries "afraid... to act as their consciences directed
them." A TRuE AND HISTORCAL NARRATIVE, supra note 118, at 53, 57. Thomas Ste-
phens wrote that Causton "intimidated" petitjuries. STEPHENS, supra note 118, at 95.
His evidence included an eyewitness' affidavit that said Causton "treated ... [Wat-
son's] jury with very indecent language" and a letter from four members of the jury
saying that the foreman's statement "was extorted by menaces" from Causton "and
not assented to by us." Id. at 132, 136. Robert Parker wrote about this case, "We
know how Jewreys are managed hear and what dirty works they have been made to
do." 20 GEORGIA COLONIAL REcoRDs, supra note 118, at 373 (letter from Robert
Parker to the Trustees, June 3, 1735). In The Constitutions of the Several States, Theo-
doric Bland later speculated that the memory of Causton's conduct in Watson's trial
may have led to the adoption of the provision of Georgia's 1777 Constitution that is
quoted supra in note 69 of this paper and the accompanying text. See THEODORIC
BLAND, THE CONSrI'UIIONS oF THE SEVERAL STATES 468 (undated manuscript) (Mary-
land Historical Society Library, Manuscripts Division, Bland Papers, MS.134, Box 1).
' 1See supra note 121
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failure to bring in a simple "not guilty" verdict suggests that the
jurors didn't believe they had a right to nullify the law. And the
dissenters' failure to complain about Causton's rejection of the
partial verdict (as opposed to the language with which he ad-
dressed the jury when he directed it to continue its work), as
well as the Trustees' approval of his performance, indicate that
the colony's judges had a right (at least under some circum-
stances) to reject ajury's verdict.
The journal of William Stephens-a former Member of Par-
liament who served as the Trustees' official observer of colonial
affairs, President of Savannah county, and finally President of
the entire colonyl 8-casts a bit more light on the rights ofjudge
and jury in the colony's early years. Stephens' thoroughjournal
includes reports of cases considerably less extraordinary than
Watson's. Moreover, in a colony with no lawyers, law books, or
experienced magistrates, 12 Stephens was a legal advisor to the
court and probably the most knowledgeable authority on law
around, which means he was singularly capable of providing us
with accurate reports of the proceedings he witnessed.
Two sets of cases in Stephens' journal are particularly in-
structive. The first is a trial for violation of one the colony's first
three laws, the 1735 act barring the importation and sale of rum
and kindred spirits!" As Causton and Stephens noted, this was
an unpopular law and juries were loath to convict people for its
violation.131 Thus, in the case at hand, although the evidence was
"2 William Stephens, A Journal of the Proceedings in Georgia Beginning October
20, 1737 (1740), 4 GEORGIA COLONIAL RECORDS, supra note 118 [hereinafter Stephens
I]; William Stephens, AJournal of the Proceedings in Georgia Beginning October 5,
1740, Supplement to 4 GEORGIA COLONIAL RECORDS, supra note 118 [hereinafter Ste-
phens II]; THE JOURNAL OF WILLIAM STEPHENS, 1741-1743 (E. Merton Coulter ed.,
1958) [hereinafter STEPHENS III]; THEJOURNAL OF WILLIAM STEPHENS, 1743-1745 (E.
Merton Coulter ed., 1959) [hereinafter STEPHENS IV]. Stephens' career is discussed
in COLEMAN, supra note 117, at 95-102, and MCCAIN, supra note 121, at 167-69, 206.
121 See MCCAIN, supra note 121 at 212-15.
"o The Scott trial, discussed in the text, is reported at Stephens I, supra note 128, at
90. The rum act, passed by the Trustees on January 9, 1735, and approved by the
Privy Council on April 3, is found at I GEORGIA COLONIAL RECORDS, supra note 118, at
44-48.
"' See 20 GEORGIA COLONIAL RECORDS, supra note 118, at 285 (letter from Thomas
Causton to James Oglethorpe, Mar. 24, 1735); Stephens I, supra note 128, at 90-91
(entry for Feb. 23, 1738). See generally, McCAIN, supra note 121, at 215.
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so strong that Causton "directed" the jury to convict Scott, who
had obviously violated the act, the jury returned a verdict of
"not guilty.",1 2 Not willing to give up without a fight, Causton re-
jected that verdict and ordered the jury to deliberate further.
When a second "not guilty" verdict was returned, however, he
accepted the inevitable and entered ajudgment of acquittal -. 3
This case makes it clear that Causton instructed criminal ju-
ries on the law and the fact before sending them out to deliber-
ate on a case.13 It also makes it clear that when a jury returned
a non-partial verdict with which he disagreed, he felt free to ref-
use to accept the verdict and order the jury to resume its delib-
erations. But a jury insistent upon returning a general verdict
of "not guilty" could always prevail in the end. That means that
juries had the power to frustrate the run act, but did they have
the right to do so?
Nothing in Stephens' journal squarely answers that ques-
tion, but a number of entries, considered together, offer some
slender evidence that Stephens' answer to that question would
have been "No."' In most of the relatively few criminal trials
reported in his journal, usually after noting the prosecution's
evidence and the gist of the defense, Stephens simply identifies
the jury's verdict.1-6 In two other instances, however, Stephens
states that the jury was so thoroughly convinced "of the Fact"
"2 See supra note 100 on the meaning of the term "direction."
'" Not all defeats are complete. Causton imposed a good behavior bond on Scott,
which he was, at least temporarily, unable to pay. Thus, despite his acquittal, Scott
was incarcerated.
... This seems also to have been the practice in civil cases. See Stephens I, supra
note 128, at 91 (entry for Feb. 23, 1737, report of Watson v. Matthews).
'm Although Stephens described the verdict in Scott's case as "barefaced" and
"scandalous," Stephens I, supra note 128, at 90, that tells us nothing about whether he
thought the jury had the right to determine the law. It is not, after all, unknown for
someone to use a rightful power in a way of which others disapprove. (Causton's
complaint about the difficulty of enforcing the rum act, see supra note 131 and ac-
companying text, is similarly unilluminating.)
" See, e.g., Stephens I, supra note 128, at 90-91 (entry for Feb. 23, 1738, Smith's
trial for clipping coins, woman's trial for petty larceny), 169 (entry forJuly 11, 1738,
trial of Hetherington & Bishop for killing cattle), 170-71 (entry ofJuly 12, 1738, trial
of Hetherington, Bishop, & Francis Elgar for killing cattle), 372 (entry of July 18,
1739, trials of Cozens & Levett for murder); STEHENS IV, supra note 128, at 67-68
(entry of Feb. 3, 1744, trial of unnamed black man for murder), 152-53 (entry of Aug.
9, 1744, trial of Ambrose Morrison for murder).
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that it brought in a speedy guilty verdict.3 7 Perhaps these en-
tries mean nothing more than that there were no legal issues in
those cases. But the quoted phrase may be a formulaic expres-
sion of the jury's limited role in every criminal case. Four facts
support this theory. First, an entry in connection with the mag-
istrates' post-verdict efforts to get to the bottom of one of these
cases shows that Stephens distinguished between "the Fact" and
legal questions arising thereon.' s Second, his records show that
the court could determine the legal sufficiency of a present-
ment and that legal rulings made at trial could be reviewed by
means of a motion of arrest of judgment. 9 Third, when a
number of people charged with missing guard duty presented
their excuses to the court, Stephens tells us that some were ac-
quitted, others convicted, and a third group, those "who made
Excuses that appeared a little plausible," had their cases put off
for jury trial, which suggests that the court decided the legal suf-
ficiency of the excuses and left only their factual validity to the
jury.140 Finally, while discussing the procedure to be followed by
a civil jury faced with a mass of documentary evidence, Stephens
notes matter-of-factly that, before the jury began its delibera-
tions on the case, the court would "Charge" it "according to
Law, whereon to find their Verdict. 1 41 This is very circumstan-
tial evidence, indeed, but it suggests that Georgia's criminal ju-
ries had no right to decide the law in a criminal case before
,17 See Stephens I, supra note 128, at 372 (entry for July 17, 1789, report of Brixy's
murder trial); Stephens II, supra note 128, at 9 (entry for Oct. 9, 1740, report of Wil-
liam Shannon's murder trial). He also speaks of "the Fact" at id. at 372 (entry forJuly
18, 1739, trials of Cozens & Levett for murder).
'm See Stephens I, supra note 128, at 376 (entry forJuly 26, 1739).
"9 On the former point, see STEPHENS III, supra note 128, at 81-82 (entry for May
19, 1742). On the latter point, see Stephens I, supra note 128, at 168-69, 171 (entries
forJuly 11 and 12, 1738) (challenge to number of peremptories allowed the defense).
10 This incident is reported in STEPHENS IV, supra note 128, at 248-49 (entry for
Nov. 5, 1745).
' Stephens I, supra note 128, at 91 (entry for Feb. 23, 1738). It is interesting to
note that the parties in this case were Joseph Watson and Mary Musgrove's second
husband, Indian trader Jacob Matthews. Watson and Matthews were business part-
ners, and this trial involved an accounting between them. The friction between him-
self and Watson led Thomas Causton to find a convenient excuse for not sitting on
the bench during the trial.
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1746, which is the only period for which we have any evidence at
all.
Colonial Maryland provides our first direct evidence of the
status of the jury lawfinding right during a substantial portion of
the colonial era. This data suggests that Maryland criminal ju-
ries may never have had such a right as of 1724, when our evi-
dentiary trail ends.
That trail begins in 1642, with the adoption of An Act For
Rule of judicature. The Act stipulated that Maryland's crimi-
nal law would govern criminal trials in the province. If that law
were not "certaine," the Act forbade the imposition of any seri-
ous punishment. However, the Act authorized provincial judges
to fix substantive rules to govern the trial of minor crimes under
such circumstances. No comparable delegation of lawmaking
"discretion" was (ever) made to juries.
Later that year, Giles Brent43 was charged in the Provincial
Court with subverting that year's military expedition against the
Susquahannock Indians.' Brent replied that his conduct in
that affair was proper, and he asked that the issue be put to a
jury. Prosecutor.John Lewger, who was also the colony's Secre-
tary and a member of the Governor's Councilf (and thus of the
Provincial Court46), objected to Brent's plea on the ground that
" 1 ARCHiV OF MARYLAND 147, 184 (William Hand Browne et al. eds., 1883).
4 At various times, Brent served as Maryland's Acting Governor, a member of its
Council and Assembly, political leader of Kent County, and its military and judicial
chief. On his life generally, see BERNARD C. STEINER, BEGINNINGS OF MARYLAND, 1631-
1639, at 103-05 (1903) [hereinafter STEINER I]; BERNARD C. STEINER, MARYLAND
DURING THE ENGLISH CIVIL WARS, PART I (1906) [hereinafter STEINER II]. On Brent's
relations with Governor Calvert during this period, see STEINER II, supra, at 41-55.
.These proceedings are reported at 4 ARCmvES OF MARYLAND, supra note 142, at
159-61, 164. This case is discussed in its historical context at STEINER II, supra note
143, at 41-55.
'0 On Lewger's position as Secretary and Councilor, see STEINER I, supra note 143,
at 44. On his appointment as Proprietor's attorney, see id. at 52. Carroll T. Bond
tells us that Lewger was a lawyer, as well. SEE CARROLL T. BOND, THE COURT OF
APPEAIS OF MARYLAND, A HISTORY 16 (1928). For more on Lewger's life, see
SEBASTIAN F. STREETER, PAPERS RELATING TO THE EARLY HISTORY OF MARYLAND 218-76
(Maryland Historical Society Fund Pub. No. 9, 1876).
116 The Governor and the members of his Council were members of the Provincial
Court, see BOND, supra note 145, at 4-5. The Governor and members of his Council
were also the superior court judges in seventeenth century EastJersey, SeeJOURNAL OF
THE COURTS OF COMMON RIGHT AND CHANCERY OF EAST NEwJERsEY 1683-1702, at 18
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it raised a legal question not determinable by a jury, but by the
court upon a demurrer. We don't know Brent's reaction to this
argument. What we" do know is that the court agreed with Lew-
ger, ordering Brent to replead or show cause why judgment
shouldn't be entered against him.147
Further evidence that Maryland juries were not thought to
have the right to determine the law in a criminal case may be
found in the record of John Elkin's 1643 trial in the Provincial
Court for the murder of the chief of a local Indian tribe.
When Elkin's jurors told the court they thought that killing a
pagan wasn't a crime and that there was no precedent under
Virginia law for treating it as murder, Governor and President
judge Leonard Calvert advised them that they were wrong about
the first point and that British, not Virginia, law governed this
case. The jurors stood fast in support of their fellow settler, fi-
nally declaring him innocent on the ground that he'd acted in
self-defense. Presumably because the confessions of Elkin and
his two cohorts proved that Elkin had not so acted, Calvert re-
fused to accept this verdict, dismissed the jury, and ordered that
the case be presented before a secondjury.
49
(Preston W. Edsall ed., 1937) [hereinafterJOURNAL OF THE COURTS OF COMMON RIGHT
AND CHANCERY], and elsewhere, see LEONARD W. LABAREE, ROYAL GOVERNMENT IN
AMERICA 99 (Frederick Ungar Pub. Co. 1958) (1930). In fact, the same magistrates
performed judicial, executive, and legislative functions in almost all of the colonies.
See LoYD, supra note 90, at 62-69; GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBuC, 1776-1787, at 159 (1972). This serves to remind us that the notion that
judges belong to an independent branch of government is profoundly modern. See
WOOD, supra, at 159-60.
"7 Choosing the former option, Brent successfully presented his excuse to the
court.
". The record of this case can be found in 4 ARCHmVES OF MARYLAND, supra note
142, at 176-84. For a discussion of its historical context, SEE AUBREY C. LAND,
COLONIAL MARYLAND-A HIsTORY42-45 (1981).
14 The court's rejection of the first jury's verdicts, its dismissal of that jury, and its
decision to resubmit the case on the same evidence to a second jury appear to have
been based on a statute enacted in August, 1642, and reenacted in modified form the
following month. See 1 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND, supra note 142, at 151-52, 187. The
relevant portion of this act, in its final form, reads as follows:
If the Judge think any verdict greivous to either party, or exceeding the
issue, committed to their inquiry, he may returne them to consider better of




The question posed by Elkin's case is why Calvert sought to
"satisfy" the jury that it was wrong about the law. Why didn't he
just tell the jury that, if it believed that Elkin killed the chief as
alleged in the indictment, it was bound by its oath to return a
guilty verdict? Did he think that, although the jury was obli-
gated to accept his view of the law, persuasion was the best way
to get the jurors to do his bidding? Or did he believe, seven
years before Lilburne's trial, that juries had the right to judge
the law?
If the date of this case didn't make the latter possibility un-
likely enough, the Calverts' general preference for exercising
150 151personal control over their domain,"' including its courts,
would make it even less probable. And the subsequent turn of
events in Elkin's case further supports this hypothesis. A new
jury convicted Elkin of manslaughter two days after his first trial
ended. Two days later, in accordance with a recently enacted
statute, Lewger (who had been one of the judges presiding
over Elkin's trials) filed an information requesting that the
members of Elkin's first jury be fined for their verdict. The
same afternoon, the only proceeding that seems to have oc-
curred pursuant to this information resulted in the imposition
of a hefty fine against George Pye, who had represented Elkin's
hundred in the Assembly since 1640 and appears to have been
the most prominent member of Elkin's first jury. 53 When the
And if the judge find the jury evidently partiall or willfull, he may charge
anotherJury to enquire & try by the same evidence. And if they find contrary
to the former jury all the former Jury may be fined at the discretion of the
Judge ....
Id at 187.
"o See 2 CHARLES M. ANDREWS, THE COLONIAL PERIOD OF AMERICAN HISTORY 298-302
(1964); Lois Green Carr, Extension of Empire: English Law in Colonial Maryland
(1988) (unpublished manuscript on file with author). Not surprisingly, the colonists'
efforts to reduce the Calverts' power and increase their own (through the Assembly)
were a prominent feature of the colony's early political history. See LAND, supra note
148, at 34-38; STEINER II, supra note 143.
... See 57 ARCHIVES OF MARLAND, supra note 142, at xiv.
See supra note 149.
1S As to Pye's service as St. George's Hundred's representative in the Assembly, see
STEINER II, supra note 143, at 15 n.28, 21 n.53 & accompanying text, 33. For evidence
that Pye also served as commander of the Hundred's "fort" during the Indian trou-
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court reconvened two days after that, Pye was convicted and
fined yet again, this time on a new information Lewger filed
against him alone. The record describes this offense as follows:
[when] the Court [was] importunately pressing & charging the Jury that
were upon the triall of John Elkin, to proceed according to their evi-
dence & conscience, & arguing & pleading the crime agst the prisoner at
the bar [he] in an insolent manner upbraided & reproached the whole
Court in these or the like words, viz, that [if an Englishman had been
killed by the Indians there would not have beene so much words made
of it] 15
Perhaps the gravamen of Pye's offense lay in his choice of
words or his tone of voice. Both could have offended the
bles of 1642, see id. at 42 n.157. David Whitcliffe, who had represented St. George's
along with Pye in 1642, see id. at 43, was also on thisjury. So, too, were Robert Kedger
and Arthur le Hay, supporters of Pye and prominent residents of the Hundred. See 1
ARcHIv o MARYLAND, supra note 142, at 104, 144. Finally, Elkin's residence in St.
Georges'-and perhaps his political support for Pye-are documented in iU at 104,
144.
The 1642 sessions of the Assembly were turbulent ones. See STav__& II, supra, at 33-
50. Although Pye cast a few independent votes in the first of these sessions, his proxy,
Thomas Weston, ultimately proved one of the Calverts' stoutest allies in these strug-
gles. See, e.g., 1 ARCHIMV OF MARYLAND, supra, at 137-41, 177-82. These records don't
allow us to determine whether Pye was returned to the Assembly after 1642. We do
know that his name doesn't appear again in the archives, and it has been suggested
that he moved to the West Indies. See 2 EDWARD C. PAPENFSE ET AL, A BIOGRAPHICAL
DiCGIONARY OF THE MARYLAND LEGISLATURE, 1635-1789, at 669-70 (1985). We don't
know whether he was related to Edward Pye, who came to Maryland in 1682 and
quickly became a member of the Council and the husband of Ann Sewall, Proprietor
Charles Calvert's stepdaughter. See id. at 669; 2 ANDREWS, supra note 150, at 376-77.
Ironically, it appears that Pye voted in August and September of 1642 to enact the
statute pursuant to which he was punished in this proceeding. The archives report
that he nonetheless denied that he was finable for his vote. Unfortunately, they don't
tell us the reason he gave for denying his liability.
'- 4 ARCm-v OF MARYLAND, supra note 142, at 183-84. The archives refer to many
jury charges besides the ones I discuss in the text. Some of these charges were given
before the presentation of evidence; others were given after. See, e.g., 10 id. at 295
(trial of Skigh-tam-Mongh and Couna-weza, 1653); 57 id. at 64 (Francis Carpenter's
Case, 1666), 198 (trial of Henry Mitchell, Joseph James, &John Boulton, 1667), 355
(Walter Pake's Case, 1668), 357 (trial of Thomas Corker & William Kee, 1668); 65 i.
at 5 (trial of James Sall, John, & Robert Speare, 1671), 10 (Isabella Yousley's Case,
1671), 26 (Philip Lyne's Case, 1672). These records tell us that the former charge
was simply to determine the defendant's guilt, whether he had fled, and whether he




court's sense of propriety.155 However, disputing the Governor's
view of the law would surely have seemed even more arrogant.
Moreover, in light of the diplomatic necessity of obtaining a
conviction, 156 Pye's dissension might have appeared to threaten
"state security." Thus, it seems far more likely that his crime was
disputing the Governor's view of the law. Two further facts mili-
tate in favor of this theory. First, the jury's retreat to the frivo-
lous self-defense argument suggests that it considered itself
bound by Calvert's "advice" on the applicable law.'57 Second, in
defending himself against Lewger's charge, Pye appears to have
asserted neither the right of a jury to argue about the law with
the court nor the greater right to decide for itself what the law
was.158 (The existence of the latter right, it should be recalled,
was not asserted in any court in England until seven years later.)
Thus, while this colonial counterpoint to William Penn and Ed-
ward Bushell's later (and more famous) trials' 59-- like Brent's
trial-had strong political overtones, it is powerful evidence that
"" On the significance of deference in colonial America and the early Republic, see
GORDON WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1992). On the colo-
nies' use of criminal law in the seventeenth century to prevent "lesser" persons from
offending their "betters," especially magistrates, see LARR, D. ELDRIDGE, A DISTANT
HERITAGE: THE GROwTH OF FREE SPEECH IN EARLY AMERICA 5-19 (1994). For a fin-d-
si c/e Maryland case involving a spectator's disparaging remarks about a panel of trial
courtjudges, see 23 Archives of Maryland, supra note 142, at 512-13 (Williamjosephs,
Jr.'s Case, 1698).
"' Governor Calvert's instructions from his brother, the Proprietor, seem to have
emphasized the importance of maintaining good relations with the Indians by doing
justice to whites who killed them. See LAND, supra note 148, at 44.
,5 Its continuing bottom-line defiance shows that it was not simply cowed by his
demands. Nor was its successor, which also failed to convict Elkin of murder.
" As anyone who has ever questioned a referee or umpire's call knows, these two
rights are entirely distinct.
,5' See Penn and Mead's Case, 6 Howell's St. Trials 951 (1670); Bushell's Case, 6
Howell's St. Trials 999, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670). Elkin and Pye's trials con-
trast with Penn and Bushell's in that they involved the use ofjury nullification to ac-
quit a killer, rather than to protect religious liberty. They thus highlight the "bad"
side of jury nullification. Moreover, the colonial court's ability to bring the Indian
leader's killer to justice represents a striking contrast to the impotence that a modern
court would experience in a similar situation. (Indeed, many people feel that the
first trial of the police officers who beat Rodney King and the first trial of Lemerick
Nelson, for example, were similar situations, and were frustrated by the courts' inabil-
ity to avoid the verdicts rendered therein.)
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Maryland juries had no right to determine the law in criminal
cases in the first decade of the colony's existence.16
Robert Clark and James Langworth's 1652 trial for killing
Phillip Anther6 1 suggests that criminal petit juries had no right
to determine the law even where no law had been declared by
the court. Before the presentation of the evidence in this case,
the jury was charged (the record doesn't indicate whether this
was done with the defendants' consent) to bring in a special
verdict informing the court whether the death was accidental, as
the defendants claimed. The fact that the jury was so charged
suggests that, even if the parties could choose to leave the de-
termination of the law to a criminal petit jury, such juries did
not have the right to judge the law, even when the court had
not determined it.
A pair of murder prosecutions indicates that jurors so un-
derstood their province in 1668.62 The jury in each case re-
turned a special verdict rather than a general one. In the first,
the legal question thus presented to the court was whether the
fact that the defendant was so drunk that he "did not know what
he did att the time of Committing the [killing]" rendered his of-
fense manslaughter rather than (capital) murder. In the sec-
ond, the legal question involved the line between manslaughter
and "manslaughter by misadventure." Both would seem to be
cases in which the legal issue was sufficiently non-technical that
juries entitled to determine the law might well have done so.
Hence, these juries' apparently unsolicited decisions to bring in
special verdicts suggest-although they don't prove-that the
jurors thought they had no such right.
Our next evidence is again drawn from more political
prosecutions, these stemming from former Governor Josias
Fendall's "rebellion" of 168116 The first of these is Fendall's
160 The first settlements were founded in Maryland in 1634. See 2 ANDREWS, supra
note 150; at 287-88.
"" This trial is reported at 10 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND, supra note 142, at 143.
162 These two cases, Lord Proprietary v. Pake and Lord Proprietary v. Corker and Kee, may
be found in 57 id. at 354-58.
'6 These trials are reported at 5 id. at 311-34. For their historical background, see
2 ANDREWS, supra note 150, at 344-51; LAND, supra note 148, at 54-57, 79-80, 83-84.
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own trial for "false scandalous mutinous and seditious" speech
(e.g., that the Proprietor was a traitor who had formed a Catho-
lic-Indian conspiracy to ruin the colony's Protestants, that any-
one who paid the Proprietor's taxes was a fool, and that Fendall
would protect the people against Baltimore), attempted rebel-
lion, and attempting to seize Lord Baltimore and several mem-
bers of the Council. We have an unusually detailed account of
this trial, because Baltimore had ordered the Council's Clerk,
"who writes shorthand," to attend and take notes.1
6 4
At the outset of the trial, the newly sworn jury was instructed
(in the usual manner) that its "charge is to enquire whether
[Fendall] be guilty of those false scandalous mutinous and sedi-
tious speeches practices and attempts whereof he stands in-
dicted."'5 After evidence of Fendall's words had been
introduced and impeached, Fendall appears to have argued that
some of it could not be considered against him because any
statement must be proven by more than one witness in order to
justify a conviction for that statementss But Chancellor Calvert,
the President judge, then told the jury that Fendall was wrong
about the law: the two witnesses did not have to testify to having
heard him make the same "false scandalous mutinous and sedi-
tious" statement. At this point, the jury's foreman cut in, and
the following colloquy ensued:
P. Lynes Foreman-We desire to have the Act of Assembly [on which
the prosecution was based] with us to see what it directs.
Court.-You have not to do with that you have only to find whether
or no the words have been spoken accordingly as the Prisoner is
Fendall's trial is also discussed in BRADLEY GRAPIN, CRnuNAL JUSTICE IN COLONIAL
AMERmCA, 1606-1660, at 109-11 (1983).
"' 5 ARCmas OF MAVLAND, supra note 142, at 311. I don't know whether Fendall
ever commented on the accuracy of this report.
'" Id. at 318. The jury was also told to determine whether Fendall had fled and the
extent of his forfeitable holdings. For similar opening charges, see supra note 154.
' The testimony of two witnesses was required to prove a non-confessing defen-
dant guilty of sedition. See ELDRIDGE, supra note 155, at 21-22, 75-76. On the early
history of the similar rule regarding treason, which was later enshrined in the Trea-
son Clause, U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, see L. M. Hill, The Two-Witness Rule in English




charged, you are not to muse yourselves with matter of Law but you are
to enquire into matter of fact.
Fendall-That is a charge for a grandJury.
Chanc:-It is properly before this Jury they have nothing more to do
then to enquire into matter of fact whither such and such things have
been done or not the rest lyes before the Court the Grand Jury having
only found such an Information fit to be prosecuted and left it to the
petitJury to try it.
Fendall-This had not been known.
Chanc: as the Jury are going out-I am to tell you that if you cannot
find the Indictmt as it is laid you may if you think fitt find specially-l6
After deliberating, the jury returned and delivered the following
verdict: 'We find Josias Fendall guilty of speaking severall sedi-
tious words without force or practice and if the honble Court
think him guilty of the breach of the Act of Assembly we do or
else not.'' 6s The following day, the court pronounced him guilty
of uttering seditious words.
It is clear from this report that the court believed that the
jury was confined to determining facts, as might have been ex-
pected given the previous historical record. However, two other
bits of this story complicate the picture. Foreman Lynes' re-
quest to see the statute suggests that he was unaware of this limit
on the jury's responsibility.! Moreover, if we can believe his
words, Fendall was equally surprised by the charge. This would
675 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND, supra note 142, at 327. I don't know on which Act this
prosecution was based. Larry Eldridge suggests that 1 id. at 73 was the "scandalous or
contemptuous words" statute, see ELDRIDGE, supra note 155 at 25, 151 n.14, but that
bill was never enacted into law. See 1 ARcHIvES OF MARYLAND, supra, at 39; STEINER I,
supra note 143, at 107.
'68 5 ARCHIvREs OF MARYLAND, supra note 142, at 327.
69 The archives reveal that Lynes had served on some civiljuries. See, e.g., 70 id at
2, 8, 12, 17, 41 (1681 trials); 69 id. at 224, 257 (1680 trials); 68 id. at 68, 202 (1679 tri-
als), but the records of criminal trials are too skimpy to allow us to determine the ex-
tent of his prior service on criminaljuries. (To be more precise, we have no record of
criminal trials in the Provincial Court between April, 1673 and March, 1684. SeeLoIS
GREEN CARR & DAVID WILIAM JORDAN, MARYAND'S REVOLUTION OF GOVERNMENT,
1689-1692, at 305 (1974).) He does seem to have participated on the jury in the sec-
ond trial of Edward Randolph's case against John Blackmore, which is discussed be-
low in the text accompanying notes 176-83. See PROCEEDINGS OF THE MARYLAND




be remarkable because during his brief tenure as Governor,
Fendall was the President of the very court before which he was
now on trial. Had the role of the criminal jury been different
then? Had the issue of the jury's authority to determine the law
never arisen in a case tried during his term? Or was this jury
spontaneously raising a narrower question: whether it had the
right to determine the seditiousness of Fendall's speech? Was
that question unresolved in the colony? If not, could Fendall's
response signal his unfamiliarity with practice in sedition trials?
Why would he have thought them different? One more possi-
bility must be noted. Maybe Fendall's surprise was feigned.
Maybe he was grandstanding. He seems to have done that ear-
lier in the trial,170 and we cannot rule out the possibility that this
was more of the same. But grandstanding only makes sense if
there is an audience receptive to the message. Therefore, this
interlude may suggest that there was a popular conception in at
least some quarters that in some cases criminal juries had a right
to decide more than just the facts.
The other two trials held in connection with this episode
are not reported in such detail. Rather, in Lord Baltimore's
words, the record of these trials is nothing more than "the Rec-
ords as things of this nature are usually entered.",17 Thus, they
skip from the swearing of the jury (which in each case was basi-
cally the same jury as the one that sat in Fendall's case) to the
announcement of its verdict. In the case of John Coode, an As-
sembly member whom the Proprietor believed to be Fendall's
partner in crime, the jury returned a simple verdict of "not
70 After the jury was sworn and given its initial charge, when the prosecutor called
his first two witnesses, Fendall complained that he wasn't given adequate notice of his
trial, the charges against him, or the prosecutor's evidence. It is difficult to believe
that Fendall didn't know that he should have raised this issue earlier. In any event,
the Chancellor pointed out that he had been given ample notice that he would be
tried at that session of the court, that no defendant had ever been given complete
pre-trial discovery of the prosecution's case, and that "most of [the witnesses'] deposi-
tions were [nonetheless] read to [Fendall] before the Councell" in advance of the
trial. 5 ARcHivEs OF MARYLAND, supra note 142, at 318. And Fendall was in fact able to
present favorable evidence. Hence, his complaint appears to have been entirely for
show.
17, I&L at 334.
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guilty."172 But in the trial of county courtjudge (and militia offi-
cer) George Godfrey for his efforts to rescue Fendall from his
pre-trial imprisonment, the jury returned the same kind of ver-
dict it had rendered in Fendall's case:
George Godfrey is guilty of speaking many mutinous and seditious words
and striueing as much as in him lay to raise a mutinous Company to
fetch Capt Fendall out of prison and if the Court find him guilty of the
Breach of the Act of Assembly whereof he stands Indicted they find him
guilty our else not. 7s
As in Fendall's case, the court found him guilty. But what does
this say about the jury's view of its own role? Did the jury be-
lieve itself limited to finding facts in this non-sedition case? Or
was it rebelling by refusing to utter the word "guilty" when it
disapproved of the law's judgment that defendants had acted
criminally?
An anonymous lawyer's memorandum about the 1691 trial
of four men charged with the murder of John Payne contains
further evidence that Maryland juries had no right to determine
the law in a criminal case. 74 The defendants in this extraordi-
nary case (which was part of Maryland's Protestant revolution)
were apparently denied counsel, deprived of the notes drawn up
for their benefit before the trial by the anonymous lawyer, and
intimidated by the presence of an armed force at their trial.
These circumstances prevented them from properly presenting
their defense, the memorandum claimed. That defense rested
on a point of law: whereas the prosecution claimed that Payne's
death was a murder because he was killed while acting in his ca-
pacity as a royal collector, the defense believed the crime was
not murder because Payne was killed while acting as a militia
'7 For a thumbnail sketch of Coode's life, see 2 ANDREWS, supra note 150, at 378-
79.
'' 5 ARCamVES OF MARYLAND, supra note 142, at 334.
The official report of this trial may be found in 8 id., at 245-48. The memoran-
dum, which may have been written by Robert Carvile, see CARR & JORDAN, supra note
169, at 141 n.90, can be found in 8 ARCHIVE OF MARY.AND, supra, at 250-62. The
Protestant revolution that formed its background, and Payne's death, are examined
in CARR &JORDAN, supra, which discusses the trial itself at 140-45.
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leader. What is significant for present purposes is that the
memorandum noted that this point should have been made "by
Pleading att Barr or arrest ofJudgment," not in argument to the
jury.175 Hence, the memorandum doesn't report that the court
charged the jury to determine whether Payne had been killed
while acting as royal collector, but that the bench told the jury
he had been so acting, and that his killing was therefore a mur-
der.
Two criminal prosecutions under the Navigation Acts indi-
cate that the jury had no right to judge the law in 1696. The
first pitted Edward Randolph, the Surveyor General of the Cus-
toms in North America, against John Blackmore and the ship
Ann.176 The first trial in this case ended with the entry of judg-
ment on the jury's verdict for the defense. The prosecutor at-
tacked this decision before the Governor and Council, sitting as
the newly-reorganized Court of Appeals. 7 He argued that the
defense's key evidence-a bond-was legally insufficient, and
that the jury had wrongly construed the relevant law, which was
"not determinable by a Jury '17 in any event. The high court
agreed that the bond was "not a good bond in Law," 179 so it set
175 Inasmuch as the court consisted of revolutionary leaders, it is most unlikely that
the lawyer believed it would be more sympathetic than ajury towards these supporters
of the Lord Proprietary who were charged with killing the revolutionary govern-
ment's agent.
'76 This case is documented in PROCEEDINGS, supra note 169, at 7-12, 22-25, 647-
53. (It should be obvious that I, like Carroll Bond, see id. at xlvii-xlviii, read these rec-
ords differently than David R. Owen and Michael C. Tolley, who sketch this case in
their useful book, CouRTs OF ADNRALTY IN COLONIAL AMERICA: THE MARYLAND
EXPERIENCE, 1634-1776, at 281-82 (1995)). For further information about Randolph,
see MICHAEL GARIBALDI HALL, EDWARD RANDOLPH AND THE AMERICAN COLONIES 1676-
1703 (1960).
177 On the 1694 reorganization of the Court of Appeals, see BOND, supra note 145,
at 21-34. For two other instances in which the prosecution was allowed to appeal
from an acquittal, see His Majesty v. Richard Sweatnam and Elias King, cases involving
charges of perjury and bribery, which are cited in PROCEEDINGS, supra note 169, at
xlviii. Ironically, Randolph attacked Attorney General George Plater, who repre-
sented him in these cases and made the argument mentioned in the text, as pro-
smuggler and demanded that he be dismissed from his post. See 1 NORTH CAROLINA
COLONIAL RECORDS, supra note 112, at 463-64 (petition to the Lords of Trade, Sept. 6,
1696).
17 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 169, at 11, 25.
'" See id. at 12.
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aside the verdict. A second information was then filed, identical
to the first, but history repeated itself in the trial court. The
prosecutor again appealed, on the same ground. Although our
records are incomplete, it appears that the Court of Appeals
again adjudged the bond legally insufficient.18 ° The legal con-
sequences of this decision were now drawn into question, and
the court sought the opinions of the members of its bar.181 In
the course of complying with this directive, four of the six re-
spondents endorsed the proposition that juries were not to
judge the law.182 None dissented from it.85 While we do not
know the Court of Appeals' response to these opinions, they
strongly suggest that the legal establishment believed that the
jury had no lawfinding authority. Nor is it clear that the juries'
verdicts in these prosecutions reflect a different understanding
of their role: several of the lawyers expressed the opinion that
the prosecutor's failure to challenge the bond by demurrer ef-
fectively conceded its validity, so the jury had no choice but to
treat it as sufficient.
The other trade act prosecution was the 1696 trial of Char-
les Carroll, one of the lawyers whose views were solicited in
" The published records include no statement of the Court of Appeals' ruling on
the second appeal.
.. PROCEEDINGS, supra note 169, at 647. As this entry shows, the Court also solic-
ited the lawyers' opinions on some jury-related issues in a second, civil, case. The law-
yers' responses to the two sets of questions overlapped, and for the sake of simplicity,
I shall refer to this exchange as if only one case, Blackmore's, had been involved.
On the practice of soliciting the advice of counsel, see BOND, supra note 145, at
45-47; John E. Douglass, Between Pettifoggers and Professionals: Pleaders and Practitioners
and the Beginnings of the Legal Profession in Colonial Maryland, 1634-1731, 39 AM. J.
LEGALIsT. 359, 370,372 (1995).
" For the lawyers' opinions, see PROCEEDINGS, supra note 169, at 647-53. The four
who endorsed this view are Charles Carroll, who had trained at the Inner Temple, see
id. at xxv, Robert Carvile, who was mentioned in note 174, supra, as well as William
Dent and Robert Gouldesborough, who represented Blackmore in this case. All four
of these men are mentioned in John Douglass' article, supra note 181, at 364-74,
where we learn, inter alia, that Dent was Solicitor General and that Gouldesborough
became the King's Councilor, one of the three King's attorneys (along with the Solici-
tor General and the Attorney General), in 1696.
'1 A fifth respondent, Attorney General Plater, who was Randolph's lawyer, had
(obviously) previously expressed his views on this subject, and they were in accord
with the views of the four. Philip Clarke, the sixth and final respondent, wrote no
opinion of his own andjoined one saying nothing at all about the criminal jury's right
to determine the law. Hence, his views on the subject are entirely unknown.
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Blackmore's case.1M Carroll responded to the charges filed
against him by pleading a general denial and a demurrer, which
attacked the information on a number of grounds, including a
claim that one English statute upon which the charges were
based didn't apply to the North American colonies because it
was enacted before their founding. The record says that the
jury returned a verdict for the prosecution on the general issue
and the court ruled in its favor on the demurrer. It does not say
whether the court ruled on the demurrer before or after the
jury rendered its verdict, whether the lawyers argued the law to
or before the court alone, or whether the jury was confined by
its charge to determining the facts of the case. Nonetheless, the
record is consistent with the opinion Carroll expressed in
Blackmore's case: thatjuries should just determine facts, leaving
it to the court to decide any questions of law arising therefrom.
If that is how this case was handled, it would mean that the ju-
rors' oath "to Say the Truth in the premises" referred only to
the facts. The facts would have been the jury's sole concern.
In October, 1697, Governor Frances Nicholson summoned
the lawyers and judges of the Provincial Court (which, since the
reorganization of the Court of Appeals in 1694, was no longer
composed of the Governor and Council) for a meeting with the
Council.1 ' During this audience, Nicholson told "the Chife Ius-
tice that in giving his charge to the Iuries, ... such a direction
[should] be given [that] where there is a matter of Law, they
should then bring in special verdict, and leave it to the Court."'"
Assuming that this undifferentiated fiat applied to criminal tri-
als, which would be consistent with the instructions given in
Fendall and his cohort's cases (and perhaps the import of the
trade act cases of the previous year), it would suggest that the
Governor (who was President of the Court of Appeals) didn't
think that those juries had a right to determine the law. But
'" Carroll's prosecution is documented in PROCEEDINGS, supra note 169, at 26, 29-
41. For his participation in Blackmore's case, see supra, note 182 and accompanying
text.
I' Since the reorganization of the Court of Appeals in 1694, the composition of
the Council and the Provincial Court had become increasingly distinct. See
PRoCEEDNGS, supra note 169, at xxxiii.
"' 23 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND, supra note 142, at 253.
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why was it necessary? Because the new members of the Provin-
cial Court weren't familiar with prior court practices? Because
the instruction altered those practices? Because juries were tak-
ing it upon themselves to decide legal questions involved in the
general verdict? I haven't found any answers to these questions
in either the legal or historical literature, but it seems unlikely
that this edict reflected a change in the courts' perception of
the proper role of the criminal petitjury. Rather, it seems likely
that the order was meant to facilitate review by the Court of Ap-
peals of legal questions posed by decisions in the lower courts.
The following year, Nicholson's feud with John Coode,
whom he had once caned for being drunk at church, led to the
prosecution of a number of Coode's adherents, including his
stepson, Gerard Slye, who was tried for seditious speech. 87
Slye's prosecution was in many ways a partisan echo of Elkin's.
Despite the fact that he seems clearly to have been guilty, Slye
was acquitted. Nicholson refused to accept that verdict, empan-
eled a second jury (which had already convicted another of
Coode's allies), and obtained the conviction he so desired. At
that point, twenty-seven years after the decision in Bushell's Case,
Nicholson initiated prosecutions against members of the first
j17188
jury.
This time, however, the lower house of the Assembly inter-
vened on the jurors' behalf. In a petition addressing several of
the Coode party's concerns, the Delegates presented the follow-
ing complaint to Nicholson:
... [W] hereas Juryes are allways Accompted An Especiall Bullworke to
protect our libertyes and priviledges from Arbitrary Govemmt we there-
fore make our humble Addresses That no lurors may be unjustly vexed
menaced overawed or Deterred for and from freely giveing theire verdict
according to theire Conscience and Duty nor bound in any Recogni-
zances for the peace or unjustly psecuted for so doing but that they may
" These matters are discussed in 22 id. at 178-82, ANDREWS, supra note 150, at
378-79, and DAVID WILLIAMJORDAN, FOUNDATIONS OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT IN
MARYLAND, 1632-1715, at 197-205 (1987). Slye's offense is also discussed in ELDRIDGE,
supra note 155, at 29.
" Nicholson also hauled a bystander into court for impugning the conduct of the
judges in Slye's second trial. See 23 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND, supra note 142, at 512-13
(WilliamJosephs, Jr.'s Case, 1698).
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have freedome and liberty freely & Clearly to give theire Verdict without
any Apprhesions of fear or Danger and be saved harmless for the same
unless they may Justly by Law be Attainted And that all Jurors now att
prsent under all recognizances and prosecuted for the Causes afd may be
discharaged of such recognizance and that such prosecution may Cease
189
Nicholson's response-which had the support of the Coun-
cil-was prompt and direct.
As to that parte of theire message conteining the Jurys &c, [Nicholson]
tells [the Delegates] that they are upon a nice point and that the Jury
that quitted Sly were in the opinion of all persons present at the tryall
perjured, That the Grand Jury had found the Bill againe, Askes them if
they pretended to vindicate such aJury.'9
No reply was forthcoming, and the fate of the jurors who acquit-
ted Slye is unclear.
The lower house's message can be read to support a jury's
right to nullify the law in a criminal case, but it was doubtless
meant only to free Slye's jurors-presumably the Delegates'
supporters-from Nicholson's clutches. The Governor's reply
suggested that he viewed jury nullification (which clearly ap-
pears to have occurred in this case) as perjurious factfinding,
not rightful lawfinding. It's hard to believe that this was news to
the lower house, so its failure to deny that criminal jurors could
be attainted for a corrupt verdict or that nullification was per-
jury makes it doubtful that the representatives really believed
otherwise. Even if they did, the Governor and Council (i.e., the
Court of Appeals) had the authority to determine the jury's
rights, not the lower house.
189 22 id. at 179-80.
'M IL at 182. The Council backed up the Governor in a message charging that the
Delegates' bill was really a political attack meant to allow the government's opponents
to seize power by protecting rebellious judges, jurors, and assembly members against
the legal consequences of treasonous acts. Thus, the Council described the petition
regarding Sly's jurors as complaining "[t]hat his Excy should suffer the Law to be put
in Execution agtJurors suspected of perjury and false verdict," and noted its brazen-
ness in opposing their prosecution "when you do not know whether they are guilty or
not and before any Tryall had of what they are Charged." Rd at 184, 186-87.
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In the final relevant item in the records of colonial Mary-
land, a 1724 message to the upper house, the Delegates justified
an act authorizing the issuance of bills of exception in criminal
cases (in part) by denying the jury's right to judge the law in
criminal cases. 91 While we have no record of any direct re-
sponse of either the upper house or the Governor to this argu-
ment, they supported the legislation, which became law in the
same year. 92 Nonetheless, although this episode appears to be
yet another sign that the law recognized no criminal jury law-
finding right, it also reminds us that the issue didn't die. Some
of the people seem never to have accepted the official view of
the criminal jury's rightful province, but the records don't re-
veal the scope of the authority they felt juries possessed or the
size of this group of dissenters at any point in Maryland's colo-
nial history.
New Jersey was divided into two separate colonies, East and
West New Jersey, from 1676-1702.193 There is some reason to
suspect that criminal juries in East Jersey were expected to take
their law from the judges. But the evidence is far weaker than
the Maryland data. And with respect to West Jersey and (after
1702) the reunited province of NewJersey, there is just too little
published information to hazard a guess about the scope of the
criminal jury's province.
The best place to begin an analysis of East Jersey's archival
record is with Dom Rex v. Laing,9 East Jersey's counterpart to
John Elkin's case. In this 1692 murder trial, the court learned
that one juror was holding out for an acquittal because of con-
scientious scruples about capital punishment, which would have
been the automatic sentence if Laing were convicted. Rather
than deny the relevance of the juror's views on the death pen-
alty, the court (presumably speaking through Governor Hamil-
,' See 35 ia. at 34-35.
" See 36 id at 571.
193 See generally 3 ANDREWS, supra note 150, at 138-81; JOHN E. POMFET, COLONIAL
NEWJERSEY-A HISTORY 22-91 (1973).
" This case is recorded in JOURNAL OF THE COURTS OF COMMON RIGHT AND
CHANCERY, supra note 146, at 241-43.
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ton, who was sitting as its President) argued that his opinion was
wrong. Its efforts were rewarded with a conviction.
Although this episode doesn't necessarily signify anything in
particular about the court's position on the jury's right to judge
the law and the facts in a criminal case, two other things in the
archives suggest that Governor Hamilton's court recognized no
such right. The first, and somewhat subtler, indication that this
was so is the fact that, although the reports of criminal trials in
this era often provide such a detailed account of the trial of
questions of fact as to tell us the witnesses' names,195 they never
say that either party made a legal argument before the verdict.
19
The other is John Baker's 1684 trial for breach of an EastJersey
statute governing private dealings with the Indians. 97 After the
Deputy Governor charged the jury,"" it retired to discuss the
See id. at 281 (cases of Abegee & Tom, 1695), 298 (Mary Wainright's Case,
1696), 312 (Josiah Stanburrouh's Case, 1698). Sometimes this was prefaced with a
statement to the effect that the prosecutor "proceeded to prove the matter of Fact."
See, e.g., id. at 184 (John Baker's Case, 1684), 213 (John Decent's Case, 1686), 230 (Jo-
seph Frasey's Case, 1687), 298 (Mary Wainwright's Case, 1696).
"' We are told, however, that in John Baker's case, see infra text accompanying
notes 197-99, and others, see e.g., Dyre v. Coit, JOURNAL OF ThE COURTS OF COMMON
RiGiT AND CHANcaY, supra note 146, at 199-200 (1685 qui tam suit under the Act of
Navigation & Trade); Doms. Rex v. Frasey, i&L at 230 (1687 prosecution for "Rangeing
the woods Contrary to Act of Generall Assembly"), the prosecution read the jury the
statute upon which the charge was based. Of course, in a prosecution for violation of
a statute, the content of the statute could hardly be kept secret from the jury, and
reading it aloud isn't making a legal (or any other kind of) argument. In most of the
reported cases we are also told that some kind of pre-verdict arguments were heard.
See, e.g., id at 161 (Robert Vicars' Case, 1683), 230 (Joseph Frasey's Case, 1687), 281
(Agebee's Case, 1695). On the other hand, in David Dounham's 1699 prosecution
for theft of hogs, i&L at 319-20, we are told that defense counsel made (what must have
been) a legal argument to the court after the entry of a guilty verdict against their cli-
ent. It may not be a coincidence that this is the only criminal case in which an appeal
to London was allowed. See id at 130-31.
' This trial is reported in id. at 184-85.
1 Sometimes the surviving records note that the jury was given "their Charge."
See e.g., i&L at 164 (Robert Vicars' Case, 1683), 230 (Joseph Frasey's Case, 1687). Our
report of Baker says that, "Summing up the Evidence together with what had been of-
fered on both sides," the court "Committed the same to theJury." Id. at 184. See also,
id at 199 (Peter Coit's Case, 1685). In a fifth case, we are told that the court "briefly
summoned up the Evidence and also what had bin alleged by the prisoner att the
barr, and left the same to theJury." Id. at 213 (John Decent's Case, 1686). We don't
know whether the parties disputed the law in any of these cases. Nor do we know
whether these different entries reflected different kinds of closings, or whether the
charge ever included instructions on the law.
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case. That afternoon, it returned to ask the court what the stat-
ute meant. Once it heard the court's opinion, the jury had no
trouble reaching a verdict. Baker, the jurors announced, was
"guilty of the Breach of the Act of Assembly... -according to
the strictnesse of the Letter-but not in manner and forme as is
specified in the Informacion."199 Under the circumstances, this
verdict, which the court treated as a conviction, seems to imply
that the jury didn't wish to find Baker guilty but felt bound to
follow the court's interpretation of the law. In other words, that
the jury didn't think it had the right to decide what the act
meant, or to nullify it.
Our information on jury practice in West Jersey is even
more ambiguous. Our first record is a chapter of the 1676 Con-
cessions & Agreements that was reaffirmed in the fundamental
laws adopted in 1681. This provision states
that there shall be, in every court, three justices or commissioners, who
shall sit with the twelve men of the neighborhood [(i.e., the jury)], with
them to hear all cases, and to assist the said twelve men of the neighbor-
hood in case of law;, and that they the said justices shall pronounce each
judgment as they shall receive from, and be directed by the said twelve
men, in whom only thejudgment resides, and not otherwise; and, in case
of their neglect and refusal, that then one of the twelve, by consent of
the rest, pronounce their own judgment as the judges should have
done."'
Even though William Penn, who had proclaimed during
and after his celebrated conspiracy trial that he believed juries
to be the rightful judges of the law and fact in criminal cases,
201
202may have had a hand in the drafting of this guarantee, it's not
'99 1& at 185.
NTHE GRANTS, CONCESSIONS, AND ORIUGINAL CONSTITUIONS OF THE PROVINCE OF
NEW JERSEY 396, 428 (Aaron Learning & Jacob Spicer eds. 2d ed. 1881) (emphasis
added).
2 0 See Penn and Mead's Case, 6 Howell's St. Trials at 953, 958, 961, 974. This trial,
and Penn's views on the jury's right to judge the law, are discussed in GREEN, supra
note 18, at 221-49.
202See 3 ANDREwS, supra note 150, at 167, 273; Mary Maples Dunn, Did Penn Write the
Concessions?, in TM WESTJERSEY CONCESSIONS AND AGREMFENTS OF 1676/77: A ROUND




clear whether it incorporated this notion.203 For one thing, the
provision is ambiguous on its face. Judges can "assist" juries by
advising or telling them about the law, and juries can render
'Judgments" about the facts or the law and the facts of the cases
before them.0 4 Beyond this, we must remember that Penn was a
pragmatist: he compromised his ideals in other instances, 25 and
we can't assume that he didn't do so here .26 Finally, our evi-
dence of West Jersey practice doesn't reveal whether criminal
juries had lawfinding responsibility under this law, although the
published records of criminal trials show a marked similarity to
the comparable records from the colonies discussed above. (In
particular, those records indicate that the bench charged the
jury at the end of a criminal trial, and that this charge set forth
the applicable law.207)
' Charles Andrews appears to have thought that the Concessions provided forjury
lawfinding, see 3 ANDREWS, supra note 150, at 273-74, 274 n.1, but he offers no support
for this view. The same is true ofJohn M. Murrin & A. G. Roeber, Trial byJuy: The
Virginia Paradox, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A LIVELY HERITAGE 109, 111 (Jon Kukla ed.,
1987).
' Thatjudgment had to be entered on the jury's verdict isn't dispositive. While it
could mean that juries were regarded as the final arbiters of the law as well as the
facts of the cases before them, it could also reflect the view that verdicts couldn't be
questioned because no one could know what facts the jury had found. (Indeed, ac-
cording to the leading authority, the latter position is precisely the one taken byJus-
tice Vaughan in Bushels Case See GREEN, supra note 18, at 236-49.) With respect to
the former possibility, it is worth noting that judgments could be challenged on ap-
peal. See THE BURINGTON COURT BOOK: A RECORD OF QUAKERJURISPRUDENCE IN WEST
NEwJERSEY 1680-1709, at xlvi-xlviii (H. Clay Reed & GeorgeJ. Miller eds., 1944) [here-
inafter BURLINGTON COURT BOOK].
205 Three examples should suffice. He significantly reduced the degree of popular
sovereignty in Pennsylvania's constitution as a result of others' objections. See 2 THE
PAPERS OF WILLIAM PENN 137-38 (Richard S. Dunn et al., eds., 1981-1987). Although
the Frame of Government finally banned the elective lower house of Pennsylvania's
legislature from initiating or debating laws, a position in which Penn strongly be-
lieved, he soon allowed it to do both when the colonists insisted. See MARY MAPLES
DUNN, WILLIAM PENN, POLiMCS AND CONSCIENCE 85-86, 96, 104-06, 151-53, 156, 183-88
(1967); JOSEPH E. IULICK, COLONIAL PENNSLvANL-A HISTORY 14-19, 38-39, 54-56
(1976). Lastly, to placate the Board of Trade, he dismissed three loyal Pennsylvania
officials, at least one of whom was a very capable man. See 3 THE PAPERS OF WILLIAM
PENN, supra, at 566.
' We can't look to Pennsylvania practice to resolve this uncertainty: even if the
practice in the later colony was the same as in the earlier one, we don't know what it
was. See infra notes 226-35, 238-47 and accompanying text.
For entries reflecting the giving of instructions, see, e.g., BURLINGTON COURT
BOOK, supra note 204, at 79 (Charles Sheepey's Case, 1687), 119 (Thomas Wright's
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We are at least as uninformed about jury practice in New
Jersey after its reunification.2 °8 We do know that juries were
given charges (of unknown content) in criminal cases.209 And
thatjudges were allowed to determine whether the conduct with
which a defendant was charged in an indictment or information
was actually a crime.1 Our only other relevant data is the fact
Case, 1690), 177 (trial of Peter Groome and Anne Wright, 1695), 200 (Daniell Eng-
land's Case, 1697), and BLOOD WILL OUT, OR, AN EXAMPLE oFJUsncE IN THE TRYAL,
CONDEMNATION, CONFESSION, AND EXECUTION OF THOMAS LUTn-ERLAND ... 12 (Wil-
liam Bradford pr., 1692) (Evans # 588). In his opening statement in Thomas Luther-
land's 1692 trial for murder and larceny, the Attorney General proclaimed that the
accused was going to get a fair trial according to English law. This meant, he ex-
plained, that the job of thejudges would be "but to inform the Jury in matters of Law,
and to pronounce the Sentence and Judgment written against the Prisoner, and to
order the sameJudgment to be put in Execution." Id at 8.
However, I have only found one case in which the records give any hint of what
the charge actually said, the 1694 trial of servant Jannett Monro for infanticide.
BURLINGTON COURT BOOK, supra, at 166-67. The Attorney General in that case argued
that an English statute placed upon Monro the burden of proving that her illegiti-
mate child was stillborn, to which the court (cryptically) replied "that Law was made
Ad Terrorem." Id at 167. Monro then said that the child was stillborn. The report
continues: "The Governour gives the Charge to the Jury, that if they finde what has
beene Evidenced is proofe Sufficient of the Prisoner's murdering or killing the Child,
they are to find her Guilty, otherwise not guilty." Id. The jury brought in a verdict of
not guilty. Id.
The only non-factual issue raised in this case involved the burden of proof. It isn't
clear whether the bench resolved that question or left it to the jury. But even if such
procedural questions were reserved for the judges, it wouldn't necessarily follow that
substantive legal questions would have been beyond the jury's purview. Thus, the in-
struction given in this case doesn't answer our question about the authority of crimi-
nal juries in WestJersey.
The only other criminal case in which the published court records show a legal
question was raised was Daniell England's 1697 trial for violating the import laws. See
id. at 199-200. England seems to have made a pre-trial motion questioning the
authority of the magistrate who seized his vessel. Not surprisingly, this issue was re-
solved by the court. See id. at 200. Once again, however, this does not tell us the prov-
ince of ajury to which a criminal case had been submitted for decision.
21 While there are (sometimes detailed) minutes of the proceedings of the New
Jersey Supreme Court from its first sitting in 1703 through the Revolution, they re-
main almost entirely unpublished. See CAMERON ALLEN, A GUIDE TO NEw JERSEY
BIBLIOGRAPHY AND LEGAL HISTORY 326 (1984). (Similar records exist for other colo-
nies, and they, too, are largely unpublished.).
20 See, e.g., RICHARD S. FIELD, THE PROVINCIAL COURTS OF NEwJERSEY 55 (3 Collec-
tions of the NewJersey Historical Society 1849) (Walter Pomphrey's 1705 sedition trial
before the Supreme Court); BURLINGTON COURT BOOK, supra note 204, at 294 (Robert
Edwards' Case, 1705), 298 (Mouns Cocks' Case, 1705).
210 See EDWIN P. TANNER, THE PROVINCE OF NEwJERSEY 1664-1738, at 491-92 (1967);
infra text accompanying note 219.
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that Penn's English lawyer, Roger Mompesson, served as its
Chief Justice from 1704 until 1710.21' Although the published
records don't reveal anything about the jury doctrines that
Mompesson adumbrated in New Jersey, we do know that in
1707, while sitting as Chief Justice of the New York Supreme
Court, he is said to have informed the jury in Francis Makemie's
trial for unlicensed preaching that it had the right to decide the
difficult legal questions posed by that case. 2 A pro-jury bias is
also manifest in a 1699 memorandum he wrote for Penn argu-
ing (unsuccessfully) in favor of a right to jury trial in cases
brought in colonial vice-admiralty courts to enforce the trade
laws.
213
Unfortunately, the fact that Mompesson was New Jersey's
Chief Justice tells us no more about the lawfinding responsibili-
ties of that colony's criminaljuries than the fact that thosejuries
were given charges of unknown content. The first problem is
that it's hard to know what to make of Mompesson's conduct at
Makemie's trial.2 4 No London judge would have said what he
21 3 H mHiN & BAxER, supra note 57, at 132. For biographical material on Mom-
pesson, see id, at 130-42; FEM., supra note 209, at 56-73, 89.
[Shortly before this article went to press, I discovered some evidence of the jury's
lawfinding authority in New Jersey after Roger Mompesson's tenure as that colony's
Chief Justice. This 1758 magazine article, which reports on the recent trial of John
Henry Rice for stealing a mare, indicates that, while juries may have exercised the
power to nullify the criminal law, their right to do so was (at least) debatable. See New
Jersey, 9 The New Am. Mag. 243 (Sept., 1758). According to this account, after Rice
was apprehended riding the mare, he
confessed the fact before the justice of peace, and even again at the bar, and would have
pleaded guilty, had he not been otherwise advised; yet the jury, to the surprise of the
whole court, acquitted him; thereby assuming to themselves, (contraiy to their oath) the
power of extending that mercy to the criminal, which was grantable only by the king
himself, or his vice-[reg]ent, the governor of the province.
Id (emphasis added).]
212 See infra notes 281-88 and accompanying text for a more detailed account of
Makemie's case.
213 See 4 ANDREWS, supra note 150, at 170 n.2, 259-60.
214 Indeed, Mompesson's entire tenure as New York's ChiefJustice has proven dif-
ficult to assess: he has been said both to have made no "substantial change" in the
New York court's practice or procedure and to have been responsible for bringing
the practice in New York and NewJersey's courts into closer conformity with the prac-
tice in the courts in London than were any other colony's courts. See 3 HAMUN &
BAKER, supra note 57, at 140.
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did to Makemie's jury. If this charge simply reflected a tradi-
tional New York practice that Mompesson followed because he
was not an innovator, it would only suggest that he followed the
established jury practice in NewJersey, if there was such a thing
in this newly reconstituted province. If Mompesson followed a
traditional practice in Makemie's case because he approved of
it, or if the charge. was innovation introduced by him for the
same reason, the implications for NewJersey practice during his
tenure as ChiefJustice would be quite different. Yet another set
of NewJersey consequences might ensue if Mompesson's charge
in Makemie reflected a New York tradition that he disliked but
lacked the political clout to reject or felt he shouldn't choose
that case to repudiate. Finally, if Makemie was merely an aberra-
tional response to the politics of an extraordinary trial, it might
tell us nothing at all about the prerogatives of criminal juries in
Mompesson's New Jersey court. Because, as will be seen below,
we can't identify Makemie's place in New York law, we can't even
begin to judge its relevance for NewJersey juries.
There is, however, a second problem. We can't safely as-
sume that, because Mompesson once wrote a brief advocating
one pro-jury position, he believed in, and later used his position
as NewJersey's ChiefJustice to advance, a different pro-jury po-
sition. Most obviously, supporters of jury trial needn't be sup-
porters of jury lawfinding. Moreover, and again stating the
obvious, lawyers don't always agree with the positions they argue
on behalf of their clients. Nor do judges invariably convert their
personal preferences into law. In any event, Mompesson wasn't
just any judge and New Jersey's Supreme Court wasn't just any
court.
Which brings us to Edward Cornbury, the Governor of New
York and NewJersey from 1703-1708. "15 A rapacious, unscrupu-
lous, High-Church Tory who despised Quakers and has been
said to have paraded around dressed like his first cousin, Queen
215 For more on Cornbury and the events discussed in the following paragraphs of
the text, see FIEmLD, supra note 209, at 39-89, DONALD L. KEMMERER, PATH TO FREEDOM:
THE STRUGGLE FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT IN COLONIAL NEW JERSEY 1703-1776, at 47-77
(1940), POMFRET, supra note 193, at 87-88, 123-36,JOHNWITEHYAf, TEJUDICIALAND
CIVIL HISTORYOF NEWJERSEY 382-84 (1897), and Patricia U. Bonomi, Lord Cornbury Re-
dressed: The Governor and the Problem Portrait, 51 Win. & Mary Q. 106 (1994).
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Anne, Combury had little in common with William Penn. But
Combury's father, like Penn, was Roger Mompesson's friend
and patron, so the Governor named Mompesson Chief Justice
and Council member in both of the colonies he was sent to gov-
em.2 1 6 Mompesson, in tum, served as a faithful member of
Combury's New Jersey party, the "Ring," whose principal activi-
ties seem to have been securing its power, committing graft, and
oppressing the colony's Quaker inhabitants.
Mompesson's participation in the Ring earned him the con-
tempt of many of his fellow New Jerseyans and the scorn of
modem commentators. In part, this condemnation is based
upon his servile behavior on the bench, from which (often un-
der Combury's watchful eye) he was said to have helped the
Governor's friends and oppressed his enemies.3 Two examples
of his judicial misconduct were particularly infamous (and in-
novative).
One grew out of the first three indictments presented to a
grand jury during Mompesson's tenure. Each charged someone
with sedition. The flavor of these proceedings is reflected in the
prosecution of John Hollingshead, who was charged with saying
that, at the end of a stormy session, "the Governor had dissolved
the Assembly" (which he had), and that his opponents "could
get another just as good, and if the Governor liked it not, he
might go from whence he came. 21 8 When the grand jury re-
fused to return a true bill against him, Mompesson allowed the
prosecutor to proceed by information. Hollingshead asked that
the trial be postponed, but Mompesson conditioned this relief
on his entering an issuable plea, which the judge ordered him
to do. As doing so would have had the effect of admitting that
the information stated an offense, the defendant refused to
comply with this order, and Mompesson jailed him for con-
tempt. When the case finally came to trial, Hollingshead was
216 Penn also named Mompesson to the Pennsylvania Council and Chief Justice-
ship, which positions he held from 1706-1709. See 3 HAmUN & BAKER, supra note 57,
at 130-39.
217 Ironically, William Penn complained that Mompesson did not go after the op-
position party in Pennsylvania. See 4 THE PAPERS OF WILnAM PENN, supra note 205, at
531 (letter from William Penn to James Logan, Feb. 9, 1706).
21s FILD, supra note 209, at 53; WH-rEHEAD, supra note 215, at 383.
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acquitted, but Mompesson had him held until he paid the costs
of his prosecution. 9
Mompesson's behavior in this case may seem disgraceful,
but at least he did not introduce NewJersey's courts to the prac-
tice of imposing costs on some acquitted defendants.20  How-
ever, this practice expanded in a new direction during his
tenure when courts began imposing costs on suspected wrong-
doers whom grand juries refused to indict. 1 Members of the
Council, including Mompesson, defended this practice by as-
serting that judges in England did the same thing, but the
mother country's legal authorities finally agreed with the As-
sembly that the practice was illegal in England and NewJersey. 2
And this prompts a third question about Roger Mompes-
son's conduct as Chief Justice of New Jersey's Supreme Court:
how can we reconcile his apparent embrace of the harsh Eng-
lish precedent on fining uncharged suspects with his indulgent
departure from a much clearer English practice in Makemie?
Was this behavior the product of the two colonies' legal tradi-
tions? Their differing politics? Did Mompesson feel differently
about these two practices? Or did Makemie happen to come be-
fore him on a day when he was angry with Cornbury? 3
219 See FmLD, supra note 209, at 56; WHITEHEAD, supra note 215, at 384. Consistent
with New York practice, Mompesson imposed a similar sanction on Makemie a few
years later. See infra note 287. The practice of imposing court costs on acquitted de-
fendants was also followed in other colonies. See, e.g., Hendrik Hartog, The Public Law
of a County Court; Judicial Government in Eighteenth Centuy Massachusetts, 20 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 282, 320-21 (1976); infra note 336; cf supra note 133.
- SeeJOURNAL OF THE COURTS OF COMMON RIGHTAND CHANCERY, supra note 146, at
131; BURLINGTON COURT BOOK, supra note 204, at xliii.
2' See BURLINGTON COURT BOOK, supra note 204, at xliii.
22 See id. The Assembly's remonstrance, and the Council members' reply, ad-
dressed several other issues, as well. Although Mompesson claimed he never read this
reply before signing it, it is inconceivable that, as Chief Justice, the Governor's chief
legal advisor, and Council member, he had not known of and approved of this prac-
tice virtually from the start. I would therefore have no compunction about referring
to this as his judicial misconduct even if he never personally mulcted anyone in this
manner. However, the unpublished Supreme Court records make it clear that he did
do so. See, e.g., Dom. Reg. v. Rogie, Dom. Reg. v. Cole & Pangborn, Minutes, Rules,
&c of the Supreme Court of the State of New Jersey, 1704 to 1715 (liber B) page 44
(1707) (NewJersey State Archives).
Evidence of one period of strained relations between the two men may be found
in 5 DOCUMENTS RELATIVE TO THE COLONIAL HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 410
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These questions are presently unanswerable. We therefore
don't know what inferences it is appropriate to draw about the
lawfinding authority of NewJersey's criminal juries from the fact
that Roger Mompesson was the colony's ChiefJustice. And that
means that we have no reliable indication of what the criminal
jury's lawfinding authority was in the reconstituted province of
NewJersey.
We also know very little about the lawfinding role of crimi-
nal juries in the province with which William Penn's name is
more commonly associated. The Dutch colonies on the Dela-
ware were seized by the English in 1664 and placed within the
jurisdiction of New York, where they remained until 1682. As a
result, the New York code known as the Duke of York's Laws was
in force in the area from 1676-1682.224 Other than what has al-
ready been said about jury practice in Delaware, we know
nothing more about the scope of the criminal jury's responsi-
bilities in the lands that were to become part of Pennsylvania
(or elsewhere in the Duke's American domain) before 1682,
when Pennsylvania's first laws were adopted under Penn's char-
.ter.
In a draft of the Fundamental Constitutions, his first pro-
posal for a constitution for his new colony, Penn wrote that
criminal trials
shall [be] by the verdict and Judgement of twelve of the neighbourhood
to the Party or Partys concerned .... : And thes twelve men shall sitt with
the Judges six on a side, or on a bench on purpose at an other Side of
the Court, . . . the Charge given the 12 men or verdictors by the Judges
to be audibly in open court,.., the verdict being given, the Judges in a
grave and Sober manner to pronounce Sentance accordingly.
226
(E.B. O'Callaghan & Berthold Fernow eds., 1853-1871) [hereinafter NEW YORK
HIsToRIcAL DOCUMENTS] (memorandum written by Mompesson after Cornbury's de-
parture).
"' On the jurisdiction of New York, see supra note 89. The Duke's Laws are dis-
cussed infra notes 255-61 and accompanying text. On their introduction into the
Delaware settlements, see CHARTER TO WILLIAM PENN AND LAws OF THE PRoviNcE OF
PENNyLvANA iv, 455-57 (Staughton George et al., eds. 1879) [hereinafter PENN'S
CHARTER]. There is no reason to believe that they had any continuing effect on jury
practice in Pennsylvania after 1682.
' See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
2' 2 THE PAPERS OF WMIIAM PENN, supra note 205, at 150.
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This language wasn't included in the Frame of Government or
the Laws Agreed Upon in England, both of which were adopted
in 1682. The Laws provided only "that all Tryals shall be by
Twelve Men" and that, in capital cases, the jury "shall have the
finalJudgment., 227 But Benjamin Furley, one of Penn's advisors,
wrote that there was no substantive difference between these
provisions, and he presumably knew whereof he spoke.228
As noted above, the meaning of the comparable portion of
the East Jersey Concessions is unclear. This provision, however,
is more opaque still. Even its more expansive formulation in
the Fundamental Constitutions says nothing about fact or law,
or about the judges' relationship with juries.
No other statutes shed any light on its meaning, and the re-
ported decisions aren't much more helpful.2 Those decisions
show that Penn, as Proprietor and Governor, did "Charge" the
jury in two criminal cases tried before the Provincial Council in
1683 and 1684, respectively.2° But because the content of the
"Charges" is unspecified, we can't say whether they discussed
the law at all, or (if they did) whether they authorized the juries
to determine the law for themselves. The archives also reveal
that, at the end of the trial of a civil case (in 1684 or 1685),
Nicholas Moore, the first Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court, "charged" the jury to convict a witness of perjury,
which it did.31 Moore's subsequent impeachment was partly
based on his treatment of this witness, but no one seems to have
27 Id. at 221-22. This provision was reenacted, without significant alteration, on
several occasions by the provincial assembly. See, e.g., PENN'S CHARTER, supra note 224,
at 117, 199.
228 See 2 THE PAPERS OF WILLIAM PENN, supra note 205, at 227-29.
2' The bulk of the published records of criminal trials in colonial Pennsylvania,
which are contained in RECORD OF THE COURTS OF CHESTER COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
1681-1697 (The Colonial Soc'y of Pa. 1910), and RECORD OF THE COURTS OF QUARTER
SESSIONS AND COMMON PLEAS OF BUCKS COUNTY 1684-1700 (The Colonial Soc'y of Pa.
1943), are just too sketchy to tell us anything significant about the jury's prerogatives.
They mention neither charges nor arguments. Nor do they suggest that there were
disputes about the law.
m See 1 COLONIAL RECORDS OF PENNSYLVANIA 88 (Charles Pickering's Case, 1683),
96 (Margaret Mattson's Case, 1684) (1852-1853).
231 See SAMUEL W. PENNYPACKER, PENNSYLVANIA COLONIAL. CASES 42, 47 (1892).
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objected to the fact that he gave the jury instructions.2  As men-
tioned above, the records of trials held in the Lower Counties
before their 1701 separation from Pennsylvania 3 show that
criminal juries were routinely given instructions (of unknown
content) before retiring for deliberations, and that judges could
reject verdicts of which they disapproved. 4 None of these facts
tells us whether criminal juries had the right to judge the law as
well as the facts of the cases before them.
The special verdict returned in the 1715 prosecution of Pe-
ter Evans for challenging Francis Phillips to a duelss is more
provocative than the data noted above, but ultimately no more
illuminating. The jury found that Evans sent Phillips a letter
that was plainly a challenge. Yet the jury didn't bring in a guilty
verdict. Rather, it passed the buck, returning a verdict saying he
was guilty if the Court judged the letter to be a challenge. In-
asmuch as there weren't any apparent grounds for debate on
that score, the verdict might seem to signify the jury's perceived
lack of authority to make this decision, or to nullify a law it
didn't like. However, it is also possible that the jury wanted Ev-
ans to be convicted but didn't want to be blamed for his convic-
tion, in which event the case would only tell us that criminal
petit juries could return special verdicts. And that wouldn't ma-
terially advance our inquiry.
Although the 1774 decision in Hurst v. Dippo 236 invoked the
principle that 'Judges decide law, juries decide facts" to uphold
the use of demurrers in civil cases, four other Pennsylvania case
reports from the previous decade clearly suggest that, at least
under certain circumstances, civil juries in that colony could
properly determine the law.3 7 One of these reports says that
counsel agreed the charge should be binding.H This would
"'The impeachment is discussed in id., at 39-48, and LOYD, supra note 90, at 59-62.
" On the separation, see ILUCK, supra note 205, at 69-70.
See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
"' Various records concerning this case are collected in 1 COLLECTIONS OF THE
HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF PFNNSYLVANI 262-63 (1853).
256 1 Dall. 20, 21 (1774).
'7 Anon., 1 Dall. 19 (1773); Proprietary v. Ralston, 1 Dali. 17 (1773); Boehm and
Shitz v. Engle, 1 Dali. 14 (1767); Albertson v. Robeson, 1 Dall. 8 (1764).
SeeAnon., 1 Dall. 19.
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seem to indicate that the jury's liberty to determine the law in
these civil cases was not a manifestation of its right to do so, but
of the litigants' (and perhaps the judges') authority to give juries
this responsibility when they wished to do so. Be that as it may,
we have no comparable reports of criminal cases.
The closest thing we have to an exception to this rule is the
1692 sedition trial of printer William Bradford. In that case,
which was reported by co-defendant George Keith,3 9 the Court
of Quarter Sessions held "for the first time... in the history of
English jurisprudence" that a jury could judge "the seditious
character of an alleged libellous paper."240 If Keith's account is
correct-and I do not know of any contemporaneous charge
that it was erroneous in any relevant respect-this came to pass
in the following way: Bradford moved to exclude two veniremen
for having prejudged the case, as evidenced by their having
called Keith and his followers criminals and enemies of the gov-
ernment. The prosecutor argued that the veniremen had ex-
pressed no view about whether Bradford had published the
allegedly seditious paper, and that this being all they would have
to decide as jurors, they were not biased. Consistent with the
position taken by the Justices at Westminster,241 Bradford agreed
that the papers' seditiousness was a legal question. However,
unlike the prosecutor, who thought it followed that this was a
question for the bench alone,242 Bradford argued that his mo-
tion should be granted because "the Jury are Judges in Law, as
2"' Bradford's trial is reported in GEORGE KEITH, Nw-ENGLAND'S SPIRIT OF
PERSWUTION TRANSMrITED TO PENNSILVANL AND THE PRETENDED QUAKER FOUND
PERSECUTING THE TRUE CHRISTIAN-QUAKER IN THE TRYAL OF Pam Boss, GEORGE KEITH,
THOMAs BUDD, AND WILLIAM BR.,DFRi)... (1693) (Evans # 642). Another account of
this trial, based upon Keith's report, may be found in PENNYPACKER, supra note 231, at
117. SamuelJennings responded to Keith's attack in THE STATE OF THE CASE, BRIEFLY
BUT hMPARTIALLY GIVEN BETWIXT THE PEOPLE CALLED QUAKERS IN PENSILVANIA, &C. IN
AMERICA, WHO REmAIN IN UNIrrY; AND GEORGE KEITH... (1694). For more on Brad-
ford's run-ins with the authorities in Pennsylvania, see 1 DAVID PAUL BROWN, THE
FORUM 272-83 (1856), and LEONARD W. LEw, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 22-26
(1985). Finally, for a review of Keith's tumultuous relationship with Quakerism, see
KEMMERER, supra note 215, at 51-52, and POMFET, supra note 193, at 110-15.
2
40 PENNYPACKER, supra note 231, at 138.
2" See 8 WLLAM S. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 343, 345 (1922).
242 See KEm, supra note 239, at 33-34.
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well as in matter of Fact." 43 If our report is correct, some of the
veniremen even entered the fray on behalf of Bradford's view of
the jury's responsibility to judge the paper's seditiousness. Jus-
tice Jennings voiced agreement with the prosecutor, and the
motion was denied by a divided bench.24 Yet, without explain-
ing his apparent change of mind, Jennings later instructed the
jury to decide the seditiousness of the paper in question.245
Is Keith's report accurate? Had Bradford simply stated the
established view of the criminal jury's responsibility? If so, why
did Jennings initially disagree with him? Did the court wind up
making new law? Had it concluded that seditiousness was a
question of fact, which made it a jury question by anyone's
lights? Or did the court, confident of the final outcome-or
concerned about the political palatability of the process-simply
want to throw Bradford (and the dissenters for whom he spoke)
a sop? And what of the jurors' support for Bradford's position
during voir dire? Were they speaking as his partisans, experi-
enced lawfinders, or believers that seditiousness was a question
of fact? We have no idea what the correct answer to this riddle
i .246
The only other published data pertaining to the criminal
jury's lawfinding role in colonial Pennsylvania is at least equally
ambiguous. Although Roger Mompesson was Chief Justice of
the Pennsylavnia Supreme Court from 1706-1709,247 we have no
information on whether criminal juries were authorized to de-
termine the law as well as the facts of the cases submitted to
them during his tenure.24  And then there is the testimony of
24 Id. at 34.
244 See id. at 34.
245 See id. at 36. This case thus provides further evidence that Pennsylvania criminal
juries received instructions. Moreover, it shows that those charges at least sometimes
told the jury what its responsibilities were.
216 It is also worth noting that the jury returned a special verdict against co-
defendant Thomas Budd, see id. at 36; PENNYPACKER, supra note 231, at 129-30, that
smacks of the special verdict in Evans' case, which is discussed above, in the text ac-
companying note 235.
217 See supra note 216.
24 For a discussion of Mompesson's Justiceships in New Jersey and New York, see
notes 211-23, supra, and accompanying text, and notes 281-88, infra, and accompany-
ing text. The sources discussed in notes 88-90, sup-a, and accompanying text, include
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William Lewis and Edward Tilghman, two of Pennsylvania's best
lawyers, at the 1805 impeachment trial of United States Su-
preme Court Justice Samuel Chase. 249 Lewis and Tilghman
spoke as witnesses against Chase, attacking his alleged interfer-
ence five years earlier with the ability of defense counsel (in-
cluding Lewis) to argue the law to the jury in John Fries' treason
trial. They told the Senate that, in their vast experience in
Pennsylvania's courts, lawyers argued the law to juries in crimi-
nal cases.250  According to one account of his testimony,
Tilghman went on to remark that (possibly after expressing an
opinion on the law) the judges instructed these juries that the
juries were the judges of the law and the facts.! However, Lewis
began his apprenticeship in 1770 and, like Tilghman, was ad-
mitted to practice in 1774.25 Thus, even if we give the most
generous reading imaginable to their 1805 testimony, it would
only establish that jury lawfinding in criminal cases was accepted
in Pennsylvania in 1770. (Whether it would have been a recent,
pre-Revolutionary, development or a more established tradition
in the colony would be an important unknown.) But there's no
reason to suppose that Tilghman and Lewis meant to be refer-
ring to colonial practice at all. If so, that leaves us in the famil-
iar position of knowing next to nothing about the status of jury
lawfinding doctrine before the Revolution in the land of
Penn. s
cases decided during Mompesson's tenure as Chief Justice of Pennsylvania, which
then included the Lower Counties.
'9 This trial is reported in CHARLES EVANs, REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF THE HONORABLE
SAMUEL CHASE... (1805) (S# 8173), and SAMUEL H. SMITH & THOMAS LLOYD, TRIAL OF
SAMUEL CHASE... (Da Capo Press 1970) (1803).
2' See EVANS, supra note 249, at 20-21, 27; 1 SMr-H & LLOYD, supra note 249, at 132-
35, 148.
251 See EVANS, supra note 249, at 27. Smith and Lloyd's report of this testimony is
slightly different. They do not say that Tilghman stated that judges "charged" juries
that they were judges of the law as well as the facts. Rather, this account reports
Tilghman's testimony as follows: "the court... states the evidence to the jury, and
their opinion of the law, but leaves the decision of both law and fact to the jury." 1
SMITH & LLOYD, supra note 249, at 148.
212 See EvANs, supra note 249, at 21, 27; 1 SMrH & LLOYD, supra note 249, at 134,
147; 6 DIcnoNtxY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 225 (2d ed. 1961); 9 id. at 542 (2d ed.
1963-64).
" Three manuscripts in the Historical Society of Pennsylvania are relevant to the
question of the lawfinding authority of criminal juries in colonial Pennsylvania, but
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We have much more information about colonial New York.
For one thing, New York judges gave juries instructions on the
law in criminal cases. Further, counsel was apparently allowed
to argue the law before these juries. 4 There is even direct evi-
they do not resolve it. The first of these documents appears to be John Dickinson's
undated notes for his closing argument for the defense in the murder trial ofJoseph
Jordan. These notes indicate that Dickinson admonished the jury that, in determin-
ing the validity ofJordan's insanity defense and the presence of malice aforethought
in his mind, it should "consider what the Law means by the Terms used-and then
apply the Testimony to the Definitions given." Dom. Rex v. Joseph Jordan
(n.d.) (Historical Society of Pennsylvania, R.R. Logan Collection, John Dickinson-
Official Report, Box 6, folder 2). This stricture clearly counseled the jury to be gov-
erned by "the Law," but it doesn't say whose law or by whom (if anyone) it would be
"given." (It isn't even clear whether the relevant legal rules were disputed in this
case.)
The second manuscript is a lawyer's notes on the 1769 trial of James Davis and
others for interfering with the arrest of Andrew Boyd. The King v.James Davis (1769)
(Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Yeates Papers-Misc. Legal, 1739-1772, folder 5).
The defendant in this case denied that the arrest warrant was legal and argued that
the officers used excessive force in its execution. The first point that our report notes
one of the defense lawyers to have made in closing is "Jury can judge of Law & Fact
blended." But did this mean it could judge the validity of the warrant, the excessive-
ness of the force, or both? And did the court agree that this was its right? We have
no record of the prosecution's argument or the judges' charge in this case, and no
further details of the defense's argument on this point, so these questions cannot be
answered.
The third manuscript, an unknown author's notes on the 1774 murder trial of
Harry Hartman, is even more intriguing. These notes report that one lawyer's closing
argument made the point that English subjects were fortunate in that they could only
be convicted of a crime if two juries, in two trials, voted against them. Unlike the
grand jury, which "hear[s] nothing but Witnesses on [the] part of [the] Crown," the
petitjury "hear all Witnesses on both sides-hear Arguments-Law Cases." The King
v. Harry Hartman (1774) (Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania Court Pa-
pers, 1773-1845, Hartman-Miles, Box 2, unnumbered folder). This language, which
doesn't mention judges or instructions, may be read to imply that the jury heard
counsel's legal arguments and then determined the law itself. However, there was no
question about the law in Hartaan, and this passage may have meant merely that the
lawyers could help give petit juries a clearer and more complete picture of the facts
and the law than grand juries received, without implying anything whatsoever about
who would decide what if there was any dispute about the law. Indeed, if (as seems
likely) the law was rarely in dispute in a criminal trial and was not an issue in this case,
why should we imagine that counsel would have had anything else in mind? Still, if
this comment doesn't signal the pre-War existence of the practice mentioned by
Lewis and Tilghman, it at least makes it clear that a procedural condition for that
practice-i.e., the presentation of legal arguments before the jury-did precede In-
dependence.)
See JuiLIUS GOEBEL & T. RAYMOND NAUGi-TON, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL
NEwYORK 600-06 (1944).
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dence that criminal juries had a right to disregard the judges'
views of the law. However, the data isn't strong enough to allow
us to have any real assurance about the jury's lawfinding role in
this province.
The Duke of York's Laws, promulgated in 1665, contain our
earliest information. The Duke's Laws were to some extent
based on Massachusetts Bay Colony statutes, the chapter on ju-
ries being patterned on (but by no means copied from) that
colony's code of 1660.25 Julius Goebel and T. Raymond Naugh-
ton justly observed that the Duke's Laws confused criminal and
civil procedure, 6 and this is certainly true of their provisions on
juries. Beyond that, the jury regulations give a very confusing
picture of the criminal jury's duty.
Four sections of this chapter are relevant to the present
study. The first of these passages says that juries in cases "be-
tween party and party... shall find the matter of fact... ac-
cording to the evidence; whereupon the Justices in the absence
of other Superior Officers, shall pronounce the sentence direct-
ing the Jury in point of Law...." The last declares, "The
Bench is briefly to sume the Evidence by way of Information to
2' The Duke's Laws may be found at 1 COLONiAL NEWYORK LAws, supra note 83, at
1-100. See GOEBEL & NAUGHTON, supra note 254, at 16-17, 1 HAMUnN & BAKER, supra
note 57, at 5, MICHAEL KAMMEN, COLONIAL NEW YoRK-A HISroRY 77-78, 129-130
(1975), MORTON PENNYPACKER, Tim DUKE'S LAWS: THEIR ANTECEDENTS, IMPLICATONS
AND IMPORTANCE (N.Y.U. Anglo-American Legal History Series, Series 1, No. 9)
(1944), George L. Haskins and Samuel E. Ewing, The Spread of Massachusetts Law in the
Seventeenth Century, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 413 (1958), and George L. Haskins, Influences of
New England Law on the Middle Colonies, 1 LAW & HIST. REv. 238 (1983), on their deri-
vation and promulgation. For the 1660 code's jury provisions, which are discussed
below in notes 350-59 and accompanying text, see THE COLONIAL LAWs OF
MASSACHUSETTS. REPRINTED FROM THE EDMON OF 1660.... at 167 (William H. Whit-
more ed., 1889) [hereinafter MASS. LAWS 1660-1672).
216 See GOF.BEL & NAUGHTON, supra note 254, at 387.
'7 1 COLONIAL NEwYORKLAWS, supra note 83, at 42. On its face, this section regu-
lates only civil procedure. Two other sections of the chapter expressly apply to crimi-
nal cases. See id. at 42 ("No Jury shall exceed the number of Seaven nor be under Six
unless in Special Causes upon Life and Death, The Justices shall thinke fitt to Appoint
twelve."), 43 ("A Verdict shall be so exteemed, when the Major part of the Jury is
agreed ... Except in Case of Life and Death where the whole jury is to be unanimous
in their Verdict"). The remainder of the chapter, including the other provisions
quoted in the text, facially apply to civil and criminal cases alike.




the jury. " sss In between are clauses providing that ajury may re-
turn a special verdict "if the Law is obscure, so as the Jury can-
not be Satisfied therein,"29 and that jurors may seek advice "in
open Court" from anyone "they shall think fitt to Resolve and
direct them before they give in their verdict." 260
Was the first of these provisions, which has no criminal
counterpart, supposed to apply to criminal cases? Was the sec-
ond designed to prohibit judicial instructions on the law, ban
the English practice of judicial comment on the evidence, nei-
ther, or both? Did the third reflect the jury's right to determine
the law as well as the facts, or did it merely authorize the return
of special, rather than general, verdicts? Did the fourth license
jurors to get advice about the law, the facts, or both? If jurors
were free to seek outside legal counsel, were they authorized to
seek opinions in opposition to the judges' views, or only to clar-
ify the court's law?
61
We don't know how these questions would have been an-
swered by Richard Nicolls, who purportedly wrote the Duke's
1 COLONIAL NEwYoRK LAws, supra note 83, at 43. This provision doesn't come
from the 1660 code. It does, however, resonate with a passage in James Davis' justice
of the peace manual. See supra text accompanying notes 106-109.
9 Id. at 43.
'The relevant text is:
Whensoever any Juror orJurores are not Clear in theirJudgments concerning
any Case, they shall have liberty in open Court (but not otherwise) to advice
with any particular man upon the Bench, or any other whom they shall think
fitt to Resolve and direct them before they give in their verdict.
Id.
Goebel and Naughton suggested that the provision quoted in the previous note
was meant for the benefit of Dutch New Yorkers who had difficulty with the English
language. See GOEBEL & NAUGHTON, supra note 254, at 560 n.31. (On the persistence
of the use of the Dutch language in New York after 1664, see DAVID E. NARRETr,
INHERITANCE AND FAMILY LIFE IN COLONIAL NEw YORK CIT 18-24 (1992).) They seem
not to have noticed that this law was borrowed from the Massachusetts Bay Colony's
code. See infra note 357 and accompanying text. The Bay Colony lawmakers surely
didn't adopt it to accommodate foreign language-speakers in their midst. See infra
note 366. While that doesn't necessarily mean Goebel and Naughton were wrong, see
infra note 262 and accompanying text, it does mean that other possible reasons for its
inclusion in the Duke's Laws-including the possibility that it was borrowed from the
Massachusetts code simply because it was there-should also be considered.
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Laws 262 But surviving records of criminal cases tried pursuant to
those laws give us some insight into the role accorded criminal
juries in colonial New York.63 While this data is neither unam-
biguous nor conclusive, it points toward official acceptance of
the criminal jury's right to determine the law and the facts.
In their careful study of the history of the New York Su-
preme Court, which was the province's highest court after 1691
and had jurisdiction over the trial of all major crimes,2 4 Paul
Hamlin and Charles Baker report that one "function of the
judge's charge to the jury [was] to explain the law as it applied
to the issue (or matter in the indictment) and to the evidence,
and to direct the jury respecting what verdicts were possible ac-
cording to the evidence and the law. , 215 Moreover, they tell us
that the judges of this court "generally confined" the list of peo-
ple whom juries could ask about the criminal law "to the mem-
262 Even if we knew how the Massachusetts courts would have answered some of
these questions, given the hurried manner in which the Duke's Laws were composed,
there is no reason to think Nicolls was aware of, or in agreement with, their views.
Moreover, I know of no reason to question Goebel and Naughton's observation that
"we have no evidence that the new officials in New York were familiar with more than
the bare language of the New England law book." Goebel & Naughton, supra note
254, at 386.
263 Although the Judiciary Act of 1691 remodeled the New York court system, see
generally 1 HAMLIN & BAKER, supra note 57, at 3-77, there is no reason to think that it
altered or superseded the trial practice reflected by these provisions. (Indeed, echo-
ing part of the section of the Duke's Laws set forth in the text accompanying note
257, supra, the 1691 act provided, in part, that when a case involved contested issues
of fact, "no Persons Right or property shall be ... Determined... unless the fact be
found by the verdict of Twelve Men of the Neighbourhood, as itt ought of Right to be
Done by the Law." 1 COLONIAL NEWYORK LAws, supra note 83, at 230; LAws AND ACTS
OF TBE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THEIR MAJESTY'S PROVINCE ON NEw-YORK... 5 (William
Bradford ed., 1691) [hereinafter LAWS AND ACTS], reprinted in EARLIEST NEW YORK
LAws, supra note 83, at 9 (emphasis added).) Hence, Hamlin and Baker cite later
cases, including the cases discussed in the text below, as throwing light on their
meaning. See, e.g., 1 HAMnLN & BAKER, supra, at 215-16. More importantly, even after
1691, "the Duke's Laws were cited by counsel in the Supreme Court in the same
manner as other statutes." Note, Law in Colonial New York: The Legal System of 1691, 80
HARV. L. REV. 1757, 1770 n.44 (1967). (For other evidence of the continued life of
the Duke's Laws after 1691, see id.)
1 HAMLIN & BAKER, supra note 57, at 3-4, 67-77.
265 Id. at 215. For charges of an unknown nature given in the Delaware counties
during the period in which they were ruled from New York, see supra note 88. For an-
other Delaware instruction of this era, which seems to have limited the jury to finding
facts, see supra note 89.
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bers of the bench.' 2  What's more, Hamlin and Baker identify
two 1702 cases in which Chief Justice Atwood directed juries to
return guilty verdicts. In Dom Rex v. Baker, Atwood "gave charge
to the Jury to bring Baker in guilty" and rejected three defiant
verdicts before a threat to fine disobedient jurors finally led to
the conviction he so ardently desired.267 And in Nicholas Ba-
yard's treason trial, Atwood is said to have told the jurors that
they "could not do otherwise than bring in the prisoner
guilty.
268
Nonetheless, on balance, the surviving judicial record sug-
gests that juries in colonial New York may have had the right to
find the law in criminal cases. To begin with, the evidence from
Atwood's tenure as Chief Justice is not preclusive. The jury in
Baker's case seems to have disagreed with Atwood about the
facts, not the law.26 9 And it's not clear what transpired in Ba-
yard's case. In his summation, one of Bayard's lawyers appar-
ently argued that juries were judges of the law as well as the facts
and that Bayard's jury would have to decide a purely legal ques-
tion-i.e., whether the act for which Bayard was on trial was
treason or a legitimate exercise of his right to petition for re-
dress of grievances. 270 In the published account of the case,
which was written by Bayard's party, 1 neither Atwood nor the
prosecutor is said explicitly to have denied the truth of this ar-
26' 1 HAMUN & BAKER, supra note 57, at 216 & n.197.
267 See id. at 220-21; 4 NEwYORK HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS, supra note 223, at 956-57.
" Dom. Rex v. Bayard, 14 Howell's St. Trials 471, 504 (1702). An abridged version
of this report appears in 10 Am. St. Trials 518, 536 (1702). Goebel and Naughton re-
port that Atwood was equally directive (to the point of being threatening) in the in-
structions he gave to the jury in the trial of Bayard's ally, Alderman John Hutchins.
See GOEBEL & NAUGHTON, supra note 254, at 670-71 & n.232. See 15 CALENDAR OF
STATE PAPERS, COLONIAL SERIES, AMERICA & WEST INDIES 759 (Noel Sainsbury et al.
eds., 1860-) [hereinafter CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS]. (On the political and social
background of these trials, beginning with Leisler's Rebellion, see 3 ANDREWS, supra
note 150, at 122-37, GOEBEL & NAUGHTON, supra, at 83-86, 274-76, 1 HAMIN & BAKER,
supra note 57, at 303-08, KAMMEN, supra note 255, at 118-51, LEvy, supra note 239, at
35, and Adrian Howe, The Bayard Treason Trial: Dramatizing Anglo-Dutch Politics in
Eighteenth-Centuy New York City, 47 WM. & MARY Q. 3d 57 (1990).)
See 4 NEwYORK HSTORICAL DOCUMENTS, supra note 223, at 956.
'0 See 14 Howell's St. Trials at 502, 503, 10 Am. St. Trials at 535. See also id. at 505,
10 Am. St. Trials at 537 (argument repeated in later part of trial).
"' See 1 HAmLN & BAKER, supra note 57, at 206.
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gument. Moreover, after the jury is said to have told him that it
had factual and legal problems with the case, this report doesn't
suggest that Atwood denied that the resolution of legal ques-
tions fell within its domain. Rather, he is alleged to have said
that "if they were under any difficulty, whether the matters of
fact alleged in the indictment, and which were proved to them,
were treason or no, they might find the prisoner guilty2 2 and
let the court decide that purely legal question on a motion in
arrest of judgment. Indeed, Atwood's response to this report
denies that "the Court, or the King's Counsel had declared, that
if the Jury found the Fact, they were to have no regard to matter
of Law, 278 a claim which should not lightly be dismissed.
Given all of this, perhaps Bayard's account of Atwood's charge is
an exaggerated or ambiguous redaction of a charge that really
just expressed Atwood's strongly stated belief that Bayard's guilt
was clear and urged the jury to convict him, or an accurate
summary of a deliberate effort to intimidate or fool the jury into
foregoing its legitimate option of deciding the law and the facts
of Bayard's case.
In any event, Atwood's attitude towards the criminal jury (if
he rejected its authority in rendering a general verdict to judge
the law as well as the facts) can scarcely be assumed to reflect
the criminal jury's true role in colonial New York. Atwood was
"2 14 Howell's St. Trials at 505, 10 Am. St. Trials at 536-37.
'r William Atwood, The Case of William Atwood, Esq.... (1703), in 13 COLLECIONS
OF THE NEw-YoRK HISORICAL SocmTEY 305 (1880).
' Atwood wrote this response in England as part of his unsuccessful campaign to
get the Board of Trade to help him defeat the Bayardites' attempt to remove him
from his position as ChiefJustice. New Yorkers and their Governor listed many rea-
sons why he was unfit to remain in office, see 15 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, supra note
268, at 756-59; 4 NEwYORK HISTORiCAL DOCUMENTS, supra note 223, at 1010-12, and a
denial that Bayard's jury had the right to judge the law as well as the facts of his case
was not among them. Given this, and the fact that such a denial would have been
consistent with the practice of the courts in England (as well, doubtless, as with the
views of the Lords of Trade), it's hard to imagine why Atwood would have fabricated
the denial noted in the text.
2' Partisanship may well color our accounts of Bayard's trial and that of his friend
Hutchins, which is mentioned in note 268, supra. There is, however, another reason
to doubt the literal accuracy of the report of these cases: Atwood "limited the taking
of notes in the courtroom" in these cases. 3 HAMLN & BAKER, supra note 57, at 15.
See 14 Howell's St. Trials at 484.
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an import from the mother country who had no experience
with colonial law or practice before his eighteen month tenure
as ChiefJustice.27 6 His conduct in Baker's trial violated both the
Duke's Laws and his own standards of judicial ethics27 and his
actions in Bayard's case led to his being thrown off the bench.28
Although Atwood's ouster was politically inspired,27 he may
never have understood the roles that the colony felt judges and
jurors were to play in the trial of criminal cases, and he may
therefore have given his opponents a popular ground for attack-
ing him.2 4
And we do get a very different impression of colonial New
York's vision of the criminal jury's lawfinding responsibilities
from two of the other relatively full reports of criminal trials
held in the province. The first of these trials is Francis Make-
mie's 1707 prosecution for delivering a sermon without a li-
cense. 8' Makemie, leader of the Presbytery of Philadelphia, 2
was asked to preach in some of New York's dissenting churches.
Application was made on his behalf for a license, but Governor
Cornbury, zealous to promote Anglican power, denied the re-
quest. Makemie preached anyway, and he and a colleague were
arrested. The applicability in the province of various Parliamen-
tary acts and the legal status of royal instructions-less ab-
276 See 1 HAmUN & BAKER, supra note 57, at 88-89.
2" See id. at 224. Goebel and Naughton also state that his "statement of the law" of
treson in Bayard's case "was incorrect." GOEBEL & NAUGHTON, supra note 254, at 666.
"" See 1 HAMiUN & BAKER, supra note 57, at 89, 91 n.18, 307; 3 idt at 13-15. For
more on Atwood's dismissal, see the colonial documents cited in note 274, supra.
2" See 1 HAMLN & BAKER, supra note 57, at 412.
' Even though the denial of the jury's right to decide the law as well as the facts in
a criminal case was not one of the stated reasons for Atwood's removal, see supra note
274, the suggestion that he had taken this position in the trials of Bayard and Hutch-
ins may have inflamed public sentiment against him. Indeed, this could have been
true even if these allegations were false.
"' This case is reported in FRANCIS MAEMIm, A NAaRATvE OF A NEw AND UNUSUAL
AMERICAN IMPRiSONMENT, OF Two PRESBYitERIAN MNISTERS, AND PROSECUTION OF MR.
FRANCIS MAKEMIE ONE OF THEM, FOR PREACHING ONE SERMON AT THE CrHy OF NEWYORK
(1707) (Evans # 1300), which can also be found at 4 TRACTS AND OTHER PAPERS
RELATING PRINCIPALLY TO THE ORIGIN . .. OF THE COLONIES IN NORTH AMERICA, no.4
(Peter Force ed., 1846). KAMMEN, supra note 255, at 157-58, and LEVY, supra note 239,
at 35-36, put this case in historical perspective.
2 The birth of this organization, and Makemie's role therein, are sketched in
POMFRET, supra note 193, at 103-06.
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stractly, the extent of religious liberty in New York-were the
only disputed issues at Makemie's trial. These were purely legal
questions. The Attorney General sought a special verdict, for
"the matter of fact is plainly confessed by the Defendant, as you
have heard, . . . [and] you are not Judges of Law., 283  Citing a
concern about delay, Makemie opposed this request.24 Al-
though we are told that the court initially favored the Attorney
General's motion,t Makemie's refusal to join it did not fall on
deaf ears. ChiefJustice Mompesson charged the jury as follows:
.... Gentlemen, You have heard a great deal on both sides, and Mr. At-
torney says the fact is confessed by the Defendant, and I would have you bring it in
specially, for there are some points I am not now prepared to answer, How far
[Royal] Instructions [to the Governors] may go, in having the force of a Law, es-
pecially when not published, or made known: And there is one objection made by
Mr. Makemie, and that is the Oath of Supremacy of England is abolished; &
how far it will go in this matter, I confess I am not prepared to answer: If you will
take upon you to judge of Law, you may, or bring in the fact specifically. This is
28 Id. at 34. It is not clear whether the Attorney General was asking the jury to re-
turn a special verdict or requesting that (with or without the defendant's consent we
cannot tell) the court ask or tell the jury to return one.
Be that as it may, Hamlin and Baker say that this language shouldn't be read as
denying the jury's authority to determine the law, see 1 HAmLI & BAKER, supra note
57, at 218 n.201, but they offer nojustification for their view.
2" See Makemie, supra note 281, at 35. Cf Brown v. Clock (Sup. Ct. ofJudicature
1695), reported in COLLECIONS Op THE NEW-YORK HISTORICAL SOCIETY 69-70 (1913)
(the parties agreed in chambers that "the Jury [should] go out upon a special verdict"
but the jury returned a general verdict, which the court refused to quash).
Although the defense argued that the jury should acquit because the alleged law
that was violated was in fact not law, see MAKEMIE, supra, at 21-34, Makemie replied to
the Attorney General's remark about jury lawfinding with the facetious claim, "I can-
not see one point of the Law to be judged." Id. at 35. Was Makemie, who was both a
new arrival to New York and a non-lawyer, unsure of the propriety of jury lawfinding
in the province? Of course, he did have counsel. Would an experienced New York
practitioner have had reason to share such uncertainty? Even if a lawyer familiar with
Atwood's account of Bayard's trial might have believed the Chief Justice hadn't de-
nied the right, see supra notes 270-75 and accompanying text, no one suggested that
he affirmed it. And we don't know whether lawfinding was otherwise part of the col-
ony's customary jury practice. Maybe these considerations explain why the Attorney
General seems not to have regarded the issue as settled in favor of the jury's lawfind-
ing authority. (As far as I am aware, no one has ever questioned the accuracy of these
aspects of the report of Makemie's trial.)
2 See MAXEMIE, supra note 281, at 34.
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the first Instance I can learn, has been of a Tryal or Prosecution of this nature in
America.
28
Believing Makemie to have done nothing wrong,287 the jury
brought in a general verdict of acquittal, and when the jurors
explained their decision to Mompesson, he accepted it without
complaint.8
A third well-documented criminal trial from this era, the
Zenger libel case of 1735,289 also indicates that criminal juries in
2" Id., at 36 (italics in original).
Stanley Katz believed this discussion showed that Mompesson left the law to the
jury because he "was unfamiliar with the proper procedure for such an unusual
crime, and consequently was unsure that he could limit the jury to a special verdict."
Stanley Nider Katz, Introduction to ALExANDER, supra note 29, at 218 n.34. The last
sentence quoted in the text above is the only one that could conceivably support this
interpretation, but I highly doubt that this is what it meant. I think it more likely that
Mompesson was telling the jury that there was no precedent to guide his or its judg-
ment in deciding the validity of Makemie's legal arguments.
My skepticism about Katz' reading of the text is supported by several considera-
tions. To begin with, Mompesson's charge doesn't say that he felt any uncertainty
about the jury's province in the case. Moreover, as far as we know, no one suggested
that unusual procedures were to be employed because of the nature of the crime.
Beyond this, Mompesson didn't say that the jury had the choice of rendering a gen-
eral or special verdict; rather, the choice he said it had was between deciding the facts
and deciding the law, and he told the jurors that they had the right (not just the
power) to decide both. Further, if Mompesson had thought himself faced with a
purely procedural problem, it's hard to understand why he would have commented
on the novelty of this trial "in America." After all, he was well-trained in English prac-
tice, and (were reference to practice out of NewYork to have been relevant to his de-
cision) he would presumably have referred to, and followed, it. Finally, Makemie's
defense involved legal issues that wouldn't have been presented by a similar prosecu-
tion in England.
'87 Leonard Levy suggests that the verdict may also have been sparked by the jury's
anger about the fact that the warrant issued by Cornbury ordering Makemie's arrest
implied that the Church of England was the established church in New York. See
Levy, supra note 239, at 36.
' See MAIEMIE, supra note 281, at 36. Two aftereffects of this trial should be
noted. First, Mompesson's order that the victorious defendant pay fees to the prose-
cutor, jailer, and others (a traditional practice in the colony, see GoEBEL & NAUGHTON,
supra note 254, at 731-48) led the colonial Assembly to pass a law forbidding the prac-
tice. (The act was disallowed. See id. at 741.) Second, Lord Cornbury was recalled to
England and imprisoned. With respect to both points, see KAMMEN, supra note 255,
at 158.
2" See supra note 29. Much has been written about this trial. The leading com-
mentaries are Katz, supra note 286, and LEvY, supra note 239, at 37-45, 119-43. For an
excellent, more recent contribution to our understanding of these events, see Eben
Moglen, Considering Zenger: Partisan Politics and the Legal Profession in Provincial New
York, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1495 (1994).
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the province were believed to have the right to decide the law as
well as the facts in arriving at a general verdict. The issue in
Zenger was whether the jury could determine the criminality of
the article Zenger had printed criticizing the colony's Governor.
According to our account of the trial, which was written by the
defense but seems never to have been challenged in any rele-
vant respect, defense counsel Andrew Hamilton argued that the
jury should find Zenger innocent because the criticism was ac-
curate, even though Chief Justice De Lancey had excluded his
evidence of its truth on the ground that, pursuant to the classic
rule of English libel law, truth was not a defense.m In the cli-
mactic confrontation between advocate and judge, Hamilton as-
serted that the jurors "muse' decide if the words were libelous to
return a verdict, to which De Lancey responded that (as libel ju-
ries generally did) they "may' return essentially a special verdict
and decide only if "Zenger printed and published [the] pa-
pers."29' 1 Hamilton, in turn, replied,
I know, may it please Your Honor, the jury may do so; but I do like-
wise know they may do otherwise. I know they have the right beyond all
dispute to determine both the law and the fact, and where they do not
292
doubt of the law, they ought to do so.
It appears that De Lancey didn't answer this retort at the
time. Later on, however, he seems to have conceded the point
in his charge to the jury. Our account of this charge begins with
the Chief Justice's bitter observation that Hamilton had proba-
bly persuaded the jury to ignore whatever he might say, but
what he evidently went on to say was precisely what Hamilton
had said before: "as the facts or words in the information are
' In fact, the English rule was that the greater the truth the greater the libel. See 1
WLLIAM HAWasNS, PLAS OF TME CROWN 194 (Garland facsimile ed. 1978) (1716).
Consequently, one can only wonder why De Lancey allowed Hamilton to argue as he
did. Was De Lancey unsure of the law or hungry for a good fight? Would an attempt
to silence Hamilton have been bad politics? Or did the bench have no right to re-
quire that the arguments of counsel stay within "the law"? If the last of these answers
is the right one, what would it imply about the jury's province? Did counsel have a
right to greater latitude in arguing the law than the jury had in reaching a verdict?




confessed: The only thing that can come before you is whether
the words as set forth in the information make a libel. And that
is a matter of law, no doubt, and which you may leave to the
Court."
5
Thus, Bayard, Makemie, and Zenger all seem to suggest that
New Yorkjuries had the right to determine the law and the facts
in criminal cases. This would be consistent with one plausible
interpretation of the relevant provincial statutes. Moreover, it
would be consistent with the fact that Roger Mompesson has
been said to have "instituted no substantial change in the prac-
tice, rules or procedure" of the NewYork Supreme Court.2
Yet these three cases are too slender a reed on which to
build with great confidence. The jury lawfinding issue may not
have been contested or resolved in Bayard. Five years later, in
Makemie, the Attorney General claimed that no such right ex-
isted. Although Makemie contains an express acknowledgment
of the right to decide the law and Mompesson has been said not
to have changed established practice greatly while on the New
York bench (a view he seems not to have shared),2 s Makemie
may be a fluke, the exception that proves the rule. After all, no
one in Zenger claimed that Makemie, Bayard, or any other case
had already decided the question.2 Nor did anyone suggest
' Id. at 100 (emphasis added).
3 HAMIUN & BAKER, supra note 57, at 140. But Cf supra note 214.
2' See supra note 214.
" Cf. supra notes 283-84 and accompanying text. The author of a 1738 critique of
Zenger's defense, who may have been the King's Attorney of Barbados, see
ALEXANDER, supra note 29, at 229 n.1, agreed that 'juries in criminal cases may deter-
mine both law and fact when they are complicated, if they will take such a decision
upon their consciences" and that Hamilton was correct about the jury's right to reject
the rule that truth was no defense to a charge of libel. Id. at 158. He failed, however,
to adduce any NewYork (or other) authority in support of this notion. This report of
Zenger's trial was reprinted in New York in 1770 in response to the attempted libel
prosecution of Alexander McDougall, a leader of the Sons of Liberty. Appended to
this edition was an essay arguing, inter alia, that juries had the right to decide the law
and the facts. See Observations, on the Right and Duty ofJuries, tojudge and determine
of Law as well as Fact, in A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN PETER
ZENGER ... 50-52 (1770). This writer, too, made no reference to Bayard or Makemie.
Nor did he even cite Zenger as having decided the question. Like Hamilton, and Ba-
yard's lawyer before him, he argued (as to New York precedent) only that the jury's
right to determine whether a homicide was manslaughter or murder (about which
our published sources tell us nothing) showed that juries had the right to decide the
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that jury charges had traditionally sanctioned the practice. As
for the Zenger case itself, perhaps De Lancey was outmaneu-
vered, but not persuaded that juries had the right to determine
the law and the facts, even in criminal libel cases. That would
explain why our report doesn't say that he explicitly conceded
that juries had that right.27 Moreover, it would shed light on
why, even after Zenger, Attorney General John Tabor Kempe
several times argued that juries were not the judges of the
criminal law.29s The significance of this claim, and the court's
response to it, are entirely unknown to us; but we cannot as-
sume that it was a frivolous position. It is at least possible that
these three extraordinary political trials had not decided the le-
gitimacy of the jury lawfinding claim, or that they had been gov-
erned by "special" rules,m and that the province had otherwise
rejected or not clearly passed on the claim that criminal juries
have a right to determine the law before the Revolution.300
law and facts of criminal cases before them generally. Cf. KATz, supra note 286, at 13
(asserting Makemie wasn't a "respectable precedent" for a jury right to determine law
and facts in seditious libel cases).
27 Perhaps De Lancey's "may" was meant not to suggest a right to find the law, but
sarcastically, in recognition of the fact that he couldn't force the jury to return a spe-
cial verdict or to follow his law.
" See GOEBEL & NAUGHTON, supra note 254, at 678 (Dom. Rex v. Lydius);J.R. Pole,
Reflections on American Law and the American Revolution, 50 Wm. & MARY Q.3d 123, 130
(1993) (As Pole notes, Kempe's father-and predecessor as Attorney General-had
earlier denied the jury's right to determine the law in civil cases. See id.) Although
the younger Kempe could have been arguing for a change in the law, he may also
have been making an argument that was clearly a correct statement of the law or pre-
senting his view on an issue that was still unresolved.
m See Moglen, supra note 59, at 1093 n.24; supra note 103; supra note 277 and ac-
companying text. Indeed, it is possible that such "jury rights" talk was really political
rhetoric reserved exclusively for political trials. But see supra note 296.
m Goebel and Naughten mention a few additional criminal jury charges from the
colonial period, see GOEBEL & NAUGHiTON, supra note 254, at 667-68, but those charges
shed no light on this problem. In three of these cases, the charge as we have it says
nothing at all about the law, but in none of these cases was there any debate (or room
for debate) about the law. In the fourth, King v. Van Rensselaer, our sketchy account
indicates that the court told the jury about a rule of construction to which neither
party seems to have objected, and the account says nothing about whether the jury
was told it was bound by the rule. See also supra note 89 and accompanying text.
ChiefJustice Lewis Morris's notes of yet another charge say that the jury "must" re-
turn particular verdicts if it finds specified facts to have been proven. See King v. An-
drew Broostead (charge in murder trial before New York Supreme Court, June Term,
1716), contained in LEWIS MORRIS, MANuscRi'T NOTES OF CASES BEFORE MORRIS As
1998] COLONIALJURIES
Howe didn't claim to know what the jury's rightful province
was in any of the colonies discussed above. By way of contrast,
he asserted that the jury's right to determine the law as well as
the facts in a criminal case was clearly established in colonial
Connecticut, Rhode Island, and New Hampshire.!"' Upon care-
ful analysis, however, the available data only partially supports
this claim.
The evidence Howe adduced with respect to jury practice in
colonial Connecticut consists, on examination, of four state-
CHIEFJUSTICE OF TBE SUPREME COURT OF NEw YORK .... at 4-5 (Yale Univ., Beinecke
Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Law Deposit, Morris Collection). However, the
manuscript doesn't reveal-and I don't know-whether these notes were meant to be
read verbatim to the jury, whether they were so read, or whether the law was con-
tested in this case. Thus, it's not clear what we properly can infer from the mandatory
language appearing therein.
In 1764, ChiefJustice Daniel Horsmanden refused to order the jury verdict in For-
sey v. Cunningham to be submitted for review by the Governor and his Council. See
generally 9 COLLECTIONS OF TEM NEw-YORK HISTORICAL SOcIETy 407-35 (1876). One
reason given for this decision was that verdicts could not be reexamined byjudges. In
Horsmanden's words, "By the common Law of England the Trial of Facts is intrusted
to the Jury, and the power to declare the Law upon them, is committed to the Kings
Judges. These are distinct Provinces, and the Limits between them guarded by in-
variable usage & the most incontestable authorities ...." Id. at 409. However, we
don't know whether Horsmanden felt that the same division of authority applied in
criminal cases. (For an analysis of Forsey and its place in colonial New York history,
see Milton M. Klein, Prelude to Revolution in New York: Juty Trials and Judicial Tenure, 17
WM. &MARYQ. 3d 439 (1960).)
Finally, it should be noted that nothing was said about any of this history in People
v. Croswell 3Johns. Cas. 336 (N.Y. 1804), which comprehensively examined the jury's
lawfinding authority in libel cases.
3O' See Howe, supra note 31, at 591. His reference to "other New England colonies"
obviously includes Connecticut, as he cited Connecticut sources in the footnote ac-
companying the text at this point. But Howe said "colonies," so he must have had at
least one other in mind. His later remarks make it obvious that he did not mean to
refer here to Massachusetts Bay. See id at 604-05. If he meant to include Vermont,
one of four New England states he had just mentioned, see id. at 591, his reference to
other "colonies" would have been an uncharacteristically egregious error-Vermont
was not a colony-or uncharacteristically sloppy writing. In any event, Howe cited no
evidence that "Vermont"juries had the right to judge the law in colonial times, and I
am aware of none. I therefore assume that the other colony he had in mind was New
Hampshire, about which he had just noted that "colonial judges exercised very lim-
ited powers in the trial of both civil and criminal cases." Id. (citing Daniel Chipman,
Preface to 1 D. Chip., at 9-36 (1824); THOMAS DURFEE, GLEANINGS FROM THE JUDICIAL
HISTORYOFRiODE ISLAND 43, 83 (1883)).
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ments about the authority of juries in civil cases."' Only two of
the four say anything about the lawfinding responsibility of civil
juries before the Revolution. Happily, both of them say the
same thing: that Connecticut judges didn't instruct civil juries
on the law until 1807.
The basis for this claim was a treatise written in 1810 by
State Supreme Court Judge Zephaniah Swift. Since Swift wasn't
M0' Howe cited Witter v. Brewster, Kirby 422 (Ct. 1788), 2 SwIxT, supra note 70, at
258-59, Thomas Day, Preface to 1 Conn., at xxiii (1848), and DwIGHT LooMIs & J.
GILBERT CALHOUN, THEJUDICIAL AND CIVIL HISTORY OF CoNNEcncuT 163 (1895). See
Howe, supra note 31, at 591 n.29. All four of these authorities discuss the jury's prov-
ince in civil cases only.
Wtter is an appeal of a civil judgment. One objection raised before the court was
"that the jury had mistaken the law and the evidence in the case." Witter, Kirby at 422.
The court rejected this claim, on the ground that "[i]t doth not vitiate a verdict, that
the jury have mistaken the law or the evidence; for by the practice of this state, they
are judges of both...." Id. at 423. Neither criminal nor colonial practice are men-
tioned anywhere in our report of this case, or in the court file (which I have exam-
ined).
The cited pages of Swift's treatise, supra, which has been called "the first American
law text," AumANN, supra note 67, at 74 n.22, say that contemporary civil practice in
Connecticut-and colonial practice there-followed the pattern of judge-jury com-
munication set forth below in note 306 and accompanying text. The same work's dis-
cussion of criminal procedure shows that it was different in this respect: judges in
1796 did instruct criminal juries on the law before the start ofjury deliberations. See 2
SwIFT, supra, at 401; infra text accompanying note 307. This treatise says nothing
about when or why criminal and civil practice first diverged on this point, or what the
relevant colonial criminal practice was.
Taken together, these facts demonstrate that the reference to early Connecticut
practice in Swift's 1810 Digest, see supra note 72, at 169, was made with an eye to civil,
not criminal, procedure. (If further proof were needed, the existence and placement
of a footnote Swift wrote, see supra note 74, by way of commentary on the 1821 Code,
see 1821 CONN. PUB. AcrS 49 n.6, should suffice.) Because this would have been self-
evident to Thomas Day, whose essay citing the Digest (and the court rule mentioned
above at note 72 and the accompanying text) in a discussion covering the same
ground is the third of Howe's sources, we can presume that he, too, had civil cases in
mind in the passage cited by Howe.
Citing no authority whatsoever, Howe's final source, Loomis and Calhoun's book,
says that the practice "in charging the jury" before 1807 "was to submit to [the jury]
the law as well as the facts, without expressing any opinion or giving any direction
how to find their verdict." LOoMIS & CALHOUN, supra, at 163. Because Swift's work
seems to be the only data on this question of which scholars were aware, and because
Loomis and Calhoun's language echoes Swift's comments about civil procedure, I be-
lieve that they were not speaking about, had no independent evidence about, and
thus give us no further insight into, Connecticut criminal practice before 1807.
s' See supra note 302.
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born until 1759' and didn't begin to read law until the 1780s,5
it isn't clear how he knew what colonial jury practice was. In any
event, both of Howe's oracles mischaracterized Swift's account.
According to Swift's treatise, before giving a civil case to the
jury, the court just summarized the evidence and the arguments
of counsel. However, Swift went on to note that the court had
the right to refuse to accept a verdict with which it disagreed, in
which case the bench could air its views on any legal issues in
the case before ordering the jury out to resume its delibera-
tions.ue Hence, the assertion that Connecticut judges didn't in-
struct civil juries on the law before 1807 is only half right.
'0 See BALDWIN, supra note 71, at 101; Donald F. Gerardi, Zephaniah Swift and Con-
necticut's Standing Order: Skepticism, Conservatism, and Religious Liberty in the Early Repub-
lic, 67 N. ENG. Q. 234, 236 (1994).
' See BALDWIN, supra note 71, at 105; Gerardi, supra note 304, at 239.
m6 See SWIFt, supra note 72, at 169; see also 2 Swir, supra note 70, at 258-59. It is to
this civil practice that Daniel Chipman referred in his work, which Howe cited else-
where. See supra note 301. See also BRucE H. MANN, NoGHBORS AND STRANGERS 70
(1987) (sayingjudges didn't use this power often in the seventeenth century).
The same practice may have been reflected in a 1643 law which required dead-
locked juries to explain their disagreement to the court, listen to its "answer" to their
problem, and resume their deliberations. See 1 PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE COLONY oF
CONNEancTU 84-85 (Charles J. Hoadly & J. Hammond Trumbull eds., 1850-1890)
[hereinafter CONNECTICtrr COLONIAL RECORDS]. A 1645 act went further, empower-
ing the judges to reject a jury verdict, order further deliberation, and (if the second
verdict wasn't what the court felt "the euidence given in Court" required) remit the
case to anotherjury. Id. at 117-18. In the Code of 1650, this law was slightly amended
and joined with other provisions to form a chapter onJuries andJurors. See id. at 535-
36. As amended, the law now provided that verdicts could be rejected when the court
felt the jury had failed "to haue attended the euidence given in, and true issue of the
Case" Id. (emphasis added). Did either version of the act apply to criminal cases?
What (if anything) did the italicized language from the 1650 Code add to the law?
Did it represent a change in the judge-jury relationship? I have no answers to these
questions.
This provision was retained in the Revision of 1672, but new matter was also intro-
duced into the chapter. See THE GENERAL LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF CONNECTICUT
COLONIE . . . 37 (Samuel Green ed., 1673) [hereinafter CONNECrICUT LAWS AND
LIBERTIES], reprinted in THE EARLIM LAWS OF THE NEW HAVEN AND CONNECTICUT
COLONIES 1639-1673, at 111 (John D. Cushing ed., 1977). Section two of the revised
chapter stated that, after receiving a civil verdict, the bench could either "declare the
Sentence, or direct the Jury to find according to the law." Id. This passage, which was
doubtless based upon the Massachusetts Code of 1649, see infra text accompanying
note 351; cf. Haskins & Ewing, supra note 255, at 414-15 (discussing influence of that
code on the Connecticut Code of 1650), appears to have authorized the court to re-
ject a verdict, give the kind of charge noted by Swift, and send the jury back to recon-
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However, in two sections of Swift's 1796 treatise on Con-
necticut law that Howe seems not to have discovered, Swift
commented directly on the relevant aspects of Connecticut's
criminal procedure. What he said was that contemporary
judges gave instructions on the law before sending the jury out
in a criminal case. While Swift traced the contrary practice in
civil cases to colonial times,308 his work is devoid of any hint of
the vintage of the practice followed in his day in criminal cases.
And I have found nothing that bridges this gap.3'9 In any event,
sider the case. If so, it presumably spelled out a prerogative already enjoyed by the
judges under the 1650 Code.
The 1672 Revision also included the chapter's first two explicit references to
criminal juries. Section four authorized "Grand or Petty Jur[ies]" to return a non
liquet or a special verdict. See CONNECTICUT LAWS AND LIBERTmS, supra, at 37. (A non
liquet was a verdict of, "It's not clear what verdict we ought to return." See BLACK's LAW
DICrIONANY 951 (5th ed. 1979).) Section six, on the other hand, required that cases
involving the penalty of death or banishment be tried before special juries of twelve
men, and that their verdicts be unanimous. See id Obviously, neither of these provi-
sions tells us whether the petty jury had the right to determine the law as well as the
facts in a criminal case.
A 1693 enactment allowed criminal juries to ask the court for help concerning
"the matter giuen them in charge," 4 CONNEC'ICuT COLONIAL REcoRDs, supra, at 98,
but this doesn't mean the jury had already received any instructions. The quoted
language may simply have meant "the case given them for decision" (i.e., put in their
"charge"). It might also have been a reference to the jurors' oath (in which they were
"charged" to decide the case fairly), or a later judicial exhortation to "do yourjob" or
"do right." Finally, it could have referred to judicial guidance or instruction about
how to go about deciding the case. Cf supra notes 81, 100.
The 1702 Revision made three relevant changes. First, it eliminated the chapter
on juries and moved these provisions into a chapter entitled "Actions." See AaTS AND
LAWS OF His MAJESTm'S COLONY OF CONNECTICUT IN NEw-ENGLAND 1-3 (1702) (Evans #
1043) [hereinafter CONNECICUT ACTS & LAWS]. Second, the former jury chapter's
two references to criminal cases were deleted from the code, which now said nothing
about jury practice in criminal cases. Finally, the Revision authorized the judges to
reject a civil jury's second verdict and direct it to reconsider the case for a third, and
final, time, but they lost power to refer the case to a second jury. See CONNECCUT
ACTS & LAws, supra, at 3.
The chapter on "Actions Civil" in the Code of 1784 embodies the same civil prac-
tice as the 1702 Revision, seeACTs AND LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT, IN AMERICA
5, 6 (Richard Law & Roger Sherman comps., 1784), reprinted in facsimile in TIM FIRST
LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT (John D. Cushing ed., 1982), which comports
with Swift's description of his own experience of Connecticut civil practice prior to
1807.
"07 See 2 SwIFT, supra note 70, at 401.
SeeSwiFT, supra note 72, at 169.
Except for sections four and six of the 1693 act, which were expressly directed
toward criminal cases, I don't know whether any of the provisions discussed in note
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two pages later, having moved on to the subject of verdicts, Swift
wrote that, while a jury with "a doubt about the law" in a crimi-
nal case could return a special verdict, criminal juries "have full
power to determine the law, as well as the facts, and to find a
general verdict" instead. 10 Whether he believed the exercise of
this power to be within the jury's proper province, even in 1796,
is unclear.'" Thus, we don't know whether Swift believed that
criminal juries ever had the right to determine the law in colo-
nial Connecticut, and we have no other evidence to resolve the
point.
As for Rhode Island, one nineteenth century commentator
wrote that, from the "infancy" of the colony, its judges sat "not
for the purpose of deciding causes, for the Jury decided all
questions of law and fact; but merely to preserve order, and to
see that the parties had a fair chance with the Jury."01 2 Although
it exaggerates the judges' impotence and the jury's power, this
assessment accurately captures the scope of the jury's authority.
A 1647 law directed judges to administer the juror's oath
before trialf13 and, in civil cases only, to sum up the arguments
306 applied to criminal cases. Of course, even if they did, the fact that judges were
authorized to reject disfavored verdicts doesn't prove that judges had the exclusive
right to determine the law. See supra text accompanying note 84. Nor would the fact
that a jury was ultimately to prevail prove that juries had any, much less the decisive,
right to do so. See supra text accompanying note 85.
3'0 2 SwIFt, supra note 70, at 403 (emphasis added).
" In his parallel discussion of civil verdicts, Swift says that juries "may take it upon
themselves to judge of the law, as well as the facts," id. at 260 (emphasis added), a
phenomenon he called "a defect in our judicial system," id. at 259. This condemna-
tion is repeated in the Digest. See SwFr, supra note 72, atv, 169.
312 Chipman, supra note 301, at 18.
s" PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF "THE INCORPORATION OF
PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS," AND THE CODE OF LAWS ADOPTED BY THAT ASSEMBLY IN 1647
(Williams R. Staples ed., 1847), reprinted in TMHE EARLUEST ACTS AND LAWS OF THE
COLONY OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS 1647-1719, at 58-54 (John D.
Cushing ed., 1977) [hereinafter FIRST RHODE ISLAND ACTS]. The court was to charge
civil jurors "to do justice between the parties contending, according to [the] evi-
dence." Id. at 53. Criminaljurors were to be sworn "to deal faithfully and truly in the
matter, it being a matter of consequence and moment, and to proceed to determine
according to the light of their consciences, upon the evidence given in." Id. at 54.
Given that the founders of Rhode Island had experienced oppression at the hands
of the law in the Puritan colonies, see SYDNEYV. JAMES, COLONIAL RHODE ISLAND-A
HISTORY 13-32 (1975), their Assembly may not have equated 'Justice" and "con-
science" with whatever happened to be the "law" in the colony at any given moment
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and evidence after the trial and "advise" the jury "to go forth
and do justice and right between their neighbors, according to
the evidence that has been brought, for what has been
pleaded."314 In 1666, this act was amended to require that the
court "remind" a civil jury "of wt Is law in ye case then In play"
before jury deliberations begin.15 Notwithstanding these stat-
utes, a report written by Governor Bellomont to the Board of
Trade in 1699 tells us that Rhode Island judges "give no direc-
tions to the jury, nor sum up the evidences to them, pointing
unto the issue which they are to try."316 This situation remained
unchanged until 1827.317
in time. The fact that seventeenth-century Rhode Island was the home of religious
toleration and diversity, as well as the separation of church and state, see id. at 34-38,
68-74, can only fortify this doubt. These first laws contain some language concerning
the common law that may suggest that the "law" is "discoverable" by the application of
conscience, see FIRST RHODE ISLAND AcmS, supra, at 14; JAMES, supra, at 61-62, but, as
Charles Andrews observed, 2 ANDREWS, supra note 150, at 29, they "were modeled af-
ter the law of England and, unlike those of the Puritan colonies, were founded not on
the word of God but on the statutes of parliament."
314 FIRST RHODE ISLAND ACTS, supra note 313, at 54. In addition, the President
judge was directed in all cases to "see that order and course of Law... be dulie ob-
served" at trial. Id. at 47.
3" LAWS AND AcrS OF RHODE ISLAND, AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS (Sidney S. Rider
ed., 1896), reprinted in edited form in THE EARuESr ACMS AND LAWS OF THE COLONY OF
RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS 1647-1719, at 74 (John D. Cushing ed.,
1977). The 1666 act says that the civil and criminal jury oaths shall follow a pre-
scribed format, the latter oath being expected to direct the jury "to Proceed Accord-
ing to the Euidences Given them & ye light of their Consciences." Id. Oaths were
themselves promulgated the same year. Whereas the civil jury's oath bound it to de-
cide "according to Law and Evidence," the criminal jury's oath was to decide the case
"according to Law and Evidence, and the Light of your Conscience upon the Evi-
dence." Id. at 152. In 1729, the latter oath was modified, becoming a pledge to de-
cide the case "according to Law and Evidence." AcT AND LAWS, OF His MAJESI'iS
COLONY OF RHODE ISLAND... 183, 195-96 (1730) (Evans # 3346). It underwent no fur-
ther changes during the colonial era. See Charge to the Grand Juty, Rhode-Island
American & Providence Gazette, Nov. 13, 1827, at 2.
..6 3 RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF RHODE ISLAND, AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS, IN
NEW ENGLAND 387 (John Russell Bartlett ed., 1858). Amasa Eaton seems to have be-
lieved that this failure to give "directions" or "sum up the evidence" violated the 1647
act. Amasa M. Eaton, The Development of the Judicial System in Rhode Island, 14 YALE L. J.
150, 153 n.* (1905). He was only partly right. The 1647 act didn't require that "di-
rections" ever be given. It did, however, require thatjudges sum up the evidence and
arguments in civil cases, and to this extent Governor Bellomont claimed they were
disregarding that law.
317 See DURFEE, supra note 301, at 83, 86; Eaton, supra note 316 at 153 n.*; BENJAMIN
F. HALLETT, TRIAL OF REV. MR. AVERY... 36 (2d ed. 1833); RICHARD HILDREDT-, A
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But the published records of the Court of Trials,1 8 which
cover the years 1647-1670, paint a different picture than this
data might suggest. Yes, there is a clear indication that juries
had the right to determine legal questions in criminal cases: the
record of a 1662 prosecution for forcible entry shows that the
jury in that case was even expected to decide whether an in-
dictment not written in the King's name was valid.*3 9 But these
REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF THE REV. EPHRAIM K. AVERY, BEFORE THE SUPREME JUDICIAL
COURT OF RHODE ISLAND, ON AN INDICTMENT FOR THE MURDER OF SARAH MARIA
CORNELL ... 142 (1833).
In addition to reviewing this general history, Durfee recounts a specific story illus-
trative of the division of authority between judge and jury that existed before 1827.
John Randall won ajury verdict in a civil suit, but the court ordered a new trial on the
ground that the verdict was contrary to the law and the evidence. Randall sought re-
lief from the legislature, arguing that this decision was improper because the "jurors
are judges of both law and fact." Randall won, and the legislature awarded him a
judgment on the verdict. DURFEE, supra, at 39, 41-43.
Perhaps inspired by the court's action in Randall's case, Durfee then remarks that,
while "[t]here seems to have been a feeling, then more or less prevalent, that the jury
not only had, but was entitied to have, a large discretion in matters of law as well as of
fact in both civil and criminal cases[,] ... there is no reason to think that it was ever
recognized as legitimate by either the bench or the bar." I&. at 43. With respect to
the bar's views, Durfee's own account (and perhaps the legislature's action in Ran-
dall's case) contradicts this claim. See id. at 84, 121. Nor is the court's behavior in
Randall's case inconsistent with the idea thatjuries have "a large discretion in matters
of law as well as of fact." "Large", after all, is not the same as "absolute." Cf. supra text
accompanying note 84. Moreover, as will be seen below, see infra notes 318-20 and ac-
companying text, there is direct evidence that the superior court accepted such a
right in the colony's early years. Governor Bellomont's report to the Board of Trade,
see supra note 316 and accompanying text, indicates that the judges acknowledged the
jury's lawfinding authority through the end of the seventeenth century. As ChiefJus-
tice Eddy noted in the first grand jury charge given after the enactment of the 1827
law, which a newspaper pronounced "the first instructions to a Grand Jury touching
their responsible duties that were ever given by a Court in this State," Charge to the
GrandJuy, RHODE-ISLAND AMERICAN & PROVIDENCE GAZET, Nov. 13 1827, at 1, be-
cause of the judges' "uniform" refusal to give juries any charge whatsoever, Eddy had
"no recollection of having ever heard or read what is called a charge to a Grand Jury,
and but twice to a PetitJury." Id. Hence, as another article observed, cases tried that
term featured another procedural novelty-lawyers' closing arguments on the law were
made to the court, rather than thejury. See New Supreme Court, id., Sept. 21, 1827, at 2.
Given this clear and unvarying historical record, I find Durfee's professed ability to
find "no reason" to believe the courts "ever" considered jury lawfinding "legitimate"
incomprehensible.
"' This superior court was established in 1647. See FIRST RHODE ISLAND ACrs, supra
note 313, at 45-48. The magistrates were its judges. See id.; JAMES, supra note 313, at
70.
319 See 2 RHODE ISLAND COURT RECORDS 12 (trial of William Burton et al, 1662)
(Howard Miller Chapin ed., 1920-1922).
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records also show that when ajury was unwilling to decide a case
due to the lack of an indictment, or unable to reach a verdict
due to a disagreement about the law, it could leave the decision
to the court.3 0 Moreover, these court records prove that the
judges didn't always need a jury's permission to determine the
law in a criminal case. Thus, in one 1657 case, the court dis-
missed an indictment it found not to have charged the defen-
dant with "the breach of any law in the Colony.0 21 The
following year, it put off the trial of another case so it could be
determined whether the accused's conduct violated English
law.32 In two cases, individual judges (in one instance the Gov-
ernor) are recorded as having "dissented" from the jury's ver-
dict.328 In a 1668 case, we read that the court thrice "sent [the
jury] forth" before obtaining a not guilty verdict.3 24 Whatever
this report means,325 these skimpy court records do make it clear
that the judges could set aside a jury's "guilty" verdict on the
ground that the jury had mistaken the law. Hence, after the
jury convicted the defendants in the 1662 forcible entry case
mentioned above, the defendants asked the judges not to enter
30 For cases of the former variety, see 1id. at 22 (Joshua Coggeshall's Case, 1656),
36-37 (trial of Thomas Gould et al., 1657). For a case in which the jury returned a
special verdict because of an inability to agree on a general verdict, see 2 id. at 13
(Zachary Rhoads' Case, 1662). The jurors in this case added that, for this failure to
return a general verdict, they "must Stand to the triall of law if any will procicute
them." Id.
32 1 id at 33 (Thomas Layton's Case, 1657).
" See id. at 44 (Anthony Parrent's Case, 1658). In due course, Parrent pleaded
guilty to "Attempting to procure an unlawfull assembly." Id. at 49-50.
3' See 2 id. at 17 (Andrew Harris' Case, 1663); id. at 45 (William Coddington's
Case, 1666). The latter case is the one in which the Governor dissented. Coddington
was one of the founders of Rhode Island, see 2 ANDREWS, supra note 150, at 8-11;
JAMES, supra note 313, at 25-26, a magistrate in 1647, see 2 ANDREWS, supra, at 31, the
colony's chosen President in 1648, see id., JAMES, supra, at 62, and its Governor in the
1670s, see JAMES, supra, at 93-94. At the time of Coddington's trial, a prosecution
brought by General Solicitor William Dyer for "Uttering words of Contumacie &c," he
was a magistrate-and thus a member of the Court of Trials. 2 RHODE ISLAND COURT
RECORDS, supra note 319, at 42. Coddington was acquitted.
32, 2 RHODE ISLAND COURT RECORDS, supra note 319, at 72 (Mathew Boomer's Case,
1668).
2"' It isn't clear whether the court twice refused to accept a verdict or a declaration
that the jury was unable to reach one. (The Records report a civil case in which ajury
thrice sent out proved unable to reach a verdict and was discharged. See 1 id. at 64
(Taelman v. Mott, 1660).)
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a judgment on that verdict because the jury had erred in up-
holding the indictment. The court granted this request, noting
that it was "not soe Cleare to give Judgment on the verdict."0
26
If, after consultation, it was determined that the indictment was
illegal, the report makes it clear that the judges were going to
enter ajudgment in the defendants' favor, rather than a convic-
tion. 27 In other words, despite the judges' failure to give crimi-
nal juries instructions on the law before their deliberations
began, the published court records strongly suggest that (at
least in the colony's early years) no conviction could be entered
unless the judges shared the jury's view of the law.
Jury practice in colonial New Hampshire, which became
part of Massachusetts Bay Colony after 1640 and remained
united with it until 1679,28 was decidedly different. A serious
student of that state's legal history, commenting on a 1672 Mas-
sachusetts law which is discussed below, says "instructions to the
jury had always been in vogue" in that colony.3 9 Although this
remark appears in a chapter on civil procedure, it was obviously
meant to refer to criminal cases as well: Rex v. Oliver, a 1696 mu-
tiny trial, is immediately cited as an example ofjudges charging
juries.3 0 Moreover, the same source informs us that these in-
structions covered law as well as fact
33'
It turns out that the record in Oliver says nothing about jury
instructions.3 2 Neither does the report of the 1683 treason trial
of Edward Gove and his confederates, the only other post-Union
"6 2 id. at 12.
327See id
2 SeeJERE R. DANIELL, COLONIAL NEW HAMSH-A HISTORY 39-79 (1981).
SELwIN L. PAGE, JUDICIAL BEGINNINGS IN NEW HAMPSM 1640-1700, at 90 (1959).
This law, one of the statutes alluded to below in the text following note 345, is set
forth in the text accompanying note 360, infra. Contrary to Page's assertion, the Bay
Colony's practice of expressing reasons for rejecting a verdict and ordering the jury
to deliberate further didn't begin in 1672. It can be traced back at least as far as a
1642 Massachusetts Bay law, see infra note 351 and accompanying text, which applied
in New Hampshire as well. See supra text accompanying note 324.
" See PAGE, supra note 329, at 90. The case is discussed at greater length at i&, at
58-59.
"'See id at 89-90.
"'The court papers, on which Page relied, may be found at 11 Court Papers 143,




prosecution of which we have a reasonably full published ac-
count.3s 3 Instructions are also unmentioned in our report of
David Camball's 1670 prosecution for illegal wine sales, the Un-
ion-era case about which the published records reveal the
most.
,3
Of course, these omissions don't prove that instructions
weren't given. Indeed, even if the 1672 act hadn't mandated
charging juries on law and fact, it would have been inconceiv-
able for the judges who four times rejected the Oliver jury's ver-
dict and sent the jurors back for further deliberation to have
failed to explain why they found the verdict unsatisfactory.33
But the silence of the published records is important, because it
means they don't reveal whatjury charges said.
If New Hampshire judges really did instruct criminal juries
on the law, Hodges reminds us that it wouldn't necessarily follow
that the jurors were bound to accept the judges' opinions as the
law. Moreover, as Oliver shows, New Hampshire juries didn't al-
ways obey the judges' wishes.3 The question is whether colo-
nial New Hampshire criminal juries were expected to take their
law from the court. And the answer to that question is that we
don't know.
Beyond the Massachusetts decisions examined below,337 the
published case reports only provide us with a few tantalizing
' This report, prepared by the presiding judge, appears in WnI.AM HENRY GOVE,
THE r3OVE BOoi: HISTORY AND GENEALOGY OF THE AMERICAN FAMILY OF GOVE AND
NOTES OFEUROPEAN GOVES 29-33 (1922).
This trial is reported in 40 DOCUMENTS AND RECORDs RELATnNG TO THE PROVINCE
OF NEW HAMPSHIRE 260 (Nathaniel Bouton et al. eds., 1867-) [hereinafter NEW
HAMPSHIRE STATE PAPERS].
" For a contemporaneous Massachusetts case in which such an explanation was
given, see infra text accompanying notes 362-64.
"mSee PAGE, supra note 329, at 59. The court rejected four verdicts before accept-
ing a fifth. Page doesn't say whether the jury or the bench finally relented. Nor does
he tell us whether the judges disagreed with the jury about the law or the facts of the
case. Neither point is clarified by the court papers. They do inform us that court
costs were imposed upon the one acquitted defendant, a practice we have encoun-
tered in other colonies. See supra notes 219-20 and accompanying text; note 288.
'7 See infra, notes 355, 358, 361-64, and accompanying text. Although New Hamp-
shire county court benches were largely, and then entirely, staffed by New Hampshir-
ites during the Union period, see DANIELL, supra note 328, at 46, the published court
records don't allow us to determine whether those courts diverged from Massachu-
setts procedure with respect to the issue herein under consideration. After the Revo-
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scraps of information. The report of David Camball's trial says
that the jury, "having heard & considered of pleas & evidences
presented in ye case which are on file, brought in theire verdict"
of guilty.31 What those "pleas" were, however, is not reported,
so we can't tell whether or not this passage meant that Cam-
ball's jury decided any legal questions.
Two entries in the report of the prosecutions stemming
from Gove's Rebellion provide similarly ambiguous data. This
event seems to have been prompted by Assemblyman Gove's
anger about the Governor's veto of popular legislation and
Gove's false belief that King Charles II had died and been suc-
ceeded by the Duke of York (later King James II), which seems
to have led Gove to fear that Governor Cranfield would try to
make New Hampshire a Catholic province. There was wide-
spread opposition to Cranfield, and Gove rounded up eleven
other malcontents (ten armed men and a trumpeter) before his
mounted band was arrested, without having attacked anyone,
near Hampton.3 9 At the rebels' trial, Gove admitted the facts
but argued in his own defense that Cranfield's commission was
invalid and that Cranfield's conduct otherwise justified the re-
bellion. This defense would appear to have raised several ques-
tions of law, but there is no word in the report about to whom it
was directed or about what, if anything, the court told the jurors
to do with it. We do know that the jury convicted Gove, and
that brings us to the second interesting aspect of this case: the
jury returned special verdicts with respect to his co-defendants.
Although the court's unhesitating acceptance of these verdicts
shows that courts (at least sometimes) had a right to decide the
law in a criminal case, it doesn't indicate whether that right was
exclusive. Moreover, unlike the many special verdicts rendered
lution, we know that practice in the courts of the two former colonies was generally
very different, see, e.g., PLUMER, supra note 67, but that is another story.
'40 NEW HAMSHRE STATE PAPERS, supra note 334, at 260.
These events are discussed in FRANKLN B. SANBORN, EDWARD GOVE AND WALTER
BAREFOOT, 1653-1691: THE SO-CALLED REBELLION OF 1683 (n.d.), and DANILL, supra
note 328, at 85-95, as well as the original documents, which include the presiding
judge's report of the case, see supra note 334, and papers published in 1 NEW
HAMPSHI E STATE PAPERS, supra note 334, at 493-96 (letter from Edward Randolph to
the Lords of Trade, 1684), and 6 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, supra note 268, at 387-89
(documents no. 952, 954).
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in civil cases during this period,340 these verdicts didn't state a
legal issue for the court to resolve. Thus, we have no idea
whether the jury returned them because it deemed itself in-
competent to decide the legal guilt of Gove's followers, or
whether it was simply unwilling to do so.3t
Finally, there is the ketch George affair of 1682.342 The criti-
cal issue in this condemnation suit brought under the Naviga-
tion Acts was whether the George was a foreign vessel manned by
a foreign crew, points concerning which there was conflicting
evidence. When told that the jury had brought in a verdict
against the King, Cranfield ordered that the jurors be attainted.
Upon hearing of this threat, the jury backed down and returned
a verdict for the plaintiff. Although the jury may simply have
viewed the facts differently than the Governor, he was con-
vinced that their initial verdict was a punishable act ofjury nulli-
fication. Cranfield was not ajudge, but the jurors' quick retreat
may indicate that they agreed that they had no right to nullify
the law in a civil case, even a quasi-criminal one like this.343 But
would they have felt the same about their prerogatives in a
criminal case?3"
The scope of the criminal jury's province in colonial New
Hampshire can't be determined by consulting statutory law, ei-
ther. Between 1641 and 1672, Massachusetts Bay Colony en-
340 See, e.g., 40 NEw HAMPSHIRE STATE PAPERS, supra note 334, at 193 (Wade v. Fox
and Pendleton v. Payne, 1664), 245 (Waldren v. Fford, 1669), 363 (Stevenson v. Drew,
1680), 381 (Thurtin v. Palmer and Clarke v. Nath, 1681).
'"" It should be noted that this was a handpicked jury, selected pursuant to a newly-
passed law effectively empowering the Governor to tell the sheriff who to summon for
jury duty. See 6 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, supra note 268, at 389 (document no.
954); PAGE, supra note 329, at 51, 147-49.
.. This episode is discussed in PAGE, supra note 329, at 144-49, 1 NEw HAMPSHIRE
STATE PAPFRS, supra note 334, at 492-93 (letter from Edward Randolph to the Lords of
Trade, 1684), and 17 i&. 575-78 (letter from Governor Cranfield to Lords of Trade,
Dec. 30, 1682). On its relation with Gove's Rebellion, see DANIELL, supra note 328, at
87-90.
'"" Of course, it may also reflect the jurors' fear that they would be found to have
perjured themselves with respect to the facts of the case.
'"Jurors couldn't have been attainted under 23 Hen. 8 (1532), the statute invoked
by Cranfield, for a verdict rendered in a criminal case. However, even if other sanc-
tions couldn't have been visited upon them, but see supra notes 149-60, 187-90 and ac-
companying text, it wouldn't necessarily follow that the jury would have had the right
to nullify the law.
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acted a number of ambiguous laws which may or may not imply
that jurors were expected to play a role in determining the law
in criminal cases entrusted to them. Although these statutes
were in effect in New Hampshire during the Union, I will dis-
cuss them in greater detail in my examination of Massachusetts'
colonial jury practice. 5
The only other statutes bearing on this question are a pair
of laws adopted by New Hampshire in 1754. These acts (which
remained in force until 1792) contain tantalizing, but ultimately
indecipherable, signals about the proper role of petit juries in
criminal cases. The preamble to one of these laws proclaims
"knowledge of [the] Laws" a prerequisite for "the Proper Dis-
charge" of the office of grand juror.m That declaration has no
parallel in the second act, which governs the selection of petit
jurors.m7 This asymmetry could be accidental, it could reflect
the ability of lawfinding trial jurors (unlike grand jurors) to
hear arguments on the law from the defense, as well as the
prosecutor and the court, or it could mean petit juries were to
confine themselves to deciding facts. The answer to this inter-
pretive riddle, and the scope of criminal jury's prerogatives in
colonial New Hampshire, are presently unknown. 8
Massachusetts Bay, the last colony to be examined in this
survey, is probably the one that is most famous for its juries' re-
bellion against the British trade laws. But Professor Howe was
largely right about colonial Massachusetts: for the most part, its
position on the right of a criminal jury to determine the law is
unclear. However, the historical data points toward official re-
jection of this doctrine during much of the colonial era, and
there is clear evidence that no lawfinding right was recognized
on the eve of the Revolution.
The data begins with a series of statutes.34 9 Five passages
from the Code of 1649, three of which were later included in
See infra, notes 351-66 and accompanying text.
M6 3 LAWS OF NEW HAMPSIRE ch. 17, at 87 (Henry Harrison Metcalf ed., 1915).
W See id at ch. 18, at 89-92.
Neither of the two authorities Howe cited in regard to colonial New Hampshire
practice, see supra note 306, ever mentions the relevant practice in that colony.
"9 A 1623 New Plymouth statute providing, "All Criminal facts ... should [be
tried] by the verdict of twelve Honest men to be Impannelled by Authority in forme
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the Duke's Laws," ° must be examined in any effort to ascertain
the role that the criminal jury was expected to play in Massachu-
setts Bay's courts. Four of the five are contained in the chapter
on juries. Section one of that chapter provides that civil juries
"shall finde the matter of fact with the damages and costs ac-
cording to their evidence, and the Judges shall declare the Sen-
tence (or direct the Jurie to finde) according to the law." 35'
There is no comparable provision regarding criminal juries. 2
However, while the corresponding (and derivitive) portion of
the New Plymouth Code of 1672 contains no criminal analogue
to the first quoted clause of section one, it applies the second
(which seems to license judges to reject verdicts with which they
disagree) exclusively to criminal cases. 53
of a Jury upon their oaths," 11 RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF NEW PLYMOUTH IN NEW
ENGLAND 3 (AMS Press 1968) (David Pulsifer ed., 1861), is subject to the same inter-
pretive difficulties as the first of these listed acts.
m The quoted portions of sections one and three of the chapter on juries (the lat-
ter having been modified in 1657, see infra text accompanying notes 354-56), as well as
the excerpted passage from section five, are the provisions referred to in the text.
The first seems also to have been borrowed by Connecticut, see supra note 306.
-" THE BOOK OF THE GENERAL LAUUES AND LIBERTY'ES CONCERNING THE INHABITANTS
OF THE MASSACHUSETS 32 (1648), reprinted in LAwS & LIBERTIES OF MAsSACHusETrs,
1641-1691 (John D. Cushing ed., 1976) [hereinafter LAWS AND LIBERTIS]. This provi-
sion was first enacted in 1642. See 2 RECoRDs OF THE GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF THE
MASSACHUSEiTS BAY IN NEW ENGLAND 21 (AMS Press 1968) (Nathaniel B. Shurtleff ed.,
1853-1854) [hereinafter MASS. RECORDS]. It was retained in the Codes of 1660 and
1662. See MASS. LAws 1660-1672, supra note 255, at 167; THE COLONIAL LAWS OF
MASSACHUSETTS. REPRINTED FROM THE CODE OF 1672 .... at 86 (William H. Whitmore
ed., 1890) [hereinafter MASS. LAWS 1672-1686]. In light of this history, Emory Wash-
burn's observation that the 1642 act was short-lived, see EMORY WASHBURN, SKETCHES
OF THEJUDICAL HISTORY OF MASSACauSETTS 45 (1840), is misleading. And his asser-
tion that the act was a departure from a prior practice of jury lawfinding is unsup-
ported by any evidence whatsoever. As for the likely meaning of the parenthetical
language, see supra note 306 and accompanying text; infra note 362 and accompany-
ing text.
"' A separate clause of section one guarantees a jury trial in any criminal case
where the accused was threatened with capital punishment or banishment. See MASS.
LAWS 1672-1686, supra note 351, at 86. It says nothing about the respective duties of
judge and jury.
" Section two of the New Plymouth Code's subchapter on juries says, in pertinent
part, that, after being sworn "truly to try" the case, civil juries "shall finde the matter
of fact with the damages and cost, according to their evidence." In criminal cases, it
states only that, after the jury takes the same oath, "the Judges shall declare the Sen-
tence, or direct the Jury to finde according to Law...." THE BOOK OF THE GENERAL
LAws OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE JURISDICFION OF NEW-PLYMOUTH 20 (1672), reprinted
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Section three of the chapter on juries says that "in all cases
wherein evidence is so obscure or defective that the Jurie can-
not clearly and safely give a positive verdict, . . . , it shall have
libertie to give a Non liquet or a special verdict."4 In 1657, the
right to return a non liquet was deleted and special verdicts were
authorized only when "the Law is obscure." s The General
Court explained this modification in this way:
Whereas, in all civill cases depending in suite, ye plaintiff affirmeth
that ye defendant hath donne him wrong, and accordingly presents his
case for judgment and satisfaction, it behooveth both Court and jury to
see that the affirmation be proved by sufficijent evidenc, els the case
must be found for the defendant: and so it is also in a criminall case; for,
in the eye of the lawe, every man is honest & innocent, unlesse it be
prooved legally to the contrary. All evidenc ariseth partly from matter of
fact, and partly from lawe or argument. The matter of fact is alwayes fea-
zible to be judged of as well by the jury as by the Court; and concerning
the lawe, or the point of lawe, in reference to the case in question, it is
either more easy & generally knoune, or more difficult to be discerned.
The duty of the jury is, if they doe understand the lawe to the satisfaction
of their consciences, not to put it of from themselves, but to finde ac-
cordingly, but if any of the jury doth rest unsatisfied what is lawe in the
case, then the whole jury haue liberty to present a speciall verdict. ...
And whereas the clause in ye laue, page thirty two, mentioning evidenc,
is obscure, the jury may bring in a non-liquet, which words hath occa-
sioned much trouble and delay in civill proceedings: this court doth
heereby repeale that clause .... 56
infacsimile in THE LAWS OFTE PILGRIMS (John D. Cushing ed., 1979). With respect to
the meaning of the language authorizingjudges to "direct the Jury to finde according
to Law," see notes 306, 351, and 362 and accompanying text.
'. See LAws AND LIBERTIES, supra note 351, at 32. This passage was derived from
Liberty 31 of The Body of Liberties of 1641. See MASS. LAWS 1660-1672, supra note
255, at 41. As modified, see infra text accompanying note 355, it also appeared in the
Codes of 1660 and 1672, and the Connecticut Revision of 1672. See MASS. LAWS 1660-
1672, supra, at 167; MAs. LAWS 1672-1686, supra note 351, at 87; CoNNECMsCUT LAWS
AND LIBERTIES, supra note 306, at 37. On the non !iquet verdict, see supra note 306.
s 4-1 MASS. RECORDS, supra note 351, at 290-91. For examples of special verdicts
in criminal cases in the Bay colony, see Flaherty, sup-a note 60, at 233-84; 29 THE
COLONIAL SOCET OF MASSACHUSETTS, COLLECIONS 82 (Samuel Eliot Morison ed.,
1933) (Alice Thomas' Case, 1672) [hereinafter MASs. COLLEGrONS]; 1 RECORDS OF THE
COURT OFASSLSrANTS OF THE COLONY OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY 1630-1692, at 10 (John F.
Cronin & John Noble eds., 1901-1928) (Benjamin Goad's Case, 1673) [hereinafter
RECORDS OF THE COURT OF ASSISTANTS].
36 4-1 MASS. RECORDS, supra note 351, at 290-91.
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Section five provides that when "anyJurie ... or Jurors are
not clear in their judgments or consciences, concerning any
Case wherein they are to give their verdict, they shall have liber-
tie, in open Court to advise with any man they shall think fit to
resolve or direct them, before they give in their verdict.
''ss 7
Moreover, according to section four, "if the Bench and Jurors
shall so differ at any time about their verdict that either of them
cannot proceed with peace of conscience, the Case shall be re-
ferred to the General Court who shall take the question from
both and determin[e] it."55 Finally, section one of the chapter
on appeals states that "if the point of appeal be in matter of law
then to be determined by the Bench: if in matter of fact, by the
Bench and Iurie." 59
One more statute merits note. After noting that county
court judges should "use all reasonable endeavours for clearing
the case to the Jury, by declaring the Law, and comparing the
matter of Fact and Damage proved therwith," a 1672 law re-
pealed section four of the jury chapter of the 1649 Code and
required the Bench to accept "the Verdict of the Jury finally
given."56 However, the 1692 Salem witchcraft trials prove that
317 LAWS AND LMERTIES, supra note 351, at 32. This passage was based on Liberty 76
of the Body of Liberties. See MASS. LAws 1660-1672, supra note 255, at 51. It also ap-
peared-in the Codes of 1660 and 1672. SeeMASS. LAwS 1660-1672, supra, at 168; MASS.
LAws 1672-1686, supra note 351, at 87.
* LAWS AND LmERTiEs, supra note 351, at 32. This provision was part of Liberty 31
of the Body Of Liberties. See MASS. LAWS 1660-1672, supra note 255, at 41. With one
substantial alteration-viz., the Court of Assistants replaced the General Court as the
tribunal to which those cases were to be referred-, section four was also retained in
the Codes of 1660 and 1672. See MASS. LAwS 1660-1672, supra, at 167-68; MASS. LAWS
1672-1686, supra note 351, at 87. This provision was repealed later in 1672. See MASS
LAWS 1672-1686, supra, at 201-02, which is discussed in the text accompanying notes
360-66, infra.
For criminal cases in which judges utilized their power under section four, see,
e.g., WASHBURN, supra note 351, at 45-46 (rejecting Anne Hibbins' 1656 guilty ver-
dict); 3 RECORDS OF THE COURT OF ASSISTANTS, supra note 354, at 35-38 (rejecting Ben-
jamin Saucier's 1665 not guilty verdict); id. at 201-02 (rejecting Paul Parker's 1671 not
guilty verdict).
9 LAWS AND LiBERTiES, supra note 351, at 2. This provision was preserved in the
Codes of 1660 and 1672. See MASS. LAWS 1660-1672, supra note 255, at 122; MASS.
LAws 1672-1686, supra note 351, at 3.
'0 MASS. LAws of 1672-1686, supra note 351, at 201.
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this law-which left section one of that chapter undisturbed-
didn't require judges meekly to accept verdicts of which they dis-
approved .' Thus, when a jury announced that it found Re-
becca Nurse not guilty, the judges protested that this verdict was
contrary to certain evidence."6 ' At that point, "several of the Jury
declared themselves desirous to go out again, and thereupon
the honoured Court gave leave." 363 Needless to say, the "final"
verdict was "guilty."
3 64
'6' Cf. Connecticut practice under the 1702 Revision discussed in note 306, supra.
Samuel Quincy suggested that the 1672 law was, at least in part, limited to civil ac-
tions. See Quincy, supra note 23, at 559. Although its preamble does say that it repre-
sented a response to problems that had arisen in the trial of civil suits, see MASS. LAws
of 1672-1686, supra note 851, at 201, and although the remedy of attaint created by
the act may have been used exclusively in civil suits, see supra note 75, the 1672 act re-
pealed section four of the 1649 code in its entirety and required acceptance of the fi-
nal verdict in all cases. I know of no evidence that the aspects of the 1672 act referred
to in the text were deemed inapplicable to criminal cases, and Quincy didn't say oth-
erwise. On the other hand, cases like Rex v. Oliver, see supra note 330-36 and accom-
panying text, the Rebecca Nurse trial (which is discussed in the text accompanying
the following footnote), Thomas Maule's trial, see infra note 364, and the 1760 mur-
der trial of Ebenezer Richardson, see infra note 362, suggest that the quoted portions
of the act did apply to criminal cases.
=t See 2 THm SALEM WrrcHcRAFr PAPERS 607-08 (Paul Boyer and Stephen Nissen-
baum eds., 1977). This appears to be an exercise of the kind of judicial authority
authorized by section one of the jury chapter of the 1649 Code. A comment made by
ChiefJustice Hutchinson in response to the guilty verdict returned against Ebenezer
Richardson in his 1760 murder trial shows that Massachusetts judges retained the
power to reject a verdict and order further deliberation until the end of the colonial
era. See Editorial Note, in 2 LEGAL PAPERS OFJOHN ADAMS, supra note 23, at 406 (quot-
ing 3 THOMAS HUTCHINSON, THE HISTORY OF THE COLONY AND PROVINCE OF
MASSACHUSETTS BAY 206 (Lawrence Shaw Mayo ed. 1936) (1828)).
2 SALEM WITCHCRAFT PAPERS, supra note 362, at 608.
Of course, Massachusetts Bay judges did not always have their way. Consider the
case of Thomas Maule, a feisty Quaker who was charged with libel and blasphemy for
writing a book attacking the colony's leaders for (among other things) the Salem
witch trials and for saying (in open court) that his book contained no more errors
than the Bible. See, e.g., THOMAS MAULE, NEW-ENGLAND PERSECUTORS MAULD ... A
BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE IMPRiSONMENT AND TRYAL OF THOMAS MAULE OF SALEM, FOR
PUBLISHING A BOOK .... (1697) (Evans # 801), which forms the basis for the report
contained in 5 Am. St. Trials 85 (1697); LEVY, supra note 239, at 27-28. After the mag-
istrates charged the jury that Maule's conviction was necessary for the preservation of
church and state, he argued that the manuscript he wrote wasn't blasphemous and
that there was no proof that the printed work bearing his name-i.e., the evidence
before the jury-was the book he wrote. The jury brought in a not guilty verdict.
The angry magistrates demanded an explanation, and the jurors replied that they
were too uneducated to determine whether the book was blasphemous and had too
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On their face, these provisions are impenetrably ambiguous.
Who was to determine "the law" according to which criminal ju-
ries were to decide cases? Although criminal juries were permit-
ted to return special verdicts when "the Law [was] obscure," did
that mean "when they didn't understand the law they had been
told to apply to the facts," "when they couldn't determine what
the applicable law was," or both?s Were they licensed by these
little evidence to decide whether Maule was its author. The magistrates relented and
Maule was free.
There was no proof of the obvious fact that Maule wrote the book with his name
on it, but the jury seems to have used this fortuity as an excuse for acquitting a palpa-
bly guilty man. That it could do so, however, reveals nothing about the jury's right to
determine the law as well as the facts in a criminal case. But it does lead to one fur-
ther observation.
Despite the fact that the colony's law had long officially recognized ajuror's free-
dom to vote his conscience, see Liberty 70, MASS. LAwS 1660-1672, supra note 255, at
49; LAWS AND LERTmS, supra note 351, at 52; MASS. LAwS 1672-1686, supra note 351,
at 153; GEORGE LEE HASKINS, LAW AND AUTHORriN EARLY MASSACHUSETrS: A STUDYIN
TRADITION AND DESIGN 197 (1960), the 1672 law mentioned in the text allowed that
an action for attaint would lie against ajury whose verdict was "contrary to law or evi-
dence." In fact, one Jacob Jesson was punished by the General Court in 1675 for re-
fusing to join the judges and the otherjurors in a verdict in a civil case tried before a
jury on appeal before the Court of Assistants. See 30 MAss. COLLEcTIONs, supra note
355, at 587-92. Jesson's unsuccessful defense was essentially that he had the right and
duty to make up his own mind about what legal rules should govern the case, that he
had done so, and that he could not yield to the others without violating his oath. On
the facts, his conduct would seem to have been quite justified. Whether for this rea-
son or simply to keep rebelliousness out of sight, the General Court apparently kept
the affair quiet. See ia. at 591. We don't know how common the need for, or the use
of, this kind of sanction was.
The only other Massachusetts Bay case from this era in which I am aware that a
claim was made thatjuries had the right to judge the law as well as the facts is another
civil case. The defendant in Harris v. Batt (1675), challenging three unfavorable ver-
dicts on appeal, argued, inter alia, that the jury was the judge of the law and facts and
should therefore have decided the case for him. The appeal was unsuccessful, but
that doesn't necessarily mean the General Court thought he was wrong about his jury
lawfinding claim. See 29 id. at xlvi, 539-42; but see id. at xlvi. (Incidentally, Harris was
represented on this appeal "by a woman attorney," his wife, Elizabeth. See id. at 540.)
"' See supra note 355 on the use of special verdicts in criminal cases.
Although he didn't say why, William H. Whitmore believed that the General
Court's explanation for banning non liquet verdicts, see supra text accompanying note
356, shows that the Court thought juries had a right to determine the law and the
facts. See William H. Whitmore, Introduction to MASS. LAWS 1600-1672, supra note 255,
at 91 n.52. Samuel Quincy seems to have thought so too. See Quincy, supra note 23,
at 558-59. I think that explanation, and the Court's continuing authorization of spe-
cial verdicts when "the Law is obscure," could equally have been written with cases in
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provisions to seek legal advice from wise non-magistrates?sr If
so, about what the law meant, what it was, or both? Finally, did
the facts that judges could reject verdicts they thought were
wrong and decide legal questions withoutjuries on appeal mean
that judges were thought to have the exclusive right to deter-
mine the law in a criminal case, or simply that judges and jurors
both had to be convinced of the correctness of a general verdict
in a criminal case for it to stand?
A comment by Thomas Lechford, a lawyer who left the col-
ony in 1641, s6 has been said to show that juries in seventeenth
century Massachusetts Bay had the right to determine the law
and the facts in criminal cases,s but I find it inconclusive. In
1642, Lechford wrote this about the colony's courts:
Matters of debt, trespasse, and upon the case, and equity, yea and of
heresie also, are tryed by a Jury. Which although it may seeme to be in-
different, and the Magistrates mayjudge what is Law, and what is equall,
and some of the chief Ministers informe what is heresie, yet the Jury may
find a general verdict, if they please; and seldome is there any speciall
verdict found by them, with deliberate argument made thereupon,
which breeds many inconveniences.
s
3
This passage could mean either that juries had the right to
judge the law or that they simply had the power to do so. Read
in context, the latter reading seems more plausible. This para-
graph is part of an indictment of the colony's courts. It is fol-
lowed by a paragraph that begins by casting doubt on the
mind in which juries "didn't understand the law they had been told to apply to the
facts" in mind.
George Haskins suggested that section five's authorization to seek advice "re-
flected the characteristically Puritan reluctance to force the conscience, but its inci-
dental effect may well have been to afford members of the clergy who were present in
court an opportunity to be heard on matters of conscience." See HAStiNS, supra note
364, at 213-14. However, he cited no instance of its use and I am aware of none. Cf.
supra notes 261, 266.
"7 For a recent sketch of Lechford's life, see Thomas G. Barnes, Thomas Lechford
and the Earliest Lauyering in Massachusetts, 1638-1641, in LAw IN COLONIAL
MASSACHIUSETrs 1630-1800, 3-38 (Daniel Coquilette ed., 1984).
368 See QINcy, supra note 23, at 558.




impartiality of juries and then attacks the courts for failing to
"proceed duly upon record," which Lechford believed rendered
the law "clearly arbitrary, according to the discretions of the
Judges and Magistrates for the time being. '370 The fact that he
felt that the "discretions" ofjudges, notjuries, were decisive im-
plies that he believed juries were taking their law from the
judges, and that his opposition to the widespread use of general
verdicts was based upon his perception that those verdicts were
being used to amplify magisterial "discretions" by keeping the
law off the record.
In fact, two other pieces of evidence make it extremely un-
likely that seventeenth century Massachusetts Bay juries had a
right to determine the law in criminal cases: the hostility that
courts showed towards criminal juries from the beginning of
this era and the limited role advocated for criminal juries in the
colony's contest with London at the century's end. With respect
to the former point, John Murrin's careful study indicates that
the magistrates strongly disfavored trial by jury in non-capital
criminal cases before the 1690s, and few such trials occurred s. 7
One reason for this phenomenon, he speculates, is that Puritan-
ism regarded the punishment of sin as far too important to be
left in the hands ofjuries. 2 It's hard to imagine these distrust-
ful magistrates agreeing to place the determination of law-i.e.,
the decision whether the defendant's conduct was sinful-in the
hands of the same juries.37 3 As to the latter point, after "the new
charter of 1691 . . . to all intents and purposes reduced the
commonwealth to the status of a royal colony,"3 74 there followed
370 Id. at 28; id. at 67.
-7 See Murrin, supra note 63, at 182-206.
37 See id. at 188-89.
'73 Since the Bible was the default source of criminal law in the colony, it is doubly
hard to believe that the saintly magistrates would have trusted its interpretation to
these juries. Cf. supra note 366. But, much to the magistrates' consternation, that's
precisely what happened in Maule's case. See supra note 364.
Of course, it is logically possible that the magistrates disfavored jury trial in non-
capital criminal cases (in part) precisely because juries had the right to determine the
law therein. However, this explanation would raise further questions: how and when
juries could have obtained such a right over the magistrates' opposition and why civil
juries didn't have a similar right. (On civil juries, see supra note 364.)
'74 3 ANDREWS, supra note 150, at 43.
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a period of strife during which the colonists passed laws reassert-
ing their perceived rights and the mother country disallowed
them. The statutes regarding jury trial provided that "all mat-
ters and issues in fact arising or happening within the said prov-
ince, shall be tryed by twelve good and lawful men of the
neighborhood."375 Having explicitly attempted to secure a right
to jury factfinding, 76 it is doubtful that the colonists would have
failed expressly to claim a right to jury lawfnding had they re-
garded it as part and parcel of their justice system. 7
On the other hand, there is significant direct evidence that
jury lawfinding in criminal cases was not accepted practice in
the colony on the eve of the Revolution. In Rex v. Wemms, Ts one
of the Boston Massacre trials,5 7 defense lawyer Josiah Quincy
repeatedly told the jury that it would be bound to take its law
from the judge.O We have both the trial notes and diary of
Quincy's co-counsel, John Adams, and there is no hint that he
375 1 AcTs AND RESOLVES OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY ch. 33, § 10, at 74
(1692), ch. 9, §10 at 286 (1697) (Ellis Ames & Abner Cheney Goodell eds., 1869)
[hereinafter AcTs & RESOLVES].
3I read the phrase "in face' as modifying "all matters and issues" rather than "aris-
ing or happening within the said province." That this was also the view of the editors
of the Acts and Resolves is shown by the marginal notes accompanying these provi-
sions: these notes state, respectively, that "matters of fact" and "matters and issues in
fact" are "to be tried by ajury." Id. at 74, 286.
S3 The colonists might have been deterred from asserting this right by the fear that
the claim-and the statutes-would be rejected by the Lords of Trade. However, this
theory is undermined by the facts that the statutes were designed to protect endan-
gered rights and that the statutes were disallowed by the Lords anyway, see id. at 74,
286.
After acknowledging that the record before her was hopelessly opaque, the author
of one valuable study nonetheless asserted that seventeenth century Massachusetts ju-
ries had the right to nullify the law. See Deirdre A. Harris, Note, Jury Nullification in
Historical Perspective: Massachusetts as a Case Study, 12 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 968, 977-85
(1978). It should be obvious that, having reviewed a more substantial pool of data, I
am unpersuaded.
378 SeeJoHN HoDGSON, THE TRIAL OF WILiAM WEMMS... (1770) (Evans # 11683),
which was reprinted (with some modifications) as THE TRIAL OF THE BRmSH SOLDIERS
... (1807) (S# 13739). Large portions of The Trial of William Wemms, are excerpted in
3 LEGAL PAPERS OFJOHN ADAMS, supra note 23, at 98-314. An abbreviated version of
The Trial of the British Soldiers may be found at 10 Am. St. Trials 415 (1790).
379For the leading scholarly account of the events surrounding the Boston Massa-
cre, including this trial, see HLLR ZOBEL, THE BOSTON MASSACRE (1970).
' See HODGSON, supra note 378, at 69, 136, 143-44, 3 LEGAL PAPERS OFJO-N ADAMS,
supra note 23, at 159, 228, 10 Am. St. Trials at 433, 471.
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dissented (even privately) from this assertion, although he did
disagree publicly with Quincy about the latter's conduct of this
case on at least one other occasion during the trial!" In any
event, neither Adams nor anyone else denied in court that
Quincy was right, which would strongly suggest that his view
wasn't outlandish. Moreover, Justice Trowbridge, who has been
called "the most scholarly lawyer and judge" in the colony be-
fore the Revolution, 2 echoed this assertion in the instructions
he gave to Wemms' jury.33 Thus, both a patriot lawyer and the
only judge in the colony whom the records show ever to have
addressed the matter (and Trowbridge was a neutral party in
the Revolution 3 ) rejected the lawfinding doctrine in Wemms.
And their position was consistent with what we know about the
otherjudges' charges in Wemms, with ChiefJustice Hutchinson's
earlier lament about jury nullification of the law of seditious li-
bel, and with comments made in Justice John Cushing's 1742
charge to the grand jury of Nantucket.m Finally, when John
'' See Editorial Note, in 3 LEGAL PAPERS OF JoHN ADAMs, supra note 23, at 25-27.
Clearly, the fact that Adams, like Quincy, argued the law to the jury before the court
gave the jury its instructions does not show that Adams thought Quincy was wrong
about the jury's obligation to take its law, in the end, from the court.
8 See L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel, The Massachusetts Bench and Bar: A Bio-
graphical Register ofJohn Adams" Contemporaries, in 1 LEGAL PAPERS OFJOHN ADAMS, supra
note 23, at cxi.
" See HODGSON, supra note 378, at 102, 106-07, 3 LEGAL PAPERS OFJOHN ADAMS, su-
pra note 23, at 283-84, 290-91. Trowbridge seems to have given a similar charge in the
earlier trial of Boston Massacre participant Preston. See id. at 94 n.160 and accompa-
nying text, 98. Given the cursory summaries now extant of the other judges' remarks
in Rex v. Preston, see id. at 96-98, it is quite possible that they also endorsed this view in
that case.
's See Wroth & Zobel, supra note 382, at cxi-cxii.
As to Wemms, note the mandatory tone ofJustice Oliver's charge and the state-
ment that the remainingJustices "gave their opinion of the construction of law upon
the evidence[,] but... differed in no material point" from Trowbridge and Oliver.
See HoDGSON, supra note 378, at 197-207, 3 LEGAL PAPERS OFJOHN ADAMS, supra note
23, at 302-09, 310 n.317; cf. 10 Am. St. Trials at 508 (oinitting Oliver's charge and in-
cluding him among the remaining Justices referred to above). As to Hutchinson's
complaint, see Jury Charge, QuINCV, supra note 23, at 306, 308-09, 312-13 (1769). Fi-
nally, Cushing's remarks may be found in John J. Cushing, Jr., The Charge to the
Grandjury of Nantucket, Aug. 25, 1742 (Massachusetts Historical Society, William
Cushing Papers, 1664-1814) (describing virtue of trial by jury, "one's Peers & Neigh-
bours who are to Determine all matters of Fact, & Judge of the Credibility of Evi-
dence").
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Adams finally did argue that juries were rightfully judges of the
law, he neither claimed that Quincy and Trowbridge's views
were unprecedented nor that his position reflected the colony's
traditional practice.
As this last comment implies, at least one eighteenth-
century Massachusetts lawyer did claim that juries had the right
to judge the law and the facts. In fact, William Nelson claims to
have found evidence that three did, and he treats their com-
ments as establishing the truth of the proposition.87 However,
on closer inspection, they do no such thing.
The first of these remarks comes from Robert Treat Paine's
notes on the 1769 trial of a contract case, Lyon v. Cobb.8 As is
true generally, Paine's notes on this trial are sketchy and, on oc-
casion, impossible to decipher. After summarizing the testi-
mony, he reports what appear to be a list of points made in
defense lawyer Daniel Leonard's closing argument, and that's
it-nothing about anyone else's arguments, the charge, or the
verdict. (In fact, the next time the case is mentioned in Paine's
notes, it is before referees two years later. 9) While it's hard to
know what to make of some of Paine's entries (e.g., "The con-
tract to pay"), Leonard seems to have laid out a number of rea-
sons why his client should -win, including that Lyon had been
paid and that he hadn't fully performed his end of the contract.
In the middle of this list, the following entry appears: "The Su-
per r C' rule abt. articles under 40/ Jury has a right to do as it
please." The latter portion of this line is the text cited by Nel-
son, but I see no justification for assuming that it has anything
See infra text accompanying note 391.
See Nelson I, supra note 43, at 28; Nelson II, supra note 43, at 916. Nelson makes
no attempt to reconcile with this claim the fact thatJohn Adams was prohibited from
arguing the law to the jury in Cotton v. Nye, a civil slander case tried before the
Barnstable Superior Court in 1767. See Editorial Note, in 1 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN
ADAMS, supra note 23, at 142; John Adams, Diay, in id. at 149. I'm not sure what to
make of Cotton either. At least part of the problem is that Adams' account of this in-
cident doesn't identify the basis for the judges' ruling.
3" (Bristol County Ct. of C.P. 1769) (original on file in Massachusetts Historical So-
ciety, Robert Treat Paine Papers, Minutes of Law Cases, 1760-1774) (Robert Treat
Paine Papers on Microfilm reel 12).
s" On the use of referees, see Introduction, in 1 Legal Papers ofJohn Adams, supra
note 23, at xliii.
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to do with lawfinding. Part of the problem is that the content of
the Superior Court rule is unknown. For all we know, Leonard
could have been saying nothing more than that the jury's deci-
sion as to the amount of Cobb's damages was within its absolute
discretion.
Nelson's second piece of evidence offers even less support
for his claim. It comes from Paine's notes on a 1770 case involv-
ing the boundary between several pieces of land.90 The dispute
in this case seems to have involved a purely factual question:
where Howard and the prior owner of the plaintiffs' land had
drawn the boundary between their lots. Accordingly, the iso-
lated comment that Nelson incompletely quotes from the de-
fense counsel's closing argument, "no verdict for ye Land
thrown out," presumably had nothing whatsoever to do with
lawfmding.
That cannot, however, be said aboutJohn Adams' appellate
argument in a case tried after the Boston Massacre Trials, Wright
v. Gill and Mein. This argument, the logic of which is not lim-
ited to civil juries, is easily the most celebrated brief ever written
on behalf of the jury's lawfinding authority. The notes on which
Adams based his argument, which are found in an entry in his
diary, include the following passages:
As the Constitution requires, that, the popular Branch of the Legis-
lature, should have an absolute Check so as to put a peremptory Nega-
tive upon every Act of the Government, it requires that the common
People should have as compleat a Controul, as decisive a Negative, in
everyJudgment of a Court ofJudgicatur. No Wonder then that the same
restless Ambition, of aspiring Minds, which is endeavouring to lessen or
destroy the Power of the People in Legislation, should attempt to lessen
or destroy it, in the Execution of Lawes. The Rights of Juries and of
Elections, were never attacked singly in all the English History. The
same Passions which have disliked one have detested the other, and both
have always been exploded, mutilated or undermined together.
390 Ames v. Howard (Bristol County Ct. of C.P. 1770) (original manuscript on file
in Massachusetts Historical Society, Robert Treat Paine Papers, Minutes of Law Cases,
1760-1774) (Robert Treat Paine Papers on Microfilm reel 12). Paine's handwriting is
so bad that Nelson cites this case as "Quincy v. Howard."
210 [Vol. 89
o8]COLONL]URIFS
The Oath of a Juror in England, is to determine Causes "according
to your evidence"--In this Province "according to Law and the Evidence
given you." It will be readily agreed that the Words of the Oath at
Home, imply all that is expressed by the words of the Oath here. And
whenever a general Verdict is found, it assuredly determines both the
Fact and the Law.
It was never yet disputed, or doubted, that a general Verdict, given
under the Direction of the Court in Point of Law, was a legal Determination
of the Issue. Therefore the Jury have a Power of deciding an issue upon
a general Verdict. And if they have, is it not an Absurdity to suppose that
the Law would oblige them to find a Verdict according to the Direction
of the Court, against their own Opinion, Judgment and Conscience.
... The general Rules of Law and common Regulations of Society,
under which ordinary Transactions arrange themselves, are well enough
known to ordinary Jurors. The great Principles of the Constitution, are
intimately known, they are sensibly felt by every Briton-it is scarcely ex-
travagant to say, they are drawn in and imbibed with the Nurses Milk and
first Air.
Now should the Melancholly Case arise, that the Judges should give
their Opinions to the Jury, against one of these fundamental Principles,
is a Juror obliged to give his Verdict generally according to this Direc-
tion, or even to find the fact specially and submit the Law to the Court.
Every Man of any feeling or Conscience will answer, no. It is not only his
right but his Duty in that Case to find the Verdict according to his own
best Understanding, Judgment and Conscience, tho in Direct opposition
to the Direction of the Court.
The English Law obliges no Man to decide a Cause upon Oath
against his own Judgment, nor does it oblige any Man to take any Opin-
ion upon Trust, or to pin his faith on the sleve of any mere Man.
This appellate argument may well have reflected good revo-
lutionary, democratic, ideology. And it may have had the sup-
port of many colonists, even some Loyalists. But our sources
suggest that-at least as to criminal trials-it may never have
been good law in colonial Massachusetts. 2
"', John Adams, Diary Notes on the Rights ofJuries, in 1 LEGAL PAPRS OFJOHN ADAMS,
supra note 23, at 229-30 (emphasis in original).
" It may not even have reflected Adams' personal views on jury practice or theory.
In the wake of the Stamp Act crisis of 1765, Adams' third Letter From the Earl of
Clarendon to William Pym spoke very differently about the roles ofjudge and jury:
1998]
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II. CONCLUSION
Where did the charge given by Justice Duvall in Hodges'
case come from? The prevailing view is that it reflects a colonial
heritage, the jury's right (not just its power) to determine the
law and the facts in a criminal case. The historical evidence re-
viewed in this paper, however, shows that Howe was far closer to
the truth when he acknowledged knowing very little about co-
lonial criminal jury practice. The truth is that, for the most
part, we just don't know whether, when, or where colonial
criminal juries had the authority to judge the law. It seems rea-
sonably clear that they had no such right in mid-eighteenth cen-
tury Georgia, seventeenth and (at least) early eighteenth-
century Maryland, and in Massachusetts on the eve of Inde-
pendence. On the other hand, it appears equally obvious that
criminal juries were acknowledged to have some form of law-
finding right in Rhode Island throughout the colonial period.
The rest (to varying degrees) is mystery.
The other grand division of power, is that of execution. And here the King
is by the constitution, supreme executor of the laws, and is always present in per-
son or by hisjudges, in his courts, distributingjustice among the people. But the
executive branch of the constitution, as far as respects the administration ofjus-
tice, has in it a mixture of popular power too. The judges answer to questions of
law: but no further. Were they to answer to questions of fact as well as law, being
few they might be easily corrupted .... But by the British constitution, ad ques-
tionemrfacti respondentjuratores, the jurors answer to the question of fact. In this
manner the subject is guarded, in the execution of the laws. The people choose
a grand jury to make inquiry and presentment of crimes. Twelve of these must
agree in finding the Bill. And the petit jury must try the same fact over again,
and find the person guilty before he can be punished.... So it is also in the trial
of causes between party and party: No man's property or liberty can be taken
from him, till twelve men in this Neighborhood, have said upon oath, that by
laws of his own making it ought to be taken away, i.e., that the facts are such as to
fall within such laws.
John Adams, Clarendon to William Pym, in 1 PAPERS OFJOHN ADAMS 168-69 (RobertJ.
Taylor, et al. eds., 1977). Moreover, in light of these comments, the gravamen of the
jury-related grievance noted in the famed Instructions of the Town of Braintree, see
John Adams, Instructions to Braintree's Representative Concerning the Stamp Act, in id, at
138, 141, which Adams claimed to have written, see Editorial Note, in id., at 129-32,
would appear to have been that the Stamp Act's grant of authority to Admiralty
judges to determine the facts as well as the law in enforcement actions violated this
separation of powers doctrine. Of course, it is possible that Adams' views, or their po-
litical acceptability, may have changed between the mid-1760s and the appeal in Gill
and Mein. But we must also consider the possibility that they hadn't.
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Nonetheless, given the current debate about jury nullifica-
tion, in which historical claims have so prominent a place,393 it is
important to note another salient fact about the evidence exam-
ined in this article. Although that evidence includes statements
by judges, lawyers, jurors, litigants, and others asserting that
criminal juries had the right to determine what the law was, I
have found no evidence that anyone claimed that these juries
had the right to ignore what they deemed the applicable law.
While it is possible that the latter right was recognized but that
its recognition is completely hidden from our view by a univer-
sal conspiracy of silence,39 it seems much more likely that this
silence betokens the absence of any sense that such a right ex-
isted. That would also explain the behavior of jurors in cases
like the pirate Connor, Joseph Watson, John Elkins, John Baker,
and alderman John Hutchins. 95 It would also be consistent with
the fact that, even in radical Rhode Island, criminal juries took
an oath to decide cases "according to Law and Evidence."96 And
it would suggest that the prevailing wisdom to the contrary is
wrong.
To the extent that the conventional wisdom about this, or
any other form of jury lawfinding authority is unsupported by
the evidence, so are constitutional and tradition-based argu-
ments founded thereon. However, even if we knew that Massa-
393 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
"3 Cf United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1117, 1130-37 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (affirming trial court's refusal to allow argument or give instruction on jury's
prerogative to nullify law, in part because general knowledge of this prerogative
makes its in-court acknowledgement unnecessary).
'"" See supra text accompanying note 116; notes 118-27 and accompanying text;
notes 148-60 and accompanying text; text accompanying notes 197-99; note 268.
"' See supra note 315 (emphasis added). Similarly, in Pennsylvania, where criminal
juries were still given the traditional English oath, see supra text accompanying note
391, it was said that the law was part of the evidence in accordance with which juries
were to decide a criminal case. See Untitled Manuscript (Historical Society of Penn-
sylvania, Yeates Collection, Misc. Legal Papers 1773-1776, folder 3) ("Law as Part of
the Evidence to Jury"). Also see King v. Morrison (1778) (Historical Society of Penn-
sylvania, Yeates Collection, Misc. Legal Papers 1773-1776, folder 2) (notes including
remark of trial counsel that "Consequences of Conviction out of the Question with
Respect to the Jury-They are on Oath & must follow the Dictates of the Law"), and 1
THE PUBuC STATUTE LAws OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 537 & n.11 (1808) (oath for
petit jurors in criminal cases, first embodied in statute in 1672 and retained in the
Code, to decide cases "according to your evidence, and the law of this State.").
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chusetts and Rhode Island were the only colonies that had any
real law or practice on the jury's lawfinding prerogative on the
eve of the Revolution and that they had (respectively) rejected
and recognized some such right, the question of origins would
not be moot: the same consequences would ensue if a lawfind-
ing right had become an accepted part of American law before
the adoption of the Sixth Amendment in 1791 .l Naturally, the
conventional wisdom posits that such a right was generally ac-
cepted during that period as well. But is its rejection of this as-
pect of Howe's agnosticism more justified than its position on
the jury's authority in colonial times? If so, which prerogatives
did this lawfinding right entail? 98 For now, these important
questions must remain unanswered .3
" Rhode Island didn't send delegates to the Philadelphia Convention, see MAX
FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSMrUTON OF THE UNnIED STATES 11-12 (1962), or
the First Congress, see CRFATJNG TBE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM
THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS xvi (Helen E. Veit, et al. eds., 1991), so it would have
been in no position directly to influence the drafting of Article III or the Sixth
Amendment.
" See supra text accompanying note 12; note 49.
-9 See supra note 47.
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